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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This thesis examines the formation of international climate agreements (ICAs) in a game-theoretic 
framework. I analyse strategic behaviour of a number of regions or countries in the world (hereafter 
referred to as regions) to reduce CO2 emissions. In the application, I use data that reflect regional 
characteristics, such as costs and benefits of emission abatement1, and this enables me to explore the 
regional incentives for signing an ICA. This research was carried out in the context of the STACO 
project2 at Wageningen University.  
This introductory chapter commences with the research background and a very brief assessment of 
the current major scientific insights into global warming, and provides a literature review on the 
analysis of ICAs. This is followed by the problem definition, the objectives and novel contributions of 
the thesis, the research questions and the methodologies used. Finally, an outline of the thesis is 
presented. 
1.1. Background of the global warming issue 
Global warming has been considered one of the major environmental challenges that the world is 
facing to date. The Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) states Warming of the climate system is unequivocal by quoting the observation of 
changes in the climate system, such as rise in the global average surface temperature and global 
average sea level (IPCC, 2007a). The global average surface temperature has increased by about 
0.74 ± 0.18 °C over the period 1906 to 2005, and global average sea level has risen by 3.1 ± 0.7 mm 
per year from 1993 to 2003 (IPCC, 2007a). Furthermore, AR4 shows that precipitation increased 
                                                 
1 We refer to emission abatement as abatement throughout this thesis. 
2 STACO stands for STAbility of COalitions. The STACO project has first been initiated in 2002 by Prof. E.C. 
van Ierland, Wageningen University, the Netherlands, and Dr. M. Finus, now at the University of Exeter, U.K. 
The project is maintained by the Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group of Wageningen 
University. For more information, see http://www.enr.wur.nl/UK/staco/. 
 2 
considerably over the period from 1900 to 2005 in eastern parts of North and South America, northern 
Europe and northern and central Asia, while it declined in the Sahel, the Mediterranean, southern 
Africa and parts of southern Asia. There is associated observable evidence of extreme climate events, 
such as tropical cyclones and increase in the frequency of hot days and heat waves (IPCC, 2007a). The 
main cause of global warming is considered to be greenhouse gas forcing over the last 50 years and it 
is very likely that human activities, such as burning of fossil fuels, significantly contributed to the 
rise in temperature over the last 50 years (IPCC, 2001; IPCC, 2007a).  
In the absence of additional climate policy, the baseline global emissions of greenhouse gases 
(GHGs)3 are projected to increase by values in the range between 9.7 Gigaton of carbon dioxide-
equivalent (GtCO2-eq) and 36.7 GtCO2-eq (25% - 90%) between 2000 and 2030 (IPCC, 2000; IPCC, 
2007b). Especially, the fossil fuel originated CO2 emissions are projected to grow by any rate between 
40% and 110% from 2000 to 2030 (IPCC, 2007b). As CO2 is treated as one of the major GHGs4, I will 
focus on CO2 emissions throughout the thesis.  
To tackle the problem of global warming, the Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997. It mandated that 
by the period from 2008 to 2012, Annex I countries (composed of developed countries and economies 
in transition) should reduce their GHGs emissions by approximately 5% compared to their 1990 
levels. Annex I countries have initiated their climate change programmes in order to meet their targets. 
The Protocol came into force in 2005, although the U.S.A., one of the major emitters of CO2, had not 
ratified the Protocol. Controlling CO2 emission encompasses the characteristics of a public good5. 
Benefits derived from abatement by one region are freely available to other countries (non-
excludability) and the benefits enjoyed by one region do not diminish the benefits that other countries 
may obtain (non-rivalry). These features give rise to a free-riding problem, a situation in which 
regions have few incentives to contribute to the protection of global commons, while they can enjoy 
benefits derived from abatement efforts by others. It has been widely acknowledged that cooperation 
on abatement is likely to be difficult to achieve, because of the existence of free-riding. The main 
obstacle to an implementation of a successful agreement is that the agreement must be ratified on a 
voluntary basis. There are no international institutions and international laws that implement binding 
ICAs for all countries involved. Thus, we have to rely on individual voluntary participation in an ICA. 
It remains a crucial research topic how such a voluntary agreement could be established and how 
regional incentives to participate in the agreement would change according to different forms and 
designs of the agreement. 
                                                 
3 Carbon dioxide (CO2), Methane (CH4), Nitrous oxide (N2O), Sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), Hydrofluorocarbons 
(HFCs) and Perfluorocarbons (PFCs) are the greenhouse gases listed in Kyoto Protocol (United Nations, 1998). 
4 The share of global mean radiative forcing of GHGs stated in AR4 is about 63% (1.66 W m-2) for CO2, 18% 
(0.48 W m-2) for CH4, 6% (0.16 W m-2) for N2O, and 13% (0.34 W m-2) for Halocarbons (IPCC, 2007a). 
5 For the theory of public goods, see Cornes and Sandler (1996). 
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1.2. Literature review 
Game-theoretic approaches have been widely used to examine an interaction between countries in the 
negotiation on climate change, and have emphasised difficulties in designing such a voluntary 
agreement. A number of studies on ICAs have investigated the formation of climate coalitions in a 
theoretical framework with symmetric or asymmetric countries (e.g. Hoel, 1992; Barrett, 1994, 1997; 
Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Hoel and Schneider, 1997). These studies show that self-enforcing ICAs 
can be successful only when the difference between the non-cooperative outcome and the full-
cooperative outcome is sufficiently small. The studies with asymmetric countries reveal that it is hard 
to achieve self-enforcing agreements with a large number of signatories because of asymmetries 
among countries in the context of benefits and costs from abatement (Carraro, 1999). Other studies, 
such as Fankhauser and Kverndokk (1996), Tol (2001) and Finus et al. (2006) derive similar results 
from game-theoretic models with empirical inputs. There are substantially larger global net benefits 
achieved in the full-cooperative case than in the non-cooperative case, but some countries are worse 
off because they contribute more to reduce emissions than is in their own interest. This will eventually 
lead to free-riding. Given the fact that each regions net benefits derived from abatement depend 
heavily on the arrangements enacted by the ICAs and the design of mechanisms, ICAs should be 
individually rational (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Finus, 2002) for participants in the agreement, i.e. 
each member of an ICA is at least as well off as in the non-cooperative case.  
1.2.1. Transfer schemes 
To curtail the free-riding incentives, some of the policy regimes apply the concept of transfer schemes 
between countries in the form of side payments, emission permit trading or surplus sharing (e.g. 
Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Edmonds et al., 1995; Rose et al., 1998; Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus, 
2006; Weikard et al., 2006). Transfer schemes are especially suitable to compensate regions that 
contribute relatively more to abatement in the coalition, but that have relatively low benefits from 
abatement. Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) conclude in an analytical framework that transfer schemes 
may successfully increase the number of signatories. In a model with five asymmetric regions, Botteon 
and Carraro (1997) confirm the results obtained by Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) that ICAs can 
consist of at most three countries, and conclude that transfer schemes exist that may succeed in 
stabilising larger coalitions. Tol (2001) empirically investigates the impact of side payments and 
suggests that with side payments, the largest stable coalitions do not include either the large emitters 
or the most vulnerable countries from climate change.  
In the literature on coalition formation it has been shown that transfer schemes will be effective 
when regions have different structures of costs and benefits of abatement, and the design of the 
transfer schemes will highly affect the incentives to join the agreement. Both cost-effectiveness and 
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equity issues have been treated as focal points when abatement burdens are distributed among regions. 
Rose et al. (1998) investigate the impacts of rules for allocating emission permits on the abatement 
costs of achieving the targeted emission level. They categorise transfer schemes into two types: (i) 
allocation-based rules and (ii) outcome-based rules. In allocation-based rules, emission permits are 
initially distributed to the coalition members according to certain criteria. In outcome-based rules, on 
the other hand, net benefits from cooperative abatement efforts are distributed to the coalition 
members based on certain criteria. For allocation-based rules, such as permit trading, Altamirano-
Cabrera and Finus (2006) examine the impact of different allocation schemes on the success of ICAs, 
focusing on what they call pragmatic schemes and equitable schemes. In the pragmatic schemes, 
emission permits are allocated based on certain baseline emission levels, either in the form of Business 
as Usual (BAU) emissions or emissions in the absence of cooperation (Nash equilibrium)6. In the 
equitable schemes, emission permits are allocated by considering equity aspects, such as ability to pay 
for abatements, historical responsibility for accumulated emissions, and the level of technology. They 
conclude that pragmatic schemes perform better than equitable ones in terms of the success of self-
enforcing agreements. For outcome-based rules, Weikard et al. (2006) explore the impact of surplus 
sharing rules where net benefits from cooperating are distributed to the coalition members either on an 
equitable basis or on an emission basis. They find that equitable sharing rules are inferior to emission-
based sharing rules in terms of global net benefits of controlling climate change.  
The findings of previous studies, have established that the success of ICAs with transfer schemes 
largely depends on how emission permits or net benefits are allocated among coalition members. To 
improve the design of transfer further, another type of transfer scheme called optimal sharing has 
been explored. Optimal sharing, suggested by Carraro et al. (2006), McGinty (2007), Weikard (2009) 
and Fuentes-Albero and Rubio (2010), offers two main advantages. These are: (i) if the coalition 
payoff is sufficiently large and distributed in such a way that each member obtains at least its outside-
option payoff, no incentives to leave a given coalition remain and (ii) all coalitions that are possibly 
internally stable under some sharing rule are internally stabilised. By taking a systematic approach to 
examine the role of transfer schemes, Carraro et al. (2006) attests that an appropriate transfer scheme 
(optimal transfer scheme) can maximise cooperation on abatement. 
1.2.2. Technology spillovers 
Although well-designed transfer schemes are promising, full cooperation on abatement is still hard to 
attain. Another mechanism, known as issue linkage, that has been proposed may reduce incentives to 
                                                 
6 Under a Business as Usual (BAU) scenario, no additional climate policy or measure is taken for each region to 
abate emissions, while in a Nash equilibrium, each region chooses the best abatement strategy domestically, 
taking abatement in other countries as given. 
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free-ride and expand coalitions in the global warming game. Carraro (1999) suggests that the grand 
coalition seems to be unattainable if cooperation on emission reductions alone is considered in the 
negotiations. The main idea of issue linkage is that countries negotiate not only on emission 
reductions, but also negotiate on another economic issue, for instance on technology cooperation. 
Barrett (1997) proposes linking environmental negotiations to international trade negotiations. Carraro 
and Siniscalco (1997) show that the number of signatories may increase by linking the negotiation on 
abatement to the negotiation on R&D cooperation. They assume that signatories enjoy a larger degree 
of spillover from technological cooperation than singletons. Similarly, Kemfert (2004) combines 
cooperation on abatement and technological innovation to explore the possibility of inducing 
participation from non-cooperative countries, such as the USA. This approach suggests that an 
increase in R&D expenditures will lead to technological innovation through technology spillovers and 
an increase in energy efficiency through technology spillovers and trade in goods among signatories. 
Buonanno et al. (2003) define spillovers of knowledge which affect both the production function and 
the emission-output ratio. Similarly, Golombek and Hoel (2005) assume that the technology level of 
the region is determined by its own R&D investments and the investments of other signatories. It has 
been shown that the technology spillovers from other regions will increase productivity and lower 
emission intensities, or lower marginal abatement costs. 
1.2.3. Induced technological change 
There are a number of studies on technological change (TC) and its links to economic growth. In 
neoclassical theory, TC is treated as given and it is not driven by any market forces (Solow, 1957). 
Basically, technological change is considered to shift the production function which leads to a 
reduction in capital per unit of labour (e.g. Kennedy, 1962; Uzawa, 1965) or to an increase in total 
factor productivity (Arrow et al., 1961). In economy-environment models, prominent studies are by 
Peck and Teisberg (1994) and Nordhaus and Yang (1996) who numerically examine the optimal paths 
of emissions with exogenous TC. These studies do not fully explain the drivers of the steady-state7 
growth of the economy as the growth rate is exogenously given. A new strand of growth theory, which 
is sometimes called new growth theory (or endogenous growth theory), aims to answer questions 
about the drivers of technological improvement over time. New growth theory places more emphasis 
on the potential role of investment in new knowledge and effects of technological innovation that  
drives the economic growth (seminal studies are Lucas, 1988 and Romer, 1990). Concerning the 
definitions of endogenous TC and induced TC, Jaffe et al. (2001) point out that models of 
endogenous TC generally focus on neutral TC while models of induced TC analyse the direction of 
                                                 
7 This is a situation in which per capita production and per capita consumption are constant due to constant per 
capita stock of capital and constant per capita labour supply. 
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R&D investments. In this thesis, R&D investments determine the speed of TC, but not its direction. 
Technology is endogenously determined, following the definition by Jaffe et al. (2001). In economy-
environment models, endogenous TC can be specified in different ways to fit the purpose of the 
analysis (see Weyant and Olavson, 1999; Löschel, 2002; Clarke et al., 2006; Sue Wing, 2006 for 
excellent reviews). There are three main sources of TC: (i) R&D investments (e.g. Goulder and Mathai, 
2000; Buonanno et al., 2003), (ii) technology spillovers (e.g. Griliches, 1992; Bosetti et al., 2008), and 
(iii) learning by doing (e.g. Manne and Richels, 2004; Castelnuovo et al., 2005).  
Looking at an economy-environment model Goulder and Mathai (2000) theoretically and 
numerically examine the impact of knowledge accumulation through R&D investments and learning 
by doing to investigate the optimal timing of abatement. Their finding is that R&D investments will 
postpone the optimal timing of abatement. In an economy-environment model called R&DICE, 
Nordhaus (2002) incorporates an improvement in carbon intensity (CO2 emissions per unit of GDP) 
that is derived from technological change through R&D investments into the energy sector, leading to 
fewer emissions. He finds that the role of R&D on model results is somewhat limited.  
In a coalition formation game, Buonanno et al. (2003) employ an induced environmental TC model 
to study the stability of selective coalitions. Technological change through R&D investments will 
increase production and lower the emission-output ratio. Buonanno et al. (2003) conclude that the 
existence of induced environmental TC will lower the abatement costs much more than in the case of 
exogenous environmental TC. Among the studies focusing on regional incentives to participate in a 
climate coalition, Kemfert (2004) incorporates improvement in energy efficiency derived from R&D 
investments into her model, and concludes that incentives to join a coalition tend to be stronger if the 
agreement includes cooperation both on abatement and technological innovation, since the benefits are 
higher when technology cooperation is included.  
1.3. Problem definition  
Integrated assessment models (IAMs) are suitable for evaluating the optimal level of abatement by 
taking dynamic features of the global warming problem into consideration. The original model 
STACO-1 (Finus et al., 2006; the model will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2) entails important 
dynamic aspects of climate change; it assumes, however, that levels of annual abatement and thus also 
annual (undiscounted) abatement costs are constant over time, which indicates that the strategic timing 
of abatement efforts throughout the planning horizon is not adequately considered. The first problem 
to be dealt with is related to the implementation of dynamic aspect of abatement efforts. Since each 
regions abatement level differs from period to period by balancing benefits and costs of abatement, 
the model needs to be extended from a static setting to a dynamic setting to evaluate optimal 
abatement strategies over time. To compute optimal levels of abatement, all future impacts of 
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abatement should be considered. More precisely, the benefits at a current period should be influenced 
by both current abatement and past abatement. 
The second problem concerns the design of transfer schemes that influences incentives to cooperate 
on abatement. As discussed above, a number of studies have explored various flexible mechanisms to 
increase the environmental effectiveness and stimulate cooperation on global abatement. Some of the 
regimes apply transfer schemes to affect burden-sharing for abatement efforts among countries based 
on criteria such as equity or efficiency. In most of the studies transfer schemes for allocation of 
abatement burdens are based on a single year. In reality, abatement targets for Annex I countries in the 
Kyoto protocol are assigned according to the emission level in 1990. As Germain and Steenberghe 
(2003) pointed out, a grandfathering rule based on the emission level in 1990 does not always satisfy 
the individual rationality requirement along the time path. The static schemes do not take into account 
that the future growth paths of emissions are expected to diverge substantially between regions. This 
leads to assignments where historically large emitters obtain a relatively large share of the permits or 
surplus, while fast-growing developing countries, such as China or India, obtain relatively small 
shares, resulting in increasing burdens on these developing countries to reduce their emissions; an 
issue brought forward by many developing countries in their argumentation on why they do not agree 
on any reduction targets in the Kyoto protocol. To enhance participation of developing countries, some 
alternative allocation schemes are necessary to set incentives to join an agreement especially for those 
regions whose economies are expected to grow faster in the future. This problem can be solved by 
transfer schemes in which the allocation of emission permits generates benefits for these developing 
countries. 
The third problem to be considered is how different channels of technology spillovers and the level 
of a regions own technology influence incentives to cooperate. If we consider that knowledge is a 
pure public good, each region can freely enjoy the benefits of knowledge spillovers, which is modelled 
as a world stock of knowledge in the existing studies. However, if the linkage between cooperation 
on abatement and cooperation on technology makes the knowledge exclusive to coalition members, 
the spillovers should be treated as coalitional spillovers (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1997). Therefore, 
coalition members may benefit not only from the world stock of knowledge, but also from coalitional 
spillovers generated by cooperation. The question is: are those knowledge spillovers powerful enough 
to induce incentives to join the agreement.  
In addition, knowledge spillovers for environment-related technologies can be formulated in 
different ways, following studies on the provision of public goods (Hirshleifer, 1983; Holzinger, 2001; 
Sandler and Tschirhart, 1997; Sandler, 2006). These studies discuss the concept of an aggregation 
technology as one of the properties of public good besides non-rivalry and non-excludability. 
According to the definition by Sandler (2006), the aggregation technology, referred to as the social 
composition function by Hirshleifer (1983), indicates how individual contributions to the public good 
contribute to the overall quantity of the public good available for consumption (Sandler, 2006, p.9). 
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The ways of aggregation in the literature have been categorised according to the characteristics of the 
public good. If the contribution by one region is a perfect substitute for that of others, the total amount 
of the public good is defined as the sum of all regions contributions. On the other hand, if the 
contributions are not perfect substitutes, the total amount of the public good will depend on the 
smallest contribution (weakest-link) or the largest contribution (best-shot). The knowledge for 
environment-related technologies can be considered a regional public good when technology 
cooperation is established among countries located in that region. An important question is how the 
aggregation technology affects the incentives to join an agreement.  
As shown in Section 1.3, the drivers of TC and spillovers can be determined endogenously through 
R&D investments. The fourth problem relates to the driver of technological change and its impact on 
coalition formation. In most studies, knowledge spillovers have been defined as a certain rate of 
accumulated R&D investments summed over all (coalitional) regions. As the level of reduction of 
abatement costs with induced TC differs compared to the case of exogenous TC, the question is how 
R&D investments affect the success of an international agreement and how international cooperation 
on abatement may induce the incentives for countries to invest in R&D on abatement. 
Lastly, it has been widely recognised that one of the main determinants for the result of cost-benefit 
analysis is a discount rate. The choice of an appropriate discount rate used in the cost-benefit analysis 
has long been a controversial issue and has been ongoingly debated in literature on climate change as 
it is a question of value judgement regarding how to deal with the welfare of future generation (e.g. 
Weitzman, 1994; Azar and Sterner, 1996; Schelling, 1995; Weitzman, 2001). Weitzman (1998) shows 
the rationale behind the use of the lowest possible discount rate for activities or events in the far-
distant future. Given the fact that the far future has greater uncertainties about economic and non-
economic features such as the rate of economic growth, the level and rate of technological progress 
and the amount of capital accumulation compared to the near future, he proposes to use a declining 
discount rate over time and shows the certainty equivalent discount factor as a weighted average of a 
wide range of possible discount rates for the far future, which is proved to be equal to the lowest 
possible discount rate. This approach is called Hyperbolic discounting, supported by Cropper et al. 
(1994) and Henderson and Langford (1998). Weyant (2008) also proposes that the discount rate in the 
short term would be consistent with the market rate of interest, and the discount rate in the long term 
would consider the intergenerational equity. The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change 
(Stern, 2006) has drawn further attention on discounting in the context of climate change. A major 
criticism and suggestion for improvement on the Stern review is that the Stern Review applies a low 
rate of discount rate (e.g. Nordhaus, 2007; Tol and Yohe, 2006, 2009). The low discount rate will lead 
to the situation where benefits of taking early action of reduction outweigh the costs of reduction 
efforts. Nordhaus (2007) argues that discount rate should be consistent with the observed rate of return 
on capital, and Mendelsohn (2008) argues that low discount rates are equitable because that makes 
each generation equally worse off, as each generation is burdened by the following generations. 
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In this thesis, I do not put an emphasis on the choice of the discount rate, however, I conduct a 
sensitivity analysis with different discount rates by following the ongoing discussion by economists.  
1.4. Objectives and novel contributions 
This section presents the objectives of my analysis based on the problems defined above. The first 
purpose of the analysis of transfer schemes is to compare the impacts of different transfer schemes on 
the regional incentive structures and stability of climate coalitions. Following the categorisation by 
Rose et al. (1998), I begin by examining two types of transfer schemes: allocation-based and outcome-
based transfer schemes. For allocation-based schemes, I introduce a dynamic transfer scheme where 
the initial allocation for emission permits is based on future emissions paths rather than on (static) 
emissions in some initial years. I compare the impacts of two types of allocation for emission permits 
in the grandfathering schemes. Dynamic transfer schemes can overcome obstacles that occur under 
static transfer schemes and can, therefore, contribute to the stability of international climate 
agreements (cf. Böhringer and Lange, 2005). Under outcome-based rules, gains from cooperation are 
distributed among coalition members. It has been proven that outcome-based rules are superior to 
allocation-based rules in terms of stability (Weikard et al., 2006). Furthermore, although less plausible 
for practical implementation, transfer rules can be improved by introducing an optimal sharing rule 
where a coalition member can secure at least a payoff equivalent to his outside-option payoff. 
Therefore, the novel contributions of my analysis of transfer schemes are: (i) in the model with 12 
heterogeneous regions, I derive the optimal abatement levels each year and introduce dynamic transfer 
schemes where the initial allocations of the permits are based on the projections of emissions, and (ii) I 
conduct a systematic comparison of different transfer schemes.  
Secondly, the objective of the analysis of technology spillovers is to examine the implications of 
various technology spillover mechanisms on the formation and stability of climate coalitions. As 
shown briefly in Section 1.3, there are different channels through which technology spillovers affect 
incentives to cooperate. They are categorised into three types: (i) global spillovers from a world stock 
of knowledge, (ii) spillovers that are directly derived from participation in the agreement (coalitional 
spillovers) and (iii) spillovers to outsiders. I investigate the impacts of the different aggregation 
technologies on the success of a climate coalition. Furthermore, I examine how strongly technology 
spillovers affect stability by varying the relative magnitude of spillovers between coalition members 
and spillovers to outsiders.  
Finally, the objective of analysis on induced TC is to investigate how R&D influences the success 
of an international climate agreement and how international cooperation on abatement effort triggers 
R&D activities for signatories. The role of region-specific R&D investments in reducing abatement 
costs is examined by studying different scenarios in which no technological change, exogenous 
technological change and induced technological change are considered, respectively. From the 
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outcomes of the scenario analyses I can determine the impacts of endogenous technological change. 
Furthermore, I examine which mechanism of TC (exogenous or induced) dominates the other in 
successfully forming coalitions. 
Besides mitigation actions, adaptation to climate change is crucial to reduce the impacts of climate 
change and to strengthen resilience to the future climate impacts. The costs and benefits of adaptation 
have been investigated in the literature on climate change (e.g. De Bruin et al., 2009a; De Bruin et al., 
2009b). It should be noted that this thesis focuses on the benefits and costs of mitigation. In addition, 
this thesis focuses on CO2 emissions among GHG emissions due to the data availability and reliability 
for future emissions. 
1.5. Research questions and approaches 
To achieve the objectives of my research discussed above, I will deal with the following four research 
questions. 
Q1 How can I implement the dynamic aspects of abatement efforts and incentives to join an 
international climate agreement into an applied game-theoretical analysis and which stable 
coalitions would occur if no transfer scheme is considered? 
The first research question indicates how I obtain optimal strategies for abatement levels over time. I 
relax the assumption of constant abatement levels applied in the original version of STACO model 
(Dellink et al., 2004; Finus et al., 2006). 
Q2 How does the design of transfer schemes affect the stability of an international climate 
agreement? 
The second research question investigates the impacts of different designs of transfer schemes, which 
are pragmatic and optimal transfer schemes, on the stability of voluntary-based international 
climate agreement. Furthermore it tackles the current ineffective transfer schemes and considers how 
we can identify superior transfer schemes. To answer this question, I will examine dynamic transfer 
schemes and optimal transfers. These might overcome major obstacles in ICAs, and contribute to the 
stability of climate coalitions.  
Q3 How do different technology spillover mechanisms among regions influence the incentive 
structures to join and stabilise an international climate agreement? 
The third research question deals with the impacts of technology spillovers on coalition formation. It 
also explores how different channels of technology spillovers and specifications of aggregation of 
technology can affect the regional incentive structures. In addition, I will examine whether the net 
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benefits from technology spillovers are large enough to stabilise more ambitious coalitions by 
offsetting the incentives to free-ride. 
Q4 How do R&D investments influence the success of an international agreement on abatement 
and how does international cooperation on abatement induce incentives to carry out R&D 
investments that are socially optimal? 
Finally, the fourth research question indicates how R&D investments influence regional strategies for 
abatement and stability of climate coalitions. By extending the model with exogenous TC or 
technology spillovers to incorporate an induced TC, investigation of linking cooperation on abatement 
to technology cooperation will be further improved, since cooperation affects R&D investments.  
1.6. Methodology 
There are two approaches to policy evaluation. One is cost-effectiveness analysis that may be used to 
consider achieving a certain given climate target at minimum costs. The other is cost-benefit analysis 
where a social planner implements a welfare maximising climate target (optimal abatement levels). I 
follow the second approach throughout the following chapters where the abatement levels and other 
economic variables are optimally determined in our model. 
Regarding the first research question, I consider a two-stage, non-cooperative game of coalition 
formation. At the first stage, countries decide to join a coalition or not (membership of the coalition), 
and then at the second stage, those announcing to join the coalition implement their jointly optimal 
abatement levels over the planning horizon. The abatement strategies are based on the payoff function 
of each region. I derive optimal abatement paths over time by building the STACO-2.1 model, a 
combined game-theoretic and integrated assessment model in a dynamic setting, that is an updated and 
dynamic extension of the STACO-1 model described in Finus et al. (2006). This will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter 2. All research questions will be answered by using this STACO-2.1 model. With 
regard to the stability concept, I follow the standard concept of stability applied in a non-cooperative 
game: internal stability and external stability, originally defined by dAspremont et al. (1983). If a 
coalition structure satisfies both internal and external stability, it is called stable. In the thesis, I apply 
the concept of open membership where there is no restriction for new members, because it seems in 
line with the current procedures of the Kyoto protocol and previous analysis has suggested that the 
role of restricted membership is limited (e.g. Finus et al., 2005).  
So far, little systematic work has been done on the interaction between coalition formation and 
optimal abatement paths, and on testing the stability of all partial coalitions theoretically and 
empirically. In the framework of a non-cooperative game, Tol (2001) tested stability for all possible 
coalitions, applying a fixed path of abatement instead of deriving the optimal abatement path. In the 
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framework of a cooperative game with a dynamic, multi-regional integrated assessment model, 
Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003) calculated the optimal path of abatement and aggregated discounted 
welfare for each region. STACO-2.1 is capable of identifying the regional optimal abatement paths 
based on the stream of benefits and costs of abatement. As each regions abatement strategy depends 
on its abatement costs and benefits in each period, each region can simultaneously decide by what 
amount its CO2 emissions should be reduced and when. I assume that undiscounted benefits in each 
period depend not only on current abatement but also on abatement in previous periods through 
reduced concentrations of CO2 and correspondingly lower damage levels. The model calculates related 
economic variables such as benefits, abatement costs and payoffs per year.  
Regarding the second research question, I incorporate an emission trading system in the model to 
allow for transfers among regions in the coalition. The annual transfer schemes, referred to as 
dynamic transfer schemes, which are based on expected paths of emissions, can overcome obstacles  
associated with grandfathered emission permits and can therefore contribute to the stability of 
international climate agreements. In Chapter 3, I investigate the implications of a dynamic transfer 
scheme and take further steps to examine the stability of all possible climate coalitions. Firstly, I focus 
on the transfer scheme that distributes permits in proportion to emissions. This allocation scheme is 
presented in the Kyoto protocol as Grandfathering where the allocation of permits is based on the 
historical emissions of each region. To take the future growth of emissions in developing countries 
into account, I implement a dynamic transfer scheme that bases the distribution of emission permits on 
the whole path of reference emissions. Then, I investigate the implication of outcome-based transfer 
schemes that distribute the gains from cooperation among signatories in such a way that the share of 
coalition surplus is distributed proportional to initial and future emissions. Finally, the optimal sharing 
rule is applied. 
To answer the third research question, I extend the STACO-2.1 model in Chapter 4 by embedding 
different types of technology spillovers in the abatement cost function. Basically, technology 
spillovers are assumed to create an externality to a region by reducing marginal abatement costs. 
Beside the different channels of technology spillovers discussed above, the size of spillovers depends 
on ICA membership and the nature of signatories in terms of their state of technology. Under a 
summation aggregation technology, the spillovers are assumed to be higher both when more regions 
are members of the coalition, and when regions with an advanced state of technology are members of 
the coalition. On the other hand, under a best-shot aggregation technology, technology spillovers are 
higher when the region with the most advanced technology is a member of the coalition, irrespective 
of the number of signatories. The state of technology is expressed by indicators, such as emissions, 
carbon intensity or energy intensity for each region. 
Regarding the fourth research question, I extend the model used in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 to 
determine the rate of TC endogenously by introducing R&D investment efforts in Chapter 5. The 
major difference from the analysis in previous chapters is that each region determines the optimal 
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strategy both for R&D investments and for abatement in the second stage. The stock of knowledge on 
abatement increases with R&D investments, which leads to lower abatement costs. The regional 
abatement cost functions are assumed to depend on two variables, abatement level and the stock of 
knowledge. Here I assume R&D investments are carried out by individual regions with no knowledge 
spillovers. I analyse the interaction between regional R&D investment efforts and cooperation on 
abatement in this setting. 
1.7. Outline of the thesis 
The remainder of this thesis comprises five chapters.  
Chapter 2 provides the basic structure of the STACO-2.1 model, composed of a game-theoretic 
framework and applied features, with specifications and calibrations of the functions used in the 
model. I report the base case of the simulation that will be used in the following chapters. To address 
the problem of uncertainty, I conduct a sensitivity analysis by changing crucial model parameters. The 
first two chapters together form the basis for the investigation of the individual research questions in 
the following three chapters. 
Chapter 3 investigates the features of a dynamic transfer scheme where the distribution of emission 
permits is based on the whole path of reference emissions. I analyse the impact of implementing 
dynamic transfer schemes on the stability of coalitions in the dynamic setting presented in Chapter 2. 
The model incorporates several transfer schemes, based on different allocation rules, such as surplus 
sharing and optimal sharing rules. Results are discussed for each transfer scheme. 
Chapter 4 presents the model extended with technology spillovers both between coalition members 
and between the coalition and outsiders. Additional simulations are constructed to explore the impacts 
of alternative specifications of technology in terms of who generates and receives the spillovers, the 
aggregation and indicators of the technology, and the related impacts on the marginal abatement costs. 
Chapter 5 examines the impacts of R&D investments on regional incentives to join the agreement. I 
extend the model used in previous chapters 2, 3, 4 to implement the development of TC through R&D 
investments. 
Finally, Chapter 6 provides a summary and the main conclusions of the research. All research 
questions defined in Chapter 1 will be answered in brief. Implications for policy and further research 
will be discussed. 
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical & empirical background of STACO-2.1 
2.1. Extension of the original STACO model (STACO-1) 
This chapter presents the theoretical and empirical background of the STACO model in a dynamic 
setting, STACO-2.1. The STACO model is a combined game-theoretic and integrated assessment 
model created to examine the formation and stability of international climate agreements. The model 
is a tool for analysing which coalitions are stable and which kinds of mechanisms can increase 
incentives to cooperate on reduction of CO2 emissions. The STACO model captures interactions 
between countries and the effects their abatement strategies have on the stock of CO2 in the 
atmosphere. Each countrys payoff from abatement is assessed for each coalition structure, based on 
regional benefits (avoided damages) and costs from abatement. The original STACO model (STACO-
1) as introduced by Finus et al. (2006) and described in detail by Dellink et al. (2004) has been used to 
investigate several research topics such as membership rules (Finus et al., 2005), multiple coalition 
formation (Sáiz et al., 2006), transfer schemes (Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus, 2006; Weikard et al., 
2006), and stability likelihood of coalition under uncertainty (Dellink et al., 2008b).  
In STACO-1 it is assumed that the level of annual abatement and annual undiscounted abatement 
costs are constant over time. In a model including discounting and a stock pollutant, however, a 
constant abatement path will generally be inefficient. Therefore we have constructed a model for the 
stability of coalitions, STACO-2.1, that represents a Ramsey-type dynamic extension of the STACO-1 
model. STACO-2.1 identifies the regional dynamically optimal abatement paths based on the 
discounted future stream of benefits and costs of abatement. As each regions strategy choice depends 
on its abatement costs and benefits (avoided damages) in each period, each region can simultaneously 
decide how much CO2 emissions should be reduced and when. As we deal with a stock pollutant we 
assume that undiscounted benefits in each period depend not only on current abatement but also on 
abatement in previous periods through reduced concentrations of CO2 and correspondingly lower 
damage levels. The model includes economic variables, such as benefits, abatement cost and payoffs 
(expressed yearly) and the corresponding discounted aggregates. We consider 12 heterogeneous 
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regions in the model which have individual abatement strategies. We calculate the optimal abatement 
level each year and check the stability of the coalition over the time horizon of the model. Our analysis 
is thus based on a one-shot game through considering the total discounted payoffs. We focus on the 
individual strategic behaviour for reducing emissions at the moment of the negotiation, taking future 
impacts into consideration. In this thesis, renegotiations, multiple deviations and multiple coalitions 
are abstracted from the analysis.  
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 provides the game theoretical framework of the 
model. Section 2.3 presents the calibration of the equations used in the model. In Section 2.4 the 
general features of the model are discussed. Section 2.5 reports the main results for benchmark 
scenarios without any transfer schemes and technology spillover effects. Results of the sensitivity 
analysis are presented in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 concludes. 
2.2. Theoretical background of STACO-2.1 
We consider a two-stage, non-cooperative game of coalition formation. Countries or regions 
(hereinafter referred to as regions) are denoted by Ni ,...,1= . At the first stage, regions decide to join a 
coalition or not (membership decision). Regions announcing not to join a coalition, the non-
signatories, remain singleton players, and those announcing to join, the signatories, form a unique 
coalition. In our model, which comprises twelve regions, we can obtain 4084 ( 122 -12) different 
coalition structures. Coalitions with only one member are not effective. At the second stage, regions 
adopt their abatement strategies over the planning horizon T . The strategies are based on the 
following payoff function ( π ): 
{ } { }
1 1
π ( ) (1 ) ( ( ) ( )) (1 ) ( )
T
t t
i it it i it
t t T
r b c r b
∞
− −
= = +
= + ⋅ − + + ⋅∑ ∑q q q q  Ni∈∀    (2.1) 
where the model horizon accounting for future benefits is infinity, r  is the discount rate on the payoff, 
and q  is an abatement matrix of dimension N × T 1. itb  is a concave benefit function of past and 
current global abatement and itc  is a strictly convex abatement cost function of regional current 
abatement given per region and time period. Benefit and abatement cost functions are specified in 
detail in Section 2.3. The infinite horizon for benefits from abatement ensures a proper reflection of 
the long-term aspects of climate change, while the period for which the international agreement holds 
(the planning horizon) is limited. Essentially, in 2010 ( t =0) the signatories strike an agreement that 
sets their abatement path until 2110 (T =100), while taking into account all future benefits and costs 
                                                 
1 We adopt the common notation where subscripts are dropped to denote aggregation over that index. 
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from that abatement path. We calculate the optimal abatement paths over the planning horizon. The 
abatement strategy space for each region is defined as [ ]itit eq ,0∈ , where ite  denotes regional 
emission levels in the business-as-usual scenario with no abatement. Note that benefits for each region 
depend on aggregate global emission reductions and that abatement costs depend on the regional 
emission reduction.  
Following Bloch (1997), we assume that signatories and singletons play a Nash equilibrium with 
regard to their abatement strategies, which is also called a Partial Agreement Nash Equilibrium 
(PANE) between signatories and singletons (Chander and Tulkens, 1995, 1997). Non-signatories 
choose their abatement level by maximising their own payoffs, taking the other regions abatement 
levels as given. On the other hand, signatories choose the abatement levels that maximise the sum of 
the payoffs of the signatories, taking the abatement levels of non-signatories as given. We call a 
situation where none or just one of the regions signs the agreement All Singletons and the coalition 
of all regions the Grand Coalition. In the Grand Coalition, the highest global abatement levels and 
payoffs are obtained, as all externalities of abatement are taken into account. We call a coalition 
{ }NK ,...,1⊆  stable, if the coalition satisfies both internal and external stability. Internal stability of 
a coalition requires that no signatories have an incentive to withdraw from the coalition as a lower 
payoff is obtained by changing their strategies to not join the coalition. Similarly, external stability of 
a coalition means an equilibrium where no non-signatories have an incentive to participate in the 
coalition as a lower payoff is achieved by changing their strategies to join a coalition. In the definition 
of external stability, it is implicitly assumed that non-signatories can join the coalition freely whenever 
they can obtain the higher payoffs by joining the coalition, without the approval of other signatories. 
We call this stability under open membership 2  (cf. Finus et al., 2005). Although different 
membership rules as described in Finus et al. (2005) are available as a choice in the STACO 
simulations, in this thesis we apply the concept of open membership, mainly because it seems in line 
with the procedures of the Kyoto protocol.  
2.3. Calibration of STACO-2.1 
In this section, we explain the specification and calibration of the equations used in our model, which 
we label STACO-2.1; the full model description is given in Appendix 2A. The model is an update and 
extension of the original STACO-1 model, described in Dellink et al. (2004) and Finus et al. (2006). 
We consider twelve world regions; USA (USA), Japan (JPN), European Union-15 (EU15), other 
OECD countries (OOE), Eastern European countries (EET), former Soviet Union (FSU), energy 
exporting countries (EEX), China (CHN), India (IND), dynamic Asian economies (DAE), Brazil 
                                                 
2 An alternative membership rule is called exclusive membership, see Finus et al. (2005). 
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(BRA) and the rest of the world (ROW). We set the model horizon which accounts for benefits from 
abatement to infinity, but adopt a shorter planning horizon of 100 years, ranging from 2011 to 2110 (t 
= 1,,100), for determining abatement levels 3. Together, this ensures a proper reflection of the 
intertemporal aspects of climate change, while the period for which the international agreement holds 
is limited. Essentially, in 2010, the signatories reach an agreement that sets their abatement paths until 
2110, while taking into account all future benefits and costs from these abatement paths. 
2.3.1. Emissions 
In contrast to STACO-1, we use data for CO2 emission projections derived from the EPPA model 
(Paltsev et al., 2005) to calibrate the regional Business As Usual (BAU) emission paths4 ( ite ) with no 
abatement effort from 2010 ( 0t ) to 2110 in our model expressed as:  
{ }0
a c
1 exp(b ( d ))
i
it i
i i
e
t t
= +
+ ⋅ + −
,    (2.2) 
where a, b, c, and d are parameters. Details of this approximation are given in Appendix 2B. Table 2.1 
shows each regions average emission growth rate from 2010 to 2110.  
Table 2.1: Average emission growth rate from 2010 to 2110 
Region Average emission growth rate (%) 
USA 1.35 
JPN 1.01 
EU15 1.13 
OOE 1.46 
EET 1.19 
FSU 0.93 
EEX 1.12 
CHN 1.27 
IND 1.58 
DAE 1.09 
BRA 1.21 
ROW 1.17 
In terms of the reference projections, absolute values of emission and average growth rates are 
substantially larger for USA and China than for other regions. India also has a high average emission 
                                                 
3 In general, these future benefits also depend on future abatement. However, in this application, such an 
assumption is not necessary due to the constant marginal benefits assumed. 
4 We use data from World Bank (2003) to match the regional aggregation in EPPA to STACO. 
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growth rate (1.58%) over the planning horizon. The growth rate (but not the emission levels) will 
reach their peaks for China and India around 2020 and for USA, Japan and EU15 around 2040, and 
their emissions will stabilise in later decades. 
2.3.2. Stock of CO2 
We adopt the original version of the DICE model developed by Nordhaus (1994) as the basis for stock 
of CO2 in our model. The DICE model relates to CO2 emissions (BAU emission minus abatement 
level) to the stock of CO2. The annual stock of CO2 is a function of the past stock of CO2 and the 
annual global emission level from 0t =2010 up to period t . In Eq. (2.3) the stock of CO2 is composed 
of three elements. The first term is the pre-industrial stock of CO2 ( M ), which is equal to 590 GtC. 
This pre-industrial stock of CO2 is assumed to be an equilibrium, which implies that natural emissions 
equal natural decay at that level of stock. The second term reflects the excess amount of stock of CO2 
in 2010 compared to the pre-industrial level, which decays with a constant annual rate δ =0.00866. 
The last term is the sum of global emissions after abatement from 2011 to the year t . Some fraction of 
the annual emissions during the period remains in the atmosphere at the end of the period at a constant 
rate ω=0.64 and the rest of the emissions decays over time with the rate δ . 
Then, the stock of CO2 in the atmosphere in period t  can be described by the following equation: 
( )
01
1 1
( ,..., ) (1 δ) ( ) 1 δ ω ( )
t n
t st
t t t is is
s i
M q q M M M e q−
= =
⎛ ⎞
= + − ⋅ − + − ⋅ ⋅ −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑   (2.3) 
The dynamics of the stock of CO2 can be written as a difference equation: 
1 1
1
( , ) (1 δ) ( ) ω ( )
n
t t t t it it
i
M M q M M M e q− −
=
= + − ⋅ − + ⋅ −∑     (2.4) 
The stock of CO2 in 2110 with no abatement efforts is projected to be 1,493 GtC, in line with the 
projections of the original version of DICE (Nordhaus, 1994); the associated concentration level of 
CO2 equals 700 ppm. 
2.3.3. Damages 
To derive the damage function applied to our model, we first look at the damage function in the DICE 
model. The increase in the temperature causes damage by the following equation (Nordhaus, 1994): 
t
t
Dt y
T
d ⋅⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎣
⎡Δ⋅=
2
3
γ ,         (2.5) 
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where td  denotes global damages in billion US$, Dγ  represents the impact on GDP due to the 
increase in temperature of 3 Co , tTΔ  is the increase in global temperature, and ty  gives global GDP. 
As we need to relate the stock of CO2 to the damages, we follow the climate module by Germain and 
Van Steenberghe (2003), where the stock of CO2 influences the global temperature with regard to pre-
industrial temperature as follows: 
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
⋅=Δ
M
M
T tt lnη          (2.6) 
where η  is an exogenous parameter. We substitute Eq. (2.6) into (2.5) to obtain the global damages as 
a function of the stock of CO2 as follows: 
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η         (2.7) 
In the DICE model, it is assumed that a doubling of the stock leads to increase in global temperature 
by 3 degrees Celsius. Then, Eq. (2.6) reads  )2ln(3 ⋅=η  and   
)2ln(
3
=η . The damage function is thus 
described by the following equation: 
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⎝
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⋅=        (2.8) 
where Dγ  represents impact on GDP due to a doubling of the stock by the definition in Eq. (2.5). We 
apply the estimate by Tol (1997) that damage costs amount to 2.7% of GDP for a doubling of 
concentrations over pre-industrial levels, that is, Dγ = 0.027.  
Global GDP growth is modelled as an annual incremental increase that is equivalent to about 2.3% 
of the global GDP in 2010. We follow Nordhaus (1994) and Germain and Van Steenberghe (2003) 
and approximate the climate system by a linear system of three equations (for concentrations, radiative 
forcing and atmospheric temperature increase, respectively) and ignore the non-linear feedbacks 
between the atmosphere and the oceans. Thus, we can calculate damages as a linear function of 
accumulated past and current abatement, which is required to ensure dominant strategies for our 
regions. Then, the linearised damage function is: 
 )γ(γγ 21 tD
t
t yM
M
d ⋅⋅⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛⋅+=        (2.9) 
where 1γ  and  2γ  are estimated by OLS-regression (Dellink et al., 2004). 
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2.3.4. Regional disaggregation of the benefits 
We assume that global benefits tb  from abatement are defined as avoided damages as follows: 
)),...(())0((),...,( 11 ttttttt qqMdMdqqb −= .               (2.10) 
Global benefits with numerical specification are described in Appendix 2C. Global benefits are 
allocated to each region according to the share iθ  based on the estimates by Fankhauser (1995) and 
Tol (1997). Their absolute numbers and the associated shares are represented in Table 2.2 and Table 
2.3. 
Table 2.2: Distribution of annual damage costs over different regions in absolute amounts 
and shares according to Fankhauser (1995) 
Region Fankhauser (1995) Billion US$ (%) 
USA 61.0 (22.6%) 
European Union 63.6 (23.6%) 
Other OECD 55.8 (20.7%) 
Former Soviet Union 18.2   (6.8%) 
China 16.7   (6.2%) 
Rest of the world 54.2 (20.1%) 
World 269.5 (100%) 
Subtotal OECD 180.4(66.9%) 
Subtotal non-OECD 89.1 (33.1%) 
Table 2.3: Distribution of annual damage costs over different regions in absolute amounts 
and shares according to Tol (1997) 
Region Tol (1997) Billion US$ (%) 
OECD-America 68.4 (13.1%) 
OECD-Europe 35.3   (6.7%) 
OECD-Pacific 62.9 (12.0%) 
Other Europe -11.6  (-2.2%) 
Middle East 15.9   (3.0%) 
Latin America 109.9 (21.0%) 
South & Southeast Asia 134.3 (25.6%) 
Centrally planned Asia 69.6 (13.3%) 
Africa 39.1   (7.5%) 
World 523.8 (100%) 
Subtotal OECD 166.6 (31.8%) 
Subtotal non-OECD 357.2 (68.2%) 
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Comparing the numbers of Fankhauser and Tol is not straightforward. For instance, Fankhausers 
numbers are based on purchasing-power-parity exchange rates, while Tol uses market exchange rates. 
Moreover, the categorisation in regions varies significantly between Fankhauser and Tol. For instance, 
Tol provides numbers for USA and Canada together, while Fankhauser puts Canada in the category 
Other OECD. Therefore, it was unavoidable to make some ad-hoc decisions. Two alternative sets of 
regional shares were constructed. The first alternative (STACO calibration I) is primarily based on 
the estimates of Fankhauser, which have relatively high shares of the OECD regions and relatively low 
shares of the non-OECD regions. As Fankhauser does not provide information for all regions in the 
STACO model, some additional assumptions have to be made. The second (STACO calibration II), 
is based as far as possible on Tols estimates; again additional assumptions are required. The resulting 
calibrated absolute regional damage costs and the associated shares for both calibration alternatives 
are given in Table 2.4 and will be discussed below. 
Table 2.4: Distribution of annual damage costs over different regions in absolute amounts 
and shares according to the two calibration alternatives 
Region 
STACO calibration I 
Billion US$ ((%) = 100θ ⋅i ) 
STACO calibration II 
Billion US$ ((%) = 100θ ⋅i ) 
USA 61.0 (22.6%) 64.8 (12.4%) 
JPN 46.5 (17.3%) 59.6 (11.4%) 
EU15 63.6 (23.6%) 33.5  (6.4%) 
OOE 9.3  (3.5%) 8.7  (1.7%) 
EET 3.5  (1.3%) 6.8  (1.3%) 
FSU 18.2  (6.7%) 18.2  (3.5%) 
EEX 8.1  (3.0%) 15.9  (3.0%) 
CHN 16.7  (6.2%) 32.5  (6.2%) 
IND 13.4  (5.0%) 89.5 (17.1%) 
DAE 6.7  (2.5%) 44.8  (8.5%) 
BRA 4.1  (1.5%) 27.5  (5.2%) 
ROW 18.3  (6.8%) 122.0 (23.3%) 
World 269.4 (100%) 523.8 (100%) 
Subtotal OECD 180.4 (66.9%) 166.6 (31.8%) 
Subtotal non-OECD 89.1 (33.1%) 357.2 (68.2%) 
In STACO calibration I, the data for USA are directly taken from Fankhauser. Damages for JPN 
are disaggregated from OOE assuming five times as much damage in Japan as in the other countries 
(roughly based on the share of Japan in total GDP of OOE+JPN). For EU15, the European Union 
estimate of Fankhauser is used. The damages for OOE are 1/6th of Fankhausers estimate for Other 
OECD. The total damages in the OECD for STACO calibration I match Fankhauser: 180.4 billion 
US$. 
For EET, no damage estimate is available. Based on the share of this region in global GDP, we 
assume the damage share of this region to be 1.3% of global damages. Fankhauser provides an 
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estimate for FSU that can be directly used. The estimate of the damage share for EEX is based on 
Tols estimate for Middle East, 3.0%, as Fankhauser does not provide an estimate. The absolute level 
of damages for this region is calculated using this share of 3% in global damages. The value for CHN 
is directly taken from Fankhauser. For the last four regions, IND, DAE, BRA and ROW, Fankhauser 
does not provide sufficient regional information. To match global damages with Fankhausers estimate, 
the sum of the damages for these four regions have to equal 42.5 billion US$. These damages are 
attributed to the four separate regions using their relative shares calculated in the STACO calibration 
II as discussed below. 
In STACO calibration II, the estimates of Tol are the basis for our numbers. Tol provides estimates 
for Northern America (USA and Canada), a wider range of countries in Europe and Pacific OECD 
countries. The shares for USA, JPN and EU15 are derived by rescaling Tols estimates such that total 
OECD damages equal 166.6 billion US$. The share of STACO region OOE is taken from the first 
calibration alternative and equals 5.2% of total OECD damages. The calibration of EET in alternative 
II is based on the same assumption as in alternative I: 1.3% of global damages. For FSU, the negative 
estimate of Tol is rejected and the absolute damage estimate of Fankhauser is used. The EEX estimate 
can be directly taken from Tol. For CHN, the share of the region in global damages is taken from 
calibration alternative I. Tols estimate for Asia is divided into two-thirds for IND and one-third for 
DAE. Tol gives damages for the whole of Latin-America, and we assume that the contribution of 
Brazil is 25% of that estimate. Finally, the share of ROW is calibrated such that the total damage 
estimate for non-OECD countries corresponds to that of Tol. Note that the share of this region is much 
higher than in Tols estimate, since in the STACO classification, ROW also includes all centrally 
planned Asian countries except China (i.e. Vietnam, Laos, Mongolia, North Korea) and all Latin-
American countries except Brazil. 
Then, regional benefits are defined as the share of the region times global benefits by the following 
equation: 
),...,(θ),...,( 11 ttitit qqbqqb ⋅= .              (2.11) 
For the base case, we apply Calibration I which implies relatively higher share for OECD regions, and 
relatively lower share for non-OECD regions. We conduct sensitivity analysis using Calibration II 
which implies lower share for OECD countries and higher share for India, dynamic Asian economies, 
Brazil and rest of the world.  
2.3.5. Abatement Costs 
We specify an abatement cost function following Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) curves in 2010 
generated by MITs Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model reported by Ellerman 
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and Decaux (1998). EPPA model incorporates two backstop technologies; however, those 
technologies are excluded when marginal abatement cost curves are calculated because these 
technologies are assumed not to play a role in 2010. To match our dynamic specification for the period 
2010-2110, in our model, we assume exogenous technological progress which is modelled as a 
reduction of current abatement costs at 0.5% annually ( ς =0.005) expressed as follows: 
23 )ς1(β
2
1)ς1(α
3
1)( it
t
iit
t
iitit qqqc ⋅−⋅⋅+⋅−⋅⋅=                            (2.12) 
where α  and β  are regional cost parameters described in Table 2B-3, Appendix 2B. The role of 
technological change is further explored in Chapter 4.  
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Figure 2.1: Undiscounted marginal cost curves in 2011 
Figure 2.1 represents undiscounted marginal cost curves in 2011. The USA and China have flatter 
marginal cost curves, which implies that those countries can reduce their emissions at a lower cost. On 
the other hand, Brazil and Japan have steeper marginal cost curves. Since we assume exogenous 
technological progress, each curve will move downward over time. 
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2.3.6. Objective function and derivation of optimal abatement 
We calibrate the objective function which is the payoff function for each region expressed in Eq. (2.1). 
Payoff for region i  in t  period, itπ , depends on the abatement path until t . We assume that marginal 
global benefits reflect all current and future benefits from abatement in period t , discounted back to 
period t . 
Next we calculate optimal abatement levels without cooperation and with cooperation. Regional 
abatement levels for each period are endogenously determined in the model by maximising the net 
present value (NPV) of the stream of payoffs. Each region has perfect foresight of the future and can 
plan its abatement path for the current and all future years within the planning period. Signatories 
choose the abatement levels that maximise the sum of their payoffs. The first order condition is given 
by 
)(),...,()1( 1 ititsjs
Kj ts
st qcqqbr ′=′⋅+∑∑
∈
∞
=
−                (2.13) 
where primes denote derivatives and K  denotes a coalition structure. 
Non-signatories choose the abatement levels that maximise their own individual payoff. By taking 
the derivative of the payoff function with regard to the abatement level in period t , the first order 
condition is derived as follows: 
  1(1 ) ( ,... ) ( )t s is s it it
s t
r b q q c q
∞
−
=
′ ′+ ⋅ =∑   Ki∉∀               (2.14) 
For the detailed derivation of optimal abatement, see Appendix 2C. 
2.4. General features of the STACO-2.1 
This section provides the general features of the STACO-2.1 model with regard to the game 
theoretical and the empirical aspects. Our specification of the regional benefit functions is linear in 
abatement, which leads to constant marginal benefits with regard to abatement (see Appendix 2C). 
The specification of regional marginal abatement cost is a quadratic function of a regions own 
abatement. Since marginal benefits are constant, they are independent of other regions abatements. 
Therefore, every region has a dominant abatement strategy. Thus, the optimal abatement strategy of 
some region can be determined regardless of those of other regions; see Eq. (2.13) and (2.14).  
When a region j  joins a coalition K , the aggregate payoff in the coalition including j  will be 
larger than the aggregate payoff in the coalition excluding j ,  plus the payoff of region j  in a 
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singleton structure (superadditivity) , π π πi j i
i K i K j∈ ∈ ∪
+ <∑ ∑ . However, individual payoffs do not always 
increase, and depend on the characteristics of the benefit and cost functions of both the region and the 
members of the coalition. Global payoff will increase as the number of signatories increases. When a 
region j  joins a coalition K , payoffs of regions outside the coalition will increase. Thus benefits 
from free-riding increase (positive spillovers).  
As discussed earlier, each region has constant marginal benefit and quadratic marginal cost. In a 
coalition, the burden of abatement and hence the distribution of the gains of cooperation do not only 
depend on coalition members characteristics, but also the non-signatories characteristics of both 
marginal benefits and marginal costs. Taking the example of a coalition composed of a region with 
high marginal benefits (MB) and high marginal costs (MC) and another region with a low MB and low 
MC. Figure 2.2 shows marginal benefits and marginal costs in 2011 for EU15 and China, respectively. 
Under All Singletons, the abatement level for EU15 is EUq  and for China is CHNq . Once both regions 
form a coalition, China with a flat MC function has to contribute more to abatement ( KCHNq ) than the 
EU15, which has a steeper MC function ( KEUq ). China with lower marginal benefits might be worse 
off than under All Singletons. Payoffs depend on the characteristics of MB and MC of both regions. 
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Figure 2.2: Marginal benefits and marginal costs in 2011 for EU15 and China in All 
Singletons and coalition of EU15 and China 
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2.5. Results of STACO-2.1 without transfer schemes  
In this section, we analyse the results for (i) the All Singletons coalition structure, (ii) the Grand 
coalition structure, and (iii) all stable coalition structures (if any)5. This case can serve as a suitable 
reference point for the analysis of the various mechanisms in the following chapters. We also test 
stability for each coalition that may arise from partial cooperation. As the payoff for each region 
depends on the shares of global benefits, iθ , the discount rate r  and the scale parameter of global 
damages, Dγ , and we have only imperfect information to calibrate these parameters, we conduct a 
sensitivity analysis in Section 2.6. 
2.5.1. All Singletons coalition structure 
Table 2.5 shows the results of the non-cooperative case where all players act as singletons. Under the 
All Singletons structure, marginal abatement costs equal marginal benefits for each region. The results 
for this case give good insights into the incentive structure of the different regions. The percentage of 
annual abatement compared to BAU emission tends to be decreasing over time and leads to a stock of 
CO2 of 1,448 GtC by the year 2110. This is about 1.7 times the stock level in 2010. 
Table 2.5: All Singletons structure 
Annual abatement 
(% of BAU 
emissions) 
Net present value (NPV) of 
payoff 
Marginal 
costs in 2011 
Marginal benefits 
from abatement in 
2011 Regions 
2011 2110 Billion US$ over 100 years US$/ton US$/ton 
USA 9.9 5.5 1,117 22.4 22.4
JPN 2.5 3.0 943 17.1 17.1
EU15 7.6 5.6 1,240 23.4 23.4
OOE 5.6 2.6 188 3.4 3.4
EET 4.4 2.9 71 1.3 1.3
FSU 6.7 5.3 362 6.7 6.7
EEX 1.9 2.0 164 3.0 3.0
CHN 14.8 10.8 298 6.1 6.1
IND 10.5 5.3 268 4.9 4.9
DAE 1.9 2.1 136 2.5 2.5
BRA 0.1 0.2 84 1.5 1.5
ROW 6.3 4.5 365 6.7 6.7
Global 8.0 5.5 5,238   
Global stock of CO2 in 2110 = 1,448 GtC 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that there is no guarantee that there will be one non-trivial stable coalition. 
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At the individual region level, abatement differs from region to region, as the abatement level is 
determined by marginal benefits and marginal costs and we have heterogeneous regions. The USA, a 
region with a low marginal abatement cost, and high share of global benefits, has an incentive to make 
substantial abatement efforts even in the All Singletons case, and according to our calculations in 2011 
USA reduces 9.9% of BAU emissions. Regions with higher marginal abatement cost and a lower share 
of global benefits, such as energy exporting countries, Brazil, and dynamic Asian economies, have 
hardly any incentive to reduce emissions on their own. Japan, which has a relatively high share of 
global benefits, makes comparatively little abatement efforts due to its high marginal cost. In 2011, it 
only reduces about 2.5% of emissions in the BAU case and total abatement amounts to 2 GtC over 
time. 
2.5.2. Grand coalition structure 
Table 2.6 displays the results for the Grand Coalition. In this case, marginal abatement costs equal the 
sum of marginal benefits among all regions at the level of 99.0 US$/ton. The abatement allocation 
varies widely from region to region. In the Grand Coalition, total gain from cooperation in terms of the 
NPV of payoff compared to All Singletons case is 9,973 billion US$ (15,211 billion US$ - 5,238 
billion US$). Even though at the global level, substantially higher NPV of payoff can be achieved, 
some regions are worse off when Grand Coalition is formed. For instance, China, which has the lowest 
abatement costs, has to contribute considerably to reduce emissions. 
Table 2.6: Grand Coalition structure 
Annual abatement 
(% of BAU 
emissions) 
Net present value (NPV) 
of payoff 
Marginal costs in 
2011 
Incentive to change 
membership (NPV) 
Regions 
2011 2110 Billion US$ over 100 years US$/ton 
Billion US$ over 100 
years 
USA 22.8 12.2 4,158 99.0 52
JPN 11.7 11.4 3,930 99.0 -281
EU15 18.3 12.5 5,062 99.0 -432
OOE 29.9 13.7 518 99.0 261
EET 47.6 28.8 -1 99.0 297
FSU 26.2 20.5 1,031 99.0 423
EEX 28.4 20.7 248 99.0 420
CHN 89.3 53.9 -1,777 99.0 2,727
IND 65.8 28.6 482 99.0 588
DAE 34.7 25.9 209 99.0 352
BRA 6.2 4.7 333 99.0 27
ROW 30.7 19.6 1,019 99.0 442
Global 36.6 22.5 15,211   
Global stock of CO2 in 2110 = 1,304 GtC 
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This leads to a substantial difference in the NPV of payoff, from 298 billion US$ in the All 
Singletons case to -1,777 billion US$ in the Grand Coalition. This situation violates individual 
rationality. Here, incentives to change membership are simply the gains from changing membership 
given that the other regions do not change their membership.  Regions with a positive incentive can 
benefit from leaving the Grand Coalition. Regions with a negative incentive would lose when leaving. 
Only Japan and EU15 have no incentive to leave the Grand Coalition  all other regions have a strong 
incentive to leave and take a free-rider position. 
Looking at the path of net benefits over time6 (Figure 2.3), every region except China is better off 
in the later periods over the planning horizon. The absolute net benefits of China are substantially 
lower than other regions, moreover they are decreasing over time. 
Figure 2.4 depicts the emission paths for BAU, All Singletons and the Grand Coalition. In the BAU 
scenario, no abatement takes place. BAU emissions grow in the form of an S-shaped curve, and the 
pace of growth slows down at the end of the century, reaching a level of almost 25 GtC by 2110. In 
the case of All Singletons, emissions reach approximately 24 GtC by 2110. Emissions in the Grand 
Coalition are about 20% lower than in the All Singleton case, and reach approximately 19 GtC by 
2110.   
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Figure 2.3: Annual regional net benefits in Grand Coalition (Undiscounted) 
                                                 
6 These are the net benefits from past and current abatement that arise in period t and represent a cash flow. 
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Figure 2.4: Emission paths for BAU, All Singletons, and Grand Coalition 
2.5.3. Stable coalitions 
We compute regional payoffs for all possible cartel coalitions and examine stability for all 4084 
coalition structures with an algorithm programmed in MATLAB. It is found that 14 non-trivial 
coalitions are internally stable7, of which only the one between Japan and EU15 is also externally 
stable. There is a tendency that coalitions comprising regions with similar characteristics in terms of 
benefits and costs are internally stable.  
Table 2.7 shows the results for the unique stable coalition of Japan and EU15. When comparing the 
results in Table 2.7 with those in Table 2.5, it can be established that EU15 reduces emissions about 
30% more than in the All Singletons structure. Japans abatement efforts are twice as high as in the All 
Singletons structure. As a result of their cooperation, both regions can obtain slightly higher NPV of 
payoff than in the All Singletons case.  
Incentives to change membership are shown in the last column of Table 2.7 and are expressed as 
the gains from changing membership in a situation where all other regions do not change their 
membership, i.e. we consider single deviations. For singletons, it thus reflects the incentive to join the 
coalition of Japan and EU15. Japan and EU15 have an interest in cooperation, because of their higher 
marginal benefits from abatement, while none of the other regions want to join, as their abatement 
costs would increase considerably if they have to take the benefits in Japan and EU15 into account and 
                                                 
7 These coalitions are: [EU15&JPN], [OOE&EEX], [EEX&CHN], [OOE&IND], [EEX&IND], [OOE&DAE], 
[EEX&DAE], [CHN&DAE], [IND&DAE], [FSU&BRA], [OOE&IND&BRA], [FSU&ROW], [BRA&ROW], 
[FSU&BRA&ROW]. 
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compensation payments are not available. Other coalitions are not stable, implying that free-rider 
incentives are strong and regions are often better off not joining a coalition. 
Table 2.7: Stable coalition of Japan and EU15 
Annual abatement 
(% of BAU 
emissions) 
Net present value (NPV) 
of payoff 
Marginal costs in 
2011 
Incentive to change 
membership (NPV) 
Regions 
2011 2110 Billion US$ over 100 years US$/ton 
Billion US$ over 100 
years 
USA 9.9 5.5 1,199 22.4 -143
JPN 5.5 6.0 975 40.4 -32
EU15 10.7 7.6 1,244 40.4 -4
OOE 5.6 2.6 201 3.4 -70
EET 4.4 2.9 76 1.3 -78
FSU 6.7 5.3 386 6.7 -121
EEX 1.9 2.0 175 3.0 -107
CHN 14.8 10.8 321 6.1 -725
IND 10.5 5.3 286 4.9 -159
DAE 1.9 2.1 145 2.5 -89
BRA 0.1 0.2 90 1.5 -7
ROW 6.3 4.5 389 6.7 -126
Global 8.6 5.8 5,486
Global stock of CO2 in 2110 = 1,445 GtC 
2.6. Sensitivity analysis 
As simulation results depend on parameter values which are subject to uncertainties associated with 
the quantitative model, we conduct a sensitivity analysis to examine how these uncertainties affect the 
model results. We believe that crucial parameters in the model are the scale parameter of damage and 
benefit function ( Dγ ) and the discount rate ( r ). Therefore, we change the base value of Dγ  and r  to 
50% less and 50% more, respectively. In addition, we vary the shares of global benefits ( iθ ) using 
Calibration II with a lower share for OECD countries and higher shares for India, dynamic Asian 
economies, Brazil and ROW.  
Table 2.8 presents the results of the sensitivity analysis. With regard to the level of global emission 
abatement and NPV of global payoffs, results are sensitive to both the discount rate and scale 
parameter for damage. The low discount rate increases the total abatement by about 40% in All 
Singletons and by about 35% in Grand Coalition compared to the base case, because future benefits 
from abatement will have a higher present value. Conversely, a higher discount rate will decrease the 
total abatement as current payoffs have higher value. Regarding the scale parameter Dγ , a lower value 
will decrease total abatement by 36% in All Singletons and by 32% in Grand Coalition, and a higher 
value will increase total abatement by 30% in the All Singletons case and the Grand Coalition, 
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compared to the base case. Changing the discount rate and scale parameter will increase or decrease 
absolute values of the results, but relative values between regions remain almost unchanged.  
Table 2.8: Sensitivity analysis 
Global emission 
abatement 
Net present value 
(NPV) of payoff 
Scenario 
GtC over 100 
years 
Billion US$ over 
100 years 
Stable coalition 
1. Base case     
  All Singletons 98 5,238 Yes 
  Grand Coalition 418 15,211 No 
  Stable coalition 104 5,486 [JPN-EU15] 
      
2. Change in the regional benefit shares    
Calibration II All Singletons 96 5,154 Yes 
  Grand Coalition 418 15,211 No 
  Stable coalition 103 5,461 [JPN-BRA-ROW]
      
3. Change in the scale parameter for damage    
50% less  All Singletons 63 1,673 Yes 
  Grand Coalition 285 5,106 No 
  Stable coalition - - No 
      
50% more All Singletons 125 10,108 Yes 
  Grand Coalition 520 28,625 No 
  Stable coalition 133 10,578 [JPN-EU15] 
      
4. Change in the discount rate    
50% less  All Singletons 136 20,998 Yes 
  Grand Coalition 560 58,695 No 
  Stable coalition 145 21,966 [JPN-EU15] 
      
50% more All Singletons 78 1,854 Yes 
  Grand Coalition 342 5,559 No 
  Stable coalition 83 1,943 [JPN-EU15] 
 
In all these scenarios, the Grand Coalition is never stable even though it increases the global payoff 
compared to the All Singleton case. In the scenario of Calibration II we find one stable coalition which 
consists of Japan, Brazil and ROW. These regions have a higher share of benefits from global 
abatement and higher marginal abatement costs under Calibration II. From this sensitivity analysis 
with regard to parameters examined, we may conclude that results of stability depend on the 
parameters which change regional payoff relatively, but do not depend on the scale parameter for 
damage and discount rate. 
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2.7. Final remarks 
The purpose of this chapter is to set the stage for an in depth discussion of the formation and stability 
of climate coalitions under several mechanisms. We introduce the structure of our model, STACO-2.1 
and its functional specifications in detail. We present some key results for benchmark scenarios which 
will serve as reference points for the analysis in the following chapters. 
The results suggest that regions with relatively lower marginal abatement costs and lower marginal 
benefits would be worse off when they cooperate as they bear the largest burden of abatement but 
obtain the least benefits. This already suggests that transfer schemes can be effective to stabilise larger 
coalitions. We examine this in detail in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 investigates the role of international 
technology spillovers, and Chapter 5 takes this one step further and introduces induced technological 
change into the STACO model. 
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Appendix 2A 
Box 2A-1: Equations in STACO-2.1 
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Appendix 2B 
Table 2B-1: Global parameters 
Symbol Description Value Unit Source 
M  Pre-industrial level of 
CO2 stock 
590 GtC Nordhaus (1994) 
0tM  Stock of CO2 in 2010, 
starting point for 
calculations 
835 GtC Nordhaus (1994) 
δ  Natural annual removal 
rate of CO2 stock 
0.00866 - Nordhaus (1994) 
ω  Airborne fraction of 
emissions remaining in 
the atmosphere 
0.64 - Nordhaus (1994) 
r  Discount rate 0.02 - Assumption 
iθ  Share of region i  in 
global benefits 
see Table 2.4 Own calculation based on Fankhauser 
(1995) and Tol (1997) 
iα  Abatement cost 
parameter of region i  
see Table 2B-3, 
column 2 
Own calculation based on Ellerman 
and Decaux (1998) 
iβ  Abatement cost 
parameter of region i  
see Table 2B-3,  
column 3 
Own calculation based on Ellerman and 
Decaux (1998) 
ς  Technological progress 
parameter 
0.005 - Assumption 
Dγ  Scale parameter of 
damage and benefit 
function 
0.027 - Tol (1997) 
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Table 2B-2: Regional parameters in the emission function 
Emission in 2010 Parameters 
Regions 
GtC (share) a b c d 
USA 1.763 (0.238) 6530 -0.04 1112 2065 
JPN 0.344 (0.046) 687 -0.052 292 2058 
EU15 0.943 (0.127) 2580 -0.04 589 2056 
OOE 0.360 (0.049) 1383 -0.05 240 2057 
EET 0.226 (0.030) 623 -0.05 141 2047 
FSU 0.774 (0.104) 2196 -0.03 -97 2024 
EEX 0.469 (0.063) 1282 -0.04 246 2049 
CHN 1.127 (0.152) 3467 -0.06 525 2036 
IND 0.344 (0.046) 1591 -0.05 108 2045 
DAE 0.316 (0.043) 700 -0.06 251 2048 
BRA 0.122 (0.016) 336 -0.054 82 2047 
ROW 0.637 (0.086) 1889 -0.04 287 2047 
World  7.425 (1) - - - - 
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Figure 2B-1: Regional BAU emission paths 
Source: Own calculations based on projections from the MIT-EPPA model (Paltsev et al, 
2005) 
Table 2B-3: Regional parameters in the abatement cost function 
Parameter of 
abatement cost 
Parameter of 
abatement cost 
Regions 
  
USA 0.0005 0.0398
JPN 0.0155 1.8160
EU15 0.0024 0.1503
OOE 0.0083 0
EET 0.0079 0.0486
FSU 0.0023 0.0042
EEX 0.0032 0.3029
CHN 0.00007 0.0239
IND 0.0015 0.0787
DAE 0.0047 0.3774
BRA 0.5612 8.4974
ROW 0.0021 0.0805
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Appendix 2C 
Derivation of the global benefit function and optimal abatement  
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Non-signatories 
Non-signatories choose their abatement level by maximising their own payoffs. Following Eq. (2.14), 
the optimal abatement of region i  in t  period can be derived as follows; 
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Coalition members 
Signatories choose the abatement levels that maximise the sum of the payoffs of the signatories. 
Following Eq. (2.13), the optimal abatement of region i  in the coalition K  in t  period is written as;
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Chapter 3  
Stability of international climate coalitions  A comparison 
of transfer schemes* 
This paper studies the impact of pragmatic and optimal transfer schemes on the incentives for regions 
to join international climate agreements. With an applied model that comprises twelve world regions 
we investigate: (i) a benchmark without transfers, (ii) scenarios with allocation-based rules where 
coalition members receive tradable emission permits proportional to initial or future emissions, (iii) 
scenarios with outcome-based rules where the coalition surplus is distributed proportional to 
emissions, and (iv) a scenario based on an optimal sharing rule where the coalition surplus is 
distributed proportional to outside option payoffs.  
We find that well-designed transfer schemes can stabilise larger coalitions and increase global 
abatement levels. In our applied setting we find that for allocation-based and outcome-based rules only 
small coalitions are stable, and, in the case of grandfathered emission permits, there is no stable 
coalition at all. Some obstacles associated with grandfathered emission permits can be overcome by 
incorporating the expected growth of emissions in developing countries in the distribution of emission 
permits. For the optimal transfer scheme we find that larger coalitions, which include key players such 
as the United States and China, can be stable, but no transfer scheme is capable of stabilising the 
Grand Coalition. 
 
                                                 
* This chapter is based on the article: Miyuki Nagashima, Rob Dellink, Ekko van Ierland, Hans-Peter Weikard 
(2009), Stability of international climate coalitions  A comparison of transfer schemes, Ecological Economics, 
Vol. 68, 1476-1487. The authors would like to acknowledge constructive and valuable comments from Juan-
Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera, Kelly de Bruin, Michael Finus, Eligius Hendrix, Elena Sáiz-Pérez and three 
anonymous referees. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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3.1. Introduction 
The literature on the formation and stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) has 
emphasised that transfers will strengthen incentives to join agreements. Two main insights have been 
established. First, if countries are identical, transfers will not be effective (Carraro and Siniscalco, 
1993), whereas if countries differ in their costs and benefits of pollution abatement, transfers will be 
effective. Transfers can be used to obtain the cooperation of countries with low marginal costs of 
abatement. Hence, agreements between countries with high marginal abatement benefits and countries 
with low marginal abatement costs will be particularly successful (Barrett, 2001; Weikard et al., 
2006). Secondly, it is evident from a number of studies that the incentives to join an IEA will be very 
sensitive to the way the transfer rule is designed (e.g. Botteon and Carraro, 1997; Tol, 2001; Carraro et 
al., 2006; Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus 2006; Weikard et al., 2006). However, with the exception of 
Carraro et al. (2006), there is no study which systematically compares different transfer schemes with 
respect to participation incentives, global welfare and abatement efforts.  
The purpose of this paper is to provide a comparison of different transfer schemes and relate these 
to results for an optimal transfer scheme suggested by Eyckmans and Finus (2004) and Weikard 
(2009). Our analysis employs a two-stage cartel game as introduced by dAspremont et al. (1983) 
which has been widely used for the analysis of the stability of IEAs. At the first stage an 
announcement game is played where players (regions) choose to sign or not to sign an IEA. At the 
second stage the signatories and the remaining singletons play a non-cooperative abatement game 
where the signatories maximise joint welfare. This establishes a partial agreement Nash equilibrium 
(Chander and Tulkens, 1995). A stable agreement is a Nash equilibrium of the first stage 
announcement game where payoffs are derived from the (unique) second stage equilibrium and a 
transfer scheme. A stable agreement is internally stable as no signatory wants to leave and externally 
stable as no singleton wants to join.  
Our analysis is devoted to international climate coalitions and the prospects for international 
cooperation on mitigation to achieve an efficient policy response to climate change. We employ the 
Stability of Coalitions model (STACO) comprising twelve world regions. To provide a proper 
representation of the long run impacts of climate change we have constructed a model version, 
STACO-2.1, to identify regionally optimal abatement paths based on the benefits and costs of 
abatement. The model is an update and dynamic extension of the STACO-1 model described by Finus 
et al. (2006). As each regions strategy depends on its abatement costs and benefits (avoided climate 
change damages) in each period, our abatement game is a difference game. Because we assume 
constant marginal benefits we have a unique dominant strategy equilibrium. We assume that current 
benefits in each period depend not only on current abatement but also on abatement in previous 
periods through reduced concentrations of CO2 and the corresponding lower damage levels. The 
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decisions to sign or not to sign an agreement are based on the net present value (NPV) of regional 
payoffs.  
Following Rose et al. (1998) we distinguish allocation-based and outcome-based transfer schemes. 
The former implement transfers by distributing emission permits, and the latter distribute the gains 
from cooperation. Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus (2006) have investigated the impact of different 
permit distribution schemes such as, for example, distribution according to population, ability to pay 
and initial emissions (based on grandfathering). Their finding is that only a grandfathering scheme can 
stabilise a non-trivial coalition, i.e. a coalition with at least two members. However, they note that 
coalitions are small, consisting of no more than three members, and do little to improve greenhouse 
gas abatement. As these results are derived for an essentially static model, we examine and compare 
dynamically optimal emission paths for a grandfathering scheme based on initial emissions with a 
scheme based on projections of future emissions.1 As we discuss below, this improves the incentives 
to participate in a climate agreement particularly for countries that expect large emission growth in the 
future; cf. Böhringer and Lange (2005). Although prominent among policy-makers, permit trading 
does not guarantee the best incentives for participation. Outcome-based rules that distribute the gains 
from cooperation instead of the emission permits are in general superior. The public goods character 
of greenhouse gas abatement implies that enlarging a coalition always improves payoffs. This 
characteristic allows each coalition member to receive at least the non-cooperative payoff. In this 
study we apply an ad-hoc rule stating that the coalition surplus is distributed proportional to (initial 
and future) emissions. But transfer design can be improved even further. Relevant for the participation 
decision of a country are the countrys share of the coalition payoff and its outside-option payoff. 
Hence no incentives to leave a given coalition remain if the coalition payoff is sufficiently large and 
distributed in such a way that each member gets at least its outside-option payoff. Weikard (2009) has 
shown that surplus sharing according to outside option payoffs internally stabilises all coalitions that 
are possibly stable under any sharing rule. We refer to this sharing rule as optimal sharing. It should 
be noted, however, that even optimal sharing does not guarantee participation in the Grand Coalition, 
i.e. it cannot ensure that the efficient solution is achieved, because outside option payoffs increase with 
an enlargement of the coalition. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 provides the game-theoretical framework of the 
STACO-2.1 model and its numerical specification. Section 3.3 introduces the transfer schemes that we 
examine in our model. Section 3.4 reports the main results, followed by a sensitivity analysis in 
Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes. The Appendix provides the model parameters.  
                                                 
1 The warning from Kydland and Prescott (1977) applies that dynamically optimal policies may fail if agents 
revise their expectations.  
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3.2. The stability of coalitions model (STACO-2.1) 
3.2.1. Game-theoretic background 
We model a climate agreement as a two-stage game consisting of a coalition formation stage and an 
abatement decision stage. The set of players (hereafter referred to as regions) is denoted by 
{1,..., }N n= . In the first stage, every region announces whether to sign the agreement or not. Formally 
the strategy space of each region i is the set {sign, not sign}. Signatories (those who sign) form a 
unique coalition K. Regions that do not sign remain singleton. We refer to the case where no region 
signs as All Singletons; the case where all regions sign is called the Grand Coalition. 
In the second stage, the coalition K and the singletons \i N K∈  adopt their abatement strategies 
simultaneously. An abatement strategy for a singleton \i N K∈  is defined as a vector (i.e. time-path) 
of abatements 1( ,..., )i iTq q . Abatement in period t is restricted to [ ]itit eq ,0∈  where ite  denotes 
regional emission levels in the business-as-usual (BAU) scenario with no abatement efforts. The 
coalition K adopts an abatement path that specifies period-t abatements for all coalition members 
i K∈  and all periods {1,..., }t T∈  such that period-t abatements are from the Cartesian-product space 
[ ]0, it
i K
e
∈
∏ . 
We assume that membership and abatement decisions are taken only once, and remain fixed 
throughout a planning horizon T.2 Each region obtains benefit  itb  which depend on global emission 
reductions and bears costs itc  which depend on the regions own emission reduction. The benefit 
function itb  is linear in past and current global abatement. Abatement costs  itc  are convex in regional 
current abatement. Benefit and abatement cost functions are specified in detail in Section 3.2.2. Not 
considering transfers for the moment, the payoff for each region iπ  is the net present value of benefits 
and costs that accrue over time: 
 { }1
1
( ) (1 ) ( ( ,..., ) ( ))ti it t it it
t
r b q q c q
∞
−
=
π = + ⋅ −∑q  (3.1) 
where the model horizon accounting for future benefits is infinity, r  is the discount rate, and q  is an 
abatement matrix of dimension N × T. 3  
                                                 
2 The impact of renegotiations on the stability of a climate agreement is investigated in a separate paper by 
Weikard et al. (2010). 
3 We adopt the common notation where subscripts are dropped to denote aggregation over that index. 
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The equilibrium concept we employ is subgame perfect equilibrium. We solve our two-stage game 
by backward induction. We start the analysis at the second stage, where the abatement decisions are 
taken. Following Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997) and Bloch (1997) we assume that the coalition, 
acting as a single player, and the singletons play a Cournot-Nash game. 4 More precisely, as the 
relevant strategy space is not an abatement level but an abatement path, we determine open-loop Nash 
equilibria in which each players abatement path is a best response to the paths adopted by all other 
players (cf. Dockner et al., 2000, p.86). Hence, regional abatement paths are endogenously determined 
in the model. 5  We assume that the coalition K N⊆  sets abatement paths for its members that 
maximise the coalition payoff defined as the sum of all members payoffs while singletons \i N K∈  
choose their abatement level to maximise their own payoffs. For every coalition K N⊆  the abatement 
game has a unique interior solution * *1 ( ),..., ( ))nK K(q q  under the STACO specification of benefit and 
cost functions (see Section 3.2.2). The uniqueness of the equilibrium abatement paths allows us to 
specify the payoffs directly as function of the coalition structure.  
Now we can move to the first stage. First, we formally introduce transfer schemes that redistribute 
the coalition payoff (determined at the second stage) among signatories. A financial transfer )(KFi  is 
a payment made or received such that 0=∑
∈Ki
iF  and ( ) 0iF K =  for all singletons \i N K∈ . The 
transfer schemes will be specified in Section 3.3. We obtain a valuation function )(KVi  that specifies 
the payoff for every region Ni∈  and every coalition K N⊆ , using the unique optimal abatement 
level * ( )Kq  in the calculation of payoffs. The payoffs of singletons and signatories are as follows: 
 { }∑
∞
=
− −⋅+≡
1
* )))(())((()1()(
t
*
iitit
t
i KcKbrKV qq   for  Ki∉ ,  (3.2) 
 { } )()))(())((()1()(
1
KFKcKbrKV i
t
*
iitit
t
i +−⋅+≡∑
∞
=
− qq*      for  Ki∈ ,  (3.3) 
At the first stage, given these payoffs, players decide whether to sign an abatement agreement or not. 
Those who sign form a coalition K. The Nash equilibria of the coalition formation game at the first 
stage can be derived from the valuation function given in Eq. (3.2) and (3.3). We will refer to the Nash 
equilibria as stable coalitions. A coalition K is stable if no signatory has an incentive to withdraw from 
the coalition (internal stability) and no non-signatory has an incentive to participate (external 
stability); cf. dAspremont et al. (1983). Formally, stability is defined as: 
                                                 
4 This equilibrium concept has been defined as Partial Agreement Nash Equilibrium (PANE) by Chander and 
Tulkens (1995). 
5 Although the strategy space is a set of time paths of abatement, the paths are determined once and for all.  
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 Internal stability:  ( ) ( \ { })i iV K V K i≥   ,Ki∈∀   
 External stability:  ( ) ( { })j jV K V K j≥ ∪   Kj∉∀ . 
3.2.2. The STACO-2.1 model 
In this section, we explain the numerical specification of our model, which we label STACO-2.1. The 
model is an update and extension of the original STACO-1 model, described in Dellink et al. (2004) 
and Finus et al. (2006). Here, we focus on the main features of the model. Equations are presented in 
Box 3.1. We consider twelve world regions: USA (USA), Japan (JPN), European Union-15 (EU15), 
other OECD countries (OOE), Eastern European countries (EET), former Soviet Union (FSU), energy 
exporting countries (EEX), China (CHN), India (IND), dynamic Asian economies (DAE), Brazil 
(BRA) and rest of the world (ROW). We set the model horizon to account for benefits from abatement 
to infinity, but adopt a shorter planning horizon of 100 years, ranging from 2011 to 2110, to determine 
abatement levels. With respect to abatement levels after the planning horizon T, we do not need to 
make any assumptions: they do not affect the costs and benefits that accrue to abatements in periods 
t T≤  in our model specification. Together, this ensures a reflection of the most relevant intertemporal 
aspects of climate change. The first term on the right hand side of Eq. (3.4) in Box 3.1 indicates the net 
present value of the stream of payoffs over the planning horizon. The second term captures future 
impacts after the planning horizon. Therefore, marginal global benefits reflect all current and future 
benefits from abatement in period t , discounted back to period t . Essentially, in 2010 ( 0t ) the 
signatories set their abatement paths up to 2110 (T =100), taking into account all future benefits and 
costs of abatement. We calculate the payoff function for each region and each possible coalition. 
Recall that payoff for region i  in period t , itπ , depends on the abatement path until t .  
We use the data for CO2 emissions derived from the EPPA model (Babiker et al., 2001; Paltsev et 
al., 2005) to calibrate the regional BAU emission paths6 in our model; these paths are presented in the 
Appendix. It should be noted that our calibration of BAU emissions is based on EPPA model 
simulations that include damages from climate change. Thus, any feedback from the climate to the 
economy in the case of inaction (i.e. in absence of any climate policy) is implicitly included in the 
calibration. Benefit  itb  from abatement is a function of the avoided damage, which in turn depends on 
global atmospheric temperature change. We follow Nordhaus (1994) and Germain and Van 
                                                 
6 We use data from World Bank (2003) to match the regional aggregation in EPPA to STACO. As we use 
multiple sources to calibrate the baseline, some inconsistencies may arise. We expect, however, that these are 
relatively minor compared to the uncertainties regarding the other parameter values, especially since we focus on 
stability issues, rather than forecasting optimal abatement trajectories. 
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Steenberghe (2003) and approximate the climate system by a linear system of three equations (for 
concentrations, radiative forcing and atmospheric temperature increase, respectively) and ignore the 
non-linear feedbacks between the atmosphere and the oceans. Thus, we can calculate damages as a 
linear function of accumulated past and current abatement, which is required to ensure dominant 
strategies for our regions.7 In Eq. (3.5), as defined in Chapter 2, tM  is the stock of CO2 in year t , M  
denotes the pre-industrial stock of CO2, ty  denotes global GDP in year t  as given in Nordhaus (1994), 
and 1γ  and 2γ  are estimated by OLS-regression (Dellink et al., 2004). For the global damage 
parameter Dγ , we apply the estimate by Tol (1997) that damages amount to 2.7% of GDP for a 
doubling of concentrations over pre-industrial levels, that is, Dγ = 0.027. Note that marginal benefits 
change over time due to the assumption that damages increase linearly with GDP. 
Eq. (3.6) shows the regional benefits expressed as a regional share of avoided damages. Thus, 
global benefits are allocated according to the constant share iθ  for each region, as displayed in the 
Appendix. These regional benefit shares are calibrated to regional damage estimates by Fankhauser 
(1995), as explained in detail in Dellink et al. (2004). We specify an abatement cost function following 
the estimates of the EPPA model by Ellerman and Decaux (1998); these abatement costs reflect the 
welfare costs of a cost-minimising mixture of possible mitigation responses (primarily fuel switch and 
changes in capital accumulation). In Eq. (3.7) we define α  and β  as regional cost parameters. We 
assume exogenous technological progress which is modelled as a reduction of current abatement costs 
at an annual rate ς =0.005. 
The STACO-1 model (as used in Finus et al., 2006; Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus, 2006; Weikard 
et al., 2006) assumed that each region chooses a constant abatement level over the planning time 
horizon. Here, we use a specification in which abatement levels for each period are endogenously 
determined in the model by maximising the net present value of the stream of payoffs. Each region has 
perfect foresight into the future and can plan its abatement path for the current and all future years 
until the planning horizon. In our numerical simulations with twelve regions we thus investigate 4084 
( 12212 − ) different coalition structures. 
                                                 
7 We acknowledge that this is a bold assumption, but econometric analysis reported in Dellink et al. (2008a) 
reveals that for our purposes the linearisation fits the larger non-linear model very well. Furthermore, the focus 
of our analysis is not on presenting the most up to date specification of the carbon cycle but on how costs and 
benefits of abatement influence the incentives for coalition formation. Note that our analysis abstracts from non-
linearities arising from climate thresholds (see IPCC, 2007a). 
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Box 3.1. Equations in STACO-2.1 
Payoffs 
{ } { }
1 1
π ( ) (1 ) ( ( ) ( )) (1 ) ( )
T
t t
i it it i it
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∞
− −
= = +
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Benefits  
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3.3. Transfer schemes 
In this section we introduce different transfer schemes. Section 3.3.1 presents an allocation-based 
transfer scheme, namely the emissions-based tradable emission permits scheme. Sections 3.3.2 and 
3.3.3 introduce outcome-based transfer schemes: emissions-based surplus sharing and optimal sharing. 
For a consistent comparison of the different transfer schemes, we implement all schemes as a stream 
of financial transfers between coalition members over the model horizon. Note that Eq. (3.3) implies 
that only the differences in net present values of these transfers are relevant in the stability analysis. 
3.3.1. Emissions-based tradable emission permits 
An allocation-based transfer rule describes a distribution of permits and incorporates a permit trading 
system. Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus (2006) compare several allocation-based rules for distributing 
the permits.8 We focus on the most common transfer scheme which distributes permits in proportion 
to a base year level of a full path of emissions. This allocation scheme can be considered as 
grandfathering where the allocation of permits is based on the initial emissions for each region in a 
base year. Emission permits can be traded only among signatories. The payoff ( )(KV Pit ) for a 
signatory i  in period t  after the permit trading is calculated as 
                                                 
8 For criteria of rules for allocating permits see Edmonds et al. (1995) and Rose et al. (1998). 
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 ))(~()( * KqqpKV(K)V itittit
P
it −⋅−≡  , (3.8) 
where tp  is the (market clearing) permit price in period t  and itq~  is the required abatement level for 
signatory i  in period t  to comply with the assigned emission level under the permit trading system in 
coalition K . The first term on the right hand side of Eq. (3.8), )(KVit , indicates the payoff of 
signatory i  in period t  without permit trading in coalition K . The second term implies that if a region 
reduces emissions more than assigned ( itit qq ~
* > ), the region can sell the permits to other signatories. 
On the other hand, if a region reduces emissions less than the assigned level ( itit qq ~
* < ), the region has 
to compensate the difference by purchasing permits. In the equilibrium of the permits market the price 
of a permit, tp , equals marginal abatement costs.  
In the permits market, the initially allocated emission permits to region i in period t, ite~ , are 
calculated as a fraction ( )it Kλ  of the total amount of permits allocated to the signatories in a coalition  
K with ( ) 1it
i K
Kλ
∈
=∑ , such that 
 *( )it it it
i K
e K eλ
∈
= ⋅∑%  (3.9) 
The total amount of emission permits for signatories is equal to the emission level in equilibrium, 
∑ ∑
∈ ∈
=
Ki Ki
iit ee
*~ , expressed as ∑∑ ∑
∈∈ ∈
−=
Ki
it
Ki Ki
itit qee
*~ , where ite  denotes BAU emissions of region i in 
period t. 
The required abatement level can be defined as  
 *( )it it it jt jt
j K j K
q e K e qλ
∈ ∈
⎛ ⎞
= − ⋅ −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑% . (3.10) 
Under permit trading based on initial emissions, the fraction )(Kitλ  is calculated based on the 
ratio of 2010 emissions for region i  (
0,i t
e ) over the total 2010 emissions of all signatories. Thus, the 
fraction is constant over time: 
 0
0
,
,
( ) ( ) i tit i
j t
j K
e
K K
e
λ λ
∈
= =
∑
 . (3.11a) 
Under permit trading based on future emissions, we use the full path of BAU emissions to 
determine the time-dependent fractions: 
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 ( ) itit
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 . (3.11b) 
The initial-emissions-based permit trading does not take into account projections of emissions. 
Hence, regions with growing emissions in the future have to buy permits from other signatories. The 
future-emissions-based permit trading gives regions permits which are fully adjusted to their expected 
emissions. 
It should be stressed that membership decisions are only made once, before the first period. The 
players base their decisions on the net present value of their payoff including transfers.  
3.3.2. Emissions-based surplus sharing 
Transfer schemes based on surplus sharing are proposed for instance by Weikard et al., (2006), who 
consider various sharing rules for the gains of cooperation. One of the main advantages of surplus 
sharing is that individual rationality is always satisfied as long as a coalition is at all profitable.9 The 
sharing rule assigns a fraction )(Kitλ  (with 1)( =∑
∈
K
Ki
itλ ) of the coalition surplus )(KSt  at time t  
(as defined below in Eq. (3.12)) to every signatory Ki∈ . The coalition surplus )(KSt  is defined as 
the difference between the joint gain of the signatories and the sum of the payoffs in the situation of 
the All Singletons structure, i.e. 
 ( ) ( ) ( )t it it
i K i K
S K V K V
∈ ∈
= − ∅∑ ∑ . (3.12) 
The final payoff of a signatory after the surplus sharing is then given by its payoff in the All 
Singletons structure plus its share of the coalition surplus:  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Sit it it tV K V K S Kλ= ∅ + ⋅ . (3.13) 
Although it is possible to apply many different rules to the sharing problem (such as equal sharing, 
proportional sharing and combinations), we adopt a proportional sharing rule based on emission 
levels. Therefore, the fraction of the coalition surplus is equivalent to the fraction under the emissions-
                                                 
9 Profitability means that coalitional payoff is larger than the sum of payoffs of coalition members in the All-
Singletons case. The STACO specification, in particular the functional form of the benefit function, guarantees 
profitability of every coalition, as singletons have dominant strategies, and thus there is no leakage effect. 
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based permit trading as defined in Section 3.3.1. Under the initial-emissions-based transfer scheme, 
the fractions are based on 2010 emission levels: 
 0
0
,
,
( ) ( ) i tit i
j t
j K
e
K K
e
λ λ
∈
= =
∑
. (3.14a) 
Under the future-emissions-based surplus sharing, we use the full path of reference emissions 
(BAU) to determine time-dependent fractions: 
( ) itit
jt
j K
eK
e
λ
∈
=
∑
.  (3.14b) 
3.3.3. Optimal surplus sharing 
We now apply the optimal sharing rule suggested by Carraro et al., (2006), McGinty (2007), Weikard 
(2009) and Fuentes-Albero and Rubio (2010). Optimal sharing requires that each signatorys payoff in 
net present value terms is at least as much as what it could have obtained by deviating from coalition 
K , namely the outside option payoff (cf. Weikard 2009). Outside option payoffs at time t can written 
as ( \ { })itV K i . We can define the per-period residual as ( ) ( \{ })Kt it
i K
V K V K i
∈
−∑  which is distributed 
in proportion to the outside option payoffs.10 The payoff function ( )oiV K  is defined as: 
 
{ }( )
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it Kt
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V K j
∈
≡ ⋅
∑
.  (3.15) 
Rearranging the right hand side shows that under an optimal sharing rule a coalition K  is 
internally stable if and only if in net present value terms it holds that 
 
( ) 1
( \{ })
K
i
i K
V K
V K i
∈
≥
∑
,  (3.16) 
for all i K∈  and all K N⊆ . Hence, K is internally stable if the coalition payoff (weakly) exceeds the 
sum of the outside option payoffs, and if not, K cannot be internally stable. Inequality (3.16) is a 
                                                 
10 Note that the residual can be shared by each coalition member in any way desired, because it does not affect 
internal stability (Weikard 2009). 
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necessary condition for stability. It is a sufficient condition for internal stability if transfers are 
arranged according to Eq. (3.15).  
It is important to note here that the public goods character of abatement gives rise to positive 
spillovers. If a coalition forms, it will not reap all the gains from cooperation, as singletons will also 
benefit from increased abatement. Positive spillovers provide incentives to free-ride which are larger 
for larger coalitions. Hence, a grand coalition that would internalise all externalities and implement 
efficient abatement will be faced with large outside option payoffs and will usually not be stable. 
3.4. Results 
In this section we present our results, starting in Section 3.4.1 with an examination of the benchmark 
case without transfers. Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 discuss the emissions-based permit trading and 
emissions-based surplus sharing, respectively. Section 3.4.4 presents results of an optimal sharing 
scheme.  
3.4.1. No transfers 
Table 3.1 illustrates the incentive structures of the different regions for the non-cooperative case where 
all players act as singletons. In this All Singletons structure marginal abatement costs equal marginal 
benefits within each region. The difference between annual abatement in the All Singletons case and 
in BAU decreases over time and leads to a stock of CO2 of 1,448 GtC (Gigaton carbon) by the year 
2110. This corresponds to about 1.7 times the stock level in 2010.  
Abatement differs across regions as the abatement level is determined by regional marginal 
benefits and marginal costs. In our model, developed regions have a higher share of global benefits 
than developing regions (cf. the Appendix). The USA, a region with a low marginal abatement cost 
curve and high share of global benefits, has an incentive to make substantial abatement efforts even in 
the All Singletons case, and in 2011 USA reduces 9.9% of their BAU emissions. Regions with higher 
marginal abatement costs and lower shares of global benefits, such as the energy exporting countries, 
Brazil, and dynamic Asian economies, have hardly any incentive to reduce emission on their own. 
Japan has a relatively high share of global benefits, but does not make large abatement efforts due to 
their high marginal costs of abatement. In 2011, Japan reduces only about 2.5% of its emissions in the 
BAU case.  
With a Grand Coalition marginal abatement costs equal the sum of marginal benefits among all 
regions at 99.0 US$/ton (See Table 3.2). The abatement allocation differs widely between regions. In 
the Grand Coalition, the total gain from cooperation in terms of the net present value of payoffs 
compared to the All Singletons case is almost 10 trillion US$ (15,211 billion US$ − 5,238 billion 
US$). Even though substantially higher global payoffs can be achieved, some regions are worse off 
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when the Grand Coalition is formed. For instance, China, which has the flattest abatement cost curve 
in our setting, has to contribute a lot to reduce emissions.11 
Table 3.1: All singletons structure 
Regions 
Annual abatement 
(% of BAU 
emissions) 
Net present value (NPV) of 
payoff 
Marginal 
costs in 2011 
Marginal benefits 
from abatement in 
2011 
 2011 2110 Billion US$ over 100 years US$/tC US$/tC 
USA 9.9 5.5 1,117 22.4 22.4
JPN 2.5 3.0 943 17.1 17.1
EU15 7.6 5.6 1,240 23.4 23.4
OOE 5.6 2.6 188 3.4 3.4
EET 4.4 2.9 71 1.3 1.3
FSU 6.7 5.3 362 6.7 6.7
EEX 1.9 2.0 164 3.0 3.0
CHN 14.8 10.8 298 6.1 6.1
IND 10.5 5.3 268 4.9 4.9
DAE 1.9 2.1 136 2.5 2.5
BRA 0.1 0.2 84 1.5 1.5
ROW 6.3 4.5 365 6.7 6.7
Global 8.0 5.5 5,238
Global stock of CO2 in 2110 = 1,448 GtC 
This leads to a large reduction in the net present value of Chinas payoff, from 298 billion US$ in the 
All Singletons case to -1,777 billion US$ in the Grand Coalition. The incentive to leave the coalition, 
i.e. the increase in payoffs by unilaterally changing the membership decision, is shown in the last 
column of Table 3.2. In the case of the Grand Coalition where all regions are signatories, a positive 
number indicates an incentive to leave the coalition, while a negative number indicates the benefit 
from membership. Only Japan and EU15 have no incentive to leave the Grand Coalition, that is, all 
                                                 
11 The marginal abatement cost curve of China in our model is very flat because there is a lot of scope for energy 
efficiency improvement, fuel switch and introduction of renewables in the Chinese energy system which is 
mainly based on coal. Forecasts of the development of Chinas marginal abatement costs over a century are, of 
course, subject to large standard errors. Chen (2005) offers forecasts, based on MARKAL, until the year 2030.  
Chens bottom-up assessments are not directly comparable to top-down assessments. However, a top-down 
framework is more appropriate for our analysis as it provides consistent estimates for all regions, cf. Ellerman 
and Decaux (1998).   
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other regions have stronger free-rider incentives and wish to leave. The global stock of CO2 in 2110 is 
projected to be 1,304 GtC in the Grand Coalition. 
Table 3.2: Grand coalition structure (without transfers) 
Regions 
Annual abatement 
(% of BAU 
emissions) 
Net present value (NPV) 
of payoff 
Marginal costs 
in 2011 
Incentive to change 
membership (NPV) 
 2011 2110 Billion US$ over 100 years 
US$/tC Billion US$ over 100 
years 
USA 22.8 12.2 4,158 99.0 52
JPN 11.7 11.4 3,930 99.0 -281
EU15 18.3 12.5 5,062 99.0 -432
OOE 29.9 13.7 518 99.0 261
EET 47.6 28.8 -1 99.0 297
FSU 26.2 20.5 1,031 99.0 423
EEX 28.4 20.7 248 99.0 420
CHN 89.3 53.9 -1,777 99.0 2,727
IND 65.8 28.6 482 99.0 588
DAE 34.7 25.9 209 99.0 352
BRA 6.2 4.7 333 99.0 27
ROW 30.7 19.6 1,019 99.0 442
Global 36.6 22.5 15,211   
Global stock of CO2 in 2110 = 1,304 GtC 
We compute all possible cartel coalitions and examine stability of all 4084 coalition structures with an 
algorithm programmed in MATLAB. Without transfers, 14 non-trivial coalitions are internally stable, 
of which only the one between Japan and EU15 is also externally stable. Larger coalitions are not 
stable because free-rider incentives are strong and most regions are better off when they stay outside a 
coalition. Table 3.3 shows the results for the stable coalition, Japan and EU15. Both Japan and EU15 
make larger abatement efforts than in the All Singletons structure. As a result of their cooperation, 
both regions can obtain slightly higher payoffs than in the All Singletons case.  
In equilibrium, the signatories have an interest in cooperating, because of their higher marginal 
benefits from abatement, while none of the singletons have an interest in joining, as their abatement 
costs would increase too much if they have to take the benefits of Japan and EU15 into account.  
  55
Table 3.3: Coalition of Japan and EU15 (without transfers) 
Regions 
Annual abatement 
(% of BAU 
emissions) 
Net present value (NPV) 
of payoff 
Marginal costs in 
2011 
Incentive to change 
membership (NPV) 
 2011 2110 Billion US$ over 100 years US$/tC 
Billion US$ over 100 
years 
USA 9.9 5.5 1,199 22.4 -143
JPN 5.5 6.0 975 40.4 -32
EU15 10.7 7.6 1,244 40.4 -4
OOE 5.6 2.6 201 3.4 -70
EET 4.4 2.9 76 1.3 -78
FSU 6.7 5.3 386 6.7 -121
EEX 1.9 2.0 175 3.0 -107
CHN 14.8 10.8 321 6.1 -725
IND 10.5 5.3 286 4.9 -159
DAE 1.9 2.1 145 2.5 -89
BRA 0.1 0.2 90 1.5 -7
ROW 6.3 4.5 389 6.7 -126
Global 8.6 5.8 5,486   
Global stock of CO2 in 2110 = 1,445 GtC 
3.4.2. Emissions-based tradable emission permits 
3.4.2.1. Initial-emissions-based permit trading 
We now incorporate a transfer scheme based on emission permit trading across coalition members, as 
explained in Section 3.3.1. Under the initial-emissions-based permit trading, emission permits are 
divided among the signatories based on their respective emissions in the base year 2010.12 We find 
that no non-trivial coalition is stable under initial-emissions-based permit trading. It, thus, leads to the 
most undesirable outcome among all the cases that we consider. When we compare the results with 
those under no transfers, EU15 no longer desires to stay in the coalition with Japan, as the costs of 
purchasing emission permits from Japan outweigh the benefits of collaboration. A stable coalition is 
more likely if a region with high marginal benefits, such as Japan or EU15 collaborates with a region 
with low marginal abatement costs, such as China or India. The basic idea is that the former regions 
could finance emission reductions in the latter regions. The problem is, however, that under the initial-
                                                 
12  Using 1990 emission levels instead of 2010 does not influence the main qualitative results (results are 
available from the authors upon request). 
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emissions-based permit trading scheme, the number of permits issued to China and India is relatively 
small. As their reference emissions grow relatively fast, these regions will need large abatement efforts 
in order to reach their targets. In contrast, a region like Japan will obtain a relatively large number of 
permits under the initial-emissions-based scheme, whereas their emissions are expected to hardly grow 
over the next century. 
3.4.2.2. Future-emissions-based permit trading 
A possible way out of the just described dilemma is to base the distribution of emission permits on the 
entire path of reference emissions, that is, to apply a transfer scheme based on future emissions. This 
will overcome the situation obtained in the initial-emissions-based transfer scheme as fast-growing 
regions such as India will obtain more permits over time. Under the future-emissions-based permit 
trading twelve coalitions are internally stable of which two are also externally stable: (a) EU15 and 
China, and (b) Japan and India (cf. Table 3.4).  
Table 3.4: Stable coalitions (with future-emissions-based permit trading) 
Global stock of CO2 in 2110 = 1,425 GtC (EU15 and China) and 1,444 GtC (Japan and India) 
Under the initial-emissions-based permit trading, China and India have incentive to leave the coalition 
because of higher abatement burden compared to Japan and EU15, respectively, and therefore have 
Regions Abatement in 2110 Net present value (NPV) of payoff 
Incentive to change 
membership (NPV) 
 (% of BAU emissions) Billion US$ over 100 years Billion US$ over 100 years
 
(a)  
EU15 & 
China 
(b)  
Japan &  
India  
(a)  
EU15 & 
China 
(b)  
Japan & 
India 
(a)  
EU15 &  
China 
(b)  
Japan & 
India 
USA 5.5 5.5  1,780 1,240 -654 -126
JPN 3.0 3.7  1,448 975 -23 -32
EU15 6.4 5.6  1,512 1,368 -272 -71
OOE 2.6 2.6  289 207 -176 -44
EET 2.9 2.9  109 78 -63 -7
FSU 5.3 5.3  559 398 -251 -52
EEX 2.0 2.0  252 180 -197 -56
CHN 27.6 10.8  401 332 -103 -13
IND 5.3 12.7  415 287 -105 -18
DAE 2.1 2.1  209 150 -123 -33
BRA 0.2 0.2  129 93 -84 -31
ROW 4.5 4.5  564 402 -235 -52
Global 8.2 6.0  7,667 5,709 -2,284 -536
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lower payoffs than outside the coalition. This makes the coalition internally unstable. The situation 
improves under the future-emissions-based permit trading as China and India have lower required 
abatement levels (more emission permits), and they can sell their permits to their partners, Japan and 
EU15, respectively. These transfers would encourage China and India to enter a coalition.  
Figure 3.1 shows how the transfer schemes affect the stream of payoffs for China in a coalition of 
EU15 and China. Without transfers, the payoff for China is slightly negative for the first two decades, 
but it is clearly positive for the later decades (as Chinese emissions are expected to stabilise), leading 
to a small but positive NPV of payoffs (9 billion US$). With initial-emissions-based permit trading the 
payoff decreases rapidly and becomes negative after two decades. This is due to the fast growth of 
reference emissions and thus the need for large emission reductions by China. In these periods, China 
buys permits from EU15. In later decades, the payoffs become positive again, as Chinese emissions 
stabilise and China is able to sell some permits. In net present value terms, the coalition is not 
beneficial for China (NPV of payoff equals -5 billion US$). Note that the stream of transfers from 
EU15 to China can be read from the figure by subtracting the payoffs without transfers from the 
payoffs with transfers. 
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Figure 3.1: Undiscounted payoff paths for China in the coalition of EU15 and China 
With future-emissions-based permit trading, China is able to sell permits to the EU15 in all periods, 
as the difference in growth rates between the two regions is considered in the allocation of the 
emission permits. Thus, negative payoffs in the middle of the century are prevented and China earns a 
NPV of almost 400 billion US$ on the sale of excess permits. These additional earnings overcome the 
free-rider incentives of China and, while they reduce the gains from cooperation for EU15, the 
Future-emissions-based permit trading 
No transfers 
Initial-emissions-based  
permit trading 
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outcome is beneficial for both. Thus the coalition is internally stable. Entry of another permit buyer 
(seller) violates the interests of some signatories, because the emission permit price will be too high 
(low). Thus, the coalition of EU15 and China is also externally stable. 
3.4.3. Emissions-based surplus sharing 
Table 3.5 presents the main results of the emissions-based surplus sharing scheme for the only stable 
coalition consisting of USA and China. This coalition is stable under both the initial-emissions-based 
and future-emissions-based surplus sharing. When transfers are based on a division of the gains from 
cooperation rather than a division of tradable emission permits, internal stability is less of a problem. 
Therefore, although the initial-emissions-based surplus sharing does not entirely match the 
development of the regions, the scheme is sufficient to stabilise this coalition. Most regions have less 
incentive to change membership under the future-emissions-based surplus sharing, indicating that the 
future-emissions-based surplus sharing is more robust than initial-emissions-based surplus sharing. 
Under surplus sharing the outcome in terms of net present value of global payoff and the associated 
CO2 concentration improves compared to the no transfers and permit trading case.  
Table 3.5: Coalition of USA and China (with surplus sharing) 
Regions Abatement in 2110 
Share of the coalition 
surplus 
in 2110 
Net present value 
(NPV) of payoff 
Incentive to change 
membership (NPV) 
 (% of BAU emissions) 
Billion US$ Billion US$ over 100 
years 
Billion US$ over 100 
years 
  
Initial- 
emissions
-based 
Future- 
emissions
-based 
Initial- 
emissions
-based 
Future- 
emissions
-based 
Initial- 
emissions
-based 
Future- 
emissions
-based 
USA 6.3 11 12 1,332 1,319 -215 -201
JPN 3.0 - - 1,454 1,454 -399 -421
EU15 5.6 - - 1,940 1,940 -350 -388
OOE 2.6 - - 290 290 -45 -42
EET 2.9 - - 110 110 -5 -7
FSU 5.3 - - 562 562 -58 -78
EEX 2.0 - - 253 253 -15 -23
CHN 27.1 7 7 436 449 -137 -151
IND 5.3 - - 417 417 -80 -64
DAE 2.1 - - 210 210 -25 -30
BRA 0.2 - - 130 130 -29 -30
ROW 4.5 - - 566 566 -79 -87
Global 8.2 19 19 7,700 7,700 -1,437 -1,523
Global stock of CO2 in 2110 = 1,425 GtC 
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3.4.4. Optimal sharing 
Under the optimal sharing transfer scheme, 182 non-trivial stable coalitions emerge, of which 108 are 
Pareto undominated. As discussed in Section 3.3.3, optimal sharing guarantees that a coalition is 
always internally stable if Eq. (3.16) holds. Table 3.6 presents outcomes for the top five stable 
coalitions according to the net present value of global payoffs. 
Table 3.6: Top five stable coalitions with optimal sharing 
 Net present value (NPV) of payoff (Billion US$ over 100 years) 
  
{USA, EET, CHN, 
IND, DAE} 
{EU15, EET, EEX, 
CHN, IND} 
{EU15, OOE, EET, 
CHN, IND} 
{EU15, EET, CHN, 
IND, DAE} 
{USA, EET, EEX, CHN, 
DAE, BRA} 
USA 1,603 2,413 2,386 2,378 1,566
JPN 1,933 1,930 1,910 1,904 1,883
EU15 2,595 1,778 1,769 1,762 2,527
OOE 386 386 354 380 376
EET 138 138 136 137 134
FSU 749 748 740 738 730
EEX 336 310 332 331 300
CHN 415 413 403 410 401
IND 485 487 479 484 541
DAE 261 279 276 260 253
BRA 172 172 170 170 165
ROW 755 754 746 744 736
Global 9,830 9,810 9,701 9,697 9,613
We discuss three main observations from our results. First, Barrett (1994) has shown that stable 
coalitions will be small in a model with symmetric players if the gains from cooperation (the payoff 
difference between All Singletons and the Grand Coalition) are large. Here we consider asymmetric 
regions and we obtain large stable coalitions compared to the outcomes without transfers, even though 
gains from cooperation are large. We find stable coalitions of up to six regions. Those that include 
China and one of the major OECD regions (USA or EU15) generate the highest global payoffs. In 
such coalitions regions with cheap abatement options match with regions with high marginal benefits. 
Secondly, we can obtain a significantly higher net present value of global payoffs compared to the 
outcomes under other transfer schemes. While we find that 25% of the potential gains from 
cooperation are obtained under emissions-based surplus sharing, an optimal transfer scheme can reap 
46%.13 Under optimal sharing transfers are arranged to minimise free-rider incentives by giving each 
region its outside option payoff if that is feasible; see Eq. (3.15). Every coalition that is internally 
                                                 
13 The percentages of potential gains from cooperation are 0% for All Singletons and 100% for the Grand 
Coalition. 
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stable under some sharing rule is also internally stable under optimal sharing. Hence it is expected 
from theory and does not come as surprise that optimal sharing can stabilise coalitions which perform 
better than the stable coalitions under other transfer schemes. However, the degree to which optimal 
sharing helps to bridge the gap between the All Singletons and the Grand Coalition performance is 
remarkable. 
Thirdly, ambitious coalitions will generate large positive externalities to non-cooperative regions, 
such as USA and EU15. The USA can obtain higher payoffs in a free-rider position when EU15 joins 
others; likewise EU15 can obtain higher payoffs in a free-rider position when the USA joins others 
(see Table 3.6). 
3.5. Sensitivity analysis 
As simulation results depend on parameter values which are subject to uncertainties associated with 
the numerical model, we conduct a sensitivity analysis to examine how the main assumptions affect 
the model results. The crucial parameters in this model are the abatement cost parameters α , β , the 
scale parameter of the benefit function Dγ , and the discount rate r . First, for the abatement costs, we 
simultaneously double or halve the base value of α  and β  for all regions. Second, for the scale 
parameter of the benefit function, we double the base value of Dγ ; this higher level is roughly 
equivalent to the estimate by Tol (2005). Similarly, we scale it down to one-half the original value, 
which roughly resembles the estimate of Nordhaus (1994). Finally, we change the base value of the 
discount rate r  from 2% to 1% and 3%, respectively.  
Table 3.7 presents the results of the sensitivity analysis under no transfers and with the different 
transfer schemes. Under the emissions-based permit trading and surplus sharing schemes we obtain the 
same stable coalitions using the alternative parameter values as in the base case. Similarly, under the 
optimal transfer scheme we find the same five stable coalitions that are performing best in terms of the 
net present value of global payoff and CO2 concentration as in the base case. Changing each parameter 
value will increase or decrease absolute values of the results, but ratios between regions remain almost 
unchanged. This indicates that for the transfer schemes that we analysed results in terms of stability 
are robust with respect to the investigated changes in the values of these key parameters.
  
Table 3.7: Sensitivity analysis 
Permit trading Surplus sharing Scenario No transfers 
Initial- emissions-based Future- emissions-based Initial- emissions-based Future- emissions-based 
Optimal sharing 
Base case {JPN, EU15} None {EU15, CHN} {USA, CHN} {USA, CHN} {USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE} 
      {JPN, IND}     {EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, IND} 
           {EU15, OOE, EET, CHN, IND} 
           {EU15, EET, CHN, IND, DAE} 
            {USA, EET, EEX, CHN, DAE, BRA} 
Marginal abatement cost            
Double None None {EU15, CHN} {USA, CHN} {USA, CHN} {USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE} 
      {JPN, IND}     {EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, IND} 
           {EU15, OOE, EET, CHN, IND} 
           {EU15, EET, CHN, IND, DAE} 
            {USA, EET, EEX, CHN, DAE, BRA} 
One-half {JPN, EU15} None {EU15, CHN} {USA, CHN} {USA, CHN} {USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE} 
      {JPN, IND}     {EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, IND} 
           {EU15, OOE, EET, CHN, IND} 
           {EU15, EET, CHN, IND, DAE} 
            {USA, EET, EEX, CHN, DAE, BRA} 
Marginal benefit            
Double {JPN, EU15} None {EU15, CHN} {USA, CHN} {USA, CHN} {USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE} 
      {JPN, IND}     {EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, IND} 
           {EU15, OOE, EET, CHN, IND} 
           {EU15, EET, CHN, IND, DAE} 
            {USA, EET, EEX, CHN, DAE, BRA} 
One-half None None {EU15, CHN} {USA, CHN} {USA, CHN} {USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE} 
      {JPN, IND}     {EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, IND} 
           {EU15, OOE, EET, CHN, IND} 
           {EU15, EET, CHN, IND, DAE} 
            {USA, EET, EEX, CHN, DAE, BRA} 
Discount rate            
1% {JPN, EU15} None {EU15, CHN} {USA, CHN} {USA, CHN} {USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE} 
      {JPN, IND}     {EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, IND} 
           {EU15, OOE, EET, CHN, IND} 
           {EU15, EET, CHN, IND, DAE} 
            {USA, EET, EEX, CHN, DAE, BRA} 
3% {JPN, EU15} None {EU15, CHN} {USA, CHN} {USA, CHN} {USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE} 
      {JPN, IND}     {EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, IND} 
           {EU15, OOE, EET, CHN, IND} 
           {EU15, EET, CHN, IND, DAE} 
            {USA, EET, EEX, CHN, DAE, BRA} 
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3.6. Discussion and conclusions 
In this paper we examine the stability of all possible climate coalitions in a cartel game under different 
transfer schemes using a numerical analysis. We investigate to what extent different types of transfer 
schemes can contribute to the stability of an international climate agreement, using our applied model 
STACO-2.1.  
The results of our model analysis should always be interpreted with the specific settings of the 
model and the underlying assumptions in mind; we emphasise that our analysis does not focus on 
multiple coalitions or on renegotiations, and that our conclusions only refer to one-shot cartel games. 
Nonetheless, our numerical analysis with a larger number of heterogeneous regions allows the 
identification of some general features that cannot be analysed in models with symmetric players.  
First, when the transfer scheme is poorly designed in the sense that it increases incentives to free-
ride, the best performing stable coalition may be worse than in the case of no transfers. In our setting, 
this occurs for the initial-emissions-based tradable permit system (grandfathering).  
Secondly, improvements of the initial-emissions-based tradable permit system, such as a tradable 
permit system based on the full path of emissions or a surplus sharing scheme, do enhance stability of 
coalitions, i.e. lead to stable coalitions that perform better in terms of emission reduction. The 
resulting stable coalitions, however, remain small and rather ineffective in comparison to the Grand 
Coalition. 
Thirdly, well-designed transfer schemes, including the optimal transfer scheme, can stabilise larger 
coalitions. Our paper shows in a calibrated setting that optimal transfers perform much better than 
more pragmatic transfer schemes: the most ambitious stable coalition under optimal transfers is at least 
twice as effective (in terms of reaping the potential gains from cooperation) as under any of the 
pragmatic schemes we have considered. This remarkable result implies that it is important in actual 
negotiations to design appropriate transfer schemes. But such schemes require detailed insight into the 
incentive structures of the regions. Thus, there is a trade-off between more pragmatic schemes that 
may be easier to implement but are hardly effective, and more elaborate schemes, that would be more 
effective but which may be hard to achieve in actual negotiations. 
Fourthly, large asymmetries between regions imply not only that the gains from cooperation are 
large, but also that free-rider incentives are large (cf. Barrett, 1994). Whereas transfer schemes can 
play a major role in mitigating the free-rider incentives, the financial flows involved may be huge (in 
our setting annual transfers may be several billions of US$). The political implications of such huge 
flows are daunting and may complicate negotiations. 
Finally, it turns out that even with optimal transfers ambitious coalitions consisting of e.g. USA, 
EU and China are not stable. We can conclude that transfer schemes can play a role in aligning 
regional incentives to induce larger and more effective stable coalitions, but other mechanisms are 
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required to overcome the strong remaining free-rider incentives. Although it may be difficult to 
estimate future emission paths and outside option payoffs and to implement a formal optimal sharing 
scheme, we show that for enhancing stability it is essential to be aware of the incentives for regions to 
participate. Incentives can be set either through the allocation of permits or through the design of the 
transfer mechanisms (or compensation payments). Bringing the idea of optimal sharing and the outside 
option payoffs to the attention of negotiators may help to identify an allocation of costs and benefits 
over the various regions that provides incentives to join a climate agreement and to contribute to 
global abatement of greenhouse gases. 
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Appendix 3A 
Table 3A-1: Main model parameter values 
Symbol Description Value Unit Source 
M  Pre-industrial level of CO2 stock 590 GtC Nordhaus (1994) 
δ  Natural annual removal rate of CO2 stock 0.00866 - Nordhaus (1994) 
ω  Airborne fraction of emissions remaining in the atmosphere 0.64 - Nordhaus (1994) 
r  Discount rate 0.02 - Assumption 
iθ  Share of region i  in global benefits see Table 3A-2,  column 3 
Own calculation based on 
Fankhauser (1995)  
iα  Abatement cost parameter of region i  
see Table 3A-2, 
column 4 
Own calculation based on  
Ellerman and Decaux (1998) 
iβ  Abatement cost parameter of region i  
see Table 3A-2,  
column 5 
Own calculation based on  
Ellerman and Decaux (1998) 
ς  Technological progress parameter 0.005 - Assumption 
Dγ  
Scale parameter of damage and benefit 
function 0.027 - Tol (1997) 
Table 3A-2: Regional parameter values 
Regions Emission in 2010 
Share of global 
benefits  
Parameter of 
abatement cost 
Parameter of 
abatement cost 
 GtC (share)    
USA 1.763 (0.238) 0.226 0.0005 0.0398 
JPN 0.344 (0.046) 0.173 0.0155 1.8160 
EU15 0.943 (0.127) 0.236 0.0024 0.1503 
OOE 0.360 (0.049) 0.035 0.0083 0 
EET 0.226 (0.030) 0.013 0.0079 0.0486 
FSU 0.774 (0.104) 0.068 0.0023 0.0042 
EEX 0.469 (0.063) 0.030 0.0032 0.3029 
CHN 1.127 (0.152) 0.062 0.00007 0.0239 
IND 0.344 (0.046) 0.050 0.0015 0.0787 
DAE 0.316 (0.043) 0.025 0.0047 0.3774 
BRA 0.122 (0.016) 0.015 0.5612 8.4974 
ROW 0.637 (0.086) 0.068 0.0021 0.0805 
World       7.425 (1) ( )θ 1i =∑      
iα iβiθ
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Figure 3A-1: Regional BAU emission paths 
Source: Own calculations based on projections from the MIT-EPPA model (Paltsev et al., 
2005) 
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Chapter 4 
Technology spillovers and stability of international climate 
coalitions* 
Cooperation in international environmental agreements appears difficult to attain because of strong 
free-rider incentives. This paper explores how different technology spillover mechanisms among 
regions can influence the incentives to join and stabilise an international agreement. We use an applied 
modelling framework (STACO) that enables us to investigate the stability of partial climate coalitions. 
Several theories on the impact of technology spillovers are evaluated by simulating a range of 
alternative specifications. We find that spillovers are a good instrument to increase the abatement 
efforts of coalitions and reduce the associated costs. In our setting, however, they cannot overcome the 
strong free-rider incentives that are present in larger coalitions, i.e. technology spillovers do not 
substantially increase the success of international environmental agreements. This conclusion is robust 
with respect to the specification of technology spillovers. 
                                                 
* This chapter is based on the article: Miyuki Nagashima and Rob Dellink (2008), Technology spillovers and 
stability of international climate coalitions, International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and 
Economics, Vol. 8, 343-365. The authors would like to acknowledge valuable comments and suggestions from 
two anonymous referees. We gratefully incorporated the suggestion of a reviewer to refocus our results section 
on an investigation of the level and asymmetry effects of spillovers. We thank Hans-Peter Weikard for 
simulating discussions. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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4.1. Introduction 
Successful CO2 emission abatement requires international cooperation. However, full cooperation in 
the international environmental agreements (IEAs) seems to be difficult to achieve because of free-
riding incentives. Game-theoretic approaches are widely used to explore the properties of IEAs. For 
example, Barrett (1994) proves that stable coalitions will achieve little if the difference between the 
non-cooperative outcome and the full-cooperative outcome for each region is large. In order to solve 
this problem, numerous studies examine the effects of institutional settings aimed to stimulate 
voluntary participation in the IEAs, for example, through transfers (e.g. Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; 
Bloch, 1997; Hoel and Schneider, 1997; Weikard et al., 2006). A general observation from this 
literature is that rather inefficient partial coalitions tend to emerge and the coalition with all the 
members may not be attained. De Zeeuw (2008) widens the scope to a dynamic context and confirms 
that large stable coalitions can only emerge when the gains from cooperation are small. Thus, even 
with transfers, full cooperation on emission abatement is hard to establish.  
The purpose of this paper is to systematically investigate how various technology spillover 
mechanisms affect the formation and stability of climate coalitions in a non-cooperative game. To do 
this, we use an integrated assessment model, STACO (Finus et al., 2006; Nagashima et al., 2009). We 
explore how technology spillovers that depend on the coalition that is formed influence the incentive 
structures to join the coalition. Moreover, we examine whether the effects of technology spillovers are 
large enough to stabilise more ambitious coalitions by offsetting the incentive to free-ride. We 
simulate several spillover mechanisms and specifications that are available in the literature to 
investigate the robustness of these links.  
The paper is organised as follows. The remainder of this section sketches the main insights from 
the literature on technology cooperation and coalition formation. Section 4.2 provides the game- 
theoretic and empirical framework of the STACO model, and introduces technology spillovers in the 
model. Section 4.3 reports the main results with technology spillovers, followed by an analysis of the 
impact of the level and direction of spillovers between coalition members and to outsiders in Section 
4.4. Section 4.5 provides an analysis of alternative specifications of technology, and Section 4.6 
concludes. The Appendix provides the model parameter values.  
4.1.1 Technology and coalition formation 
It has been commonly recognised that technological change plays a significant role in controlling 
climate change costs. In traditional neoclassical models, technological change is determined 
exogenously, where it increases factor productivity (e.g. for analytical studies, Arrow et al., 1961; 
Kennedy, 1962; Uzawa, 1965, and for empirical studies, Peck and Teisberg, 1994; Nordhaus, 1994; 
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Nordhaus and Yang, 1996). New growth theory places more emphasis on the endogenous role of 
technology and its positive externalities that drive economic growth (Romer, 1990; Griliches, 1992; 
Grossman and Helpman, 1994). Endogenous technological change can be measured in different ways 
(see Weyant and Olavson, 1999 and Löschel, 2002 for excellent surveys in the domain of climate 
change modelling). Löschel (2002) and Clarke et al. (2008) present three main factors in endogenous 
technological change models: (i) research and development (R&D) investment, (ii) technology 
spillovers (between countries, industries or firms) and (iii) learning-by-doing.  
In this paper, we focus on the role of technology spillovers between countries (cf. Coe and 
Helpman, 1995) for the success of international climate agreements. As our framework is a cost-
benefit analysis of climate policy, technology spillovers are not derived from R&D investment, but 
they are treated as factors that lead to cost reductions stemming from the level of knowledge in other 
regions.1 In short, technology spillovers depend on the state of technology to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions.  
In the domain of coalition formation, a number of studies have proposed to link the agreements on 
emissions abatement with technological cooperation. The main idea of this mechanism is that each 
region negotiates not only on emissions abatement but also negotiates on technological cooperation, 
which might induce regions to join a coalition. For example, Carraro and Siniscalco (1994), Cesar and 
De Zeeuw (1996) and Barrett (2003) indicate that linkage of the IEAs on climate control and 
technological cooperation may stabilise an IEA, as payoffs of signatories will increase due to 
increased technological spillovers from other signatories. Carraro and Siniscalco (1997) show that 
linkage of the environmental agreement with an agreement on technological cooperation may 
overcome free-riding problems due to the fact that the negotiation on both climate control and 
technology is more profitable to signatories when benefits from technological cooperation are 
exclusive to them than the negotiation on climate control only. Tol et al. (2000, 2001) investigate the 
diffusion of abatement technology and argue that when diffusion can be restricted to coalition 
members, this may reduce free-rider incentives, although countries prefer to cooperate only on 
technology and not on abatement. Kemfert (2004) shows in an applied coalition formation game with 
four regions that signatories can profit more when they cooperate on emissions abatement and 
technological innovation than in the case of non-cooperation. Furthermore, there exist incentives for 
non-cooperating countries, such as U.S.A., to join an agreement in which countries cooperate both on 
emission abatement and technological innovations, because they can obtain technology spillovers, 
which improve energy efficiency through trade in goods with signatories; international trade effects 
are further investigated in Kemfert et al. (2004). 
                                                 
1Growth theory considers spillovers as positive externalities, while innovation theory does not.  For a detailed 
discussion, see Weyant and Olavson (1999). 
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Buonanno et al. (2003) define the international spillovers of knowledge generated by a stock of 
world knowledge. In their setting, international knowledge spillovers affect both the production 
function and the emission to output ratio. Golombek and Hoel (2005) assume that the technology level 
of the region depends on own investments in R&D and R&D investment in other countries 
(signatories) using a certain rate of technology diffusion, and R&D activities in cooperating countries 
will lower abatement costs in non-cooperating countries due to technology diffusion. Bosetti et al. 
(2009) have recently taken up this issue in an applied setting, using the multi-regional endogenous 
growth model WITCH. 
Buchner and Carraro (2005a, 2005b, 2006) explore the interactions between technology and 
coalition formation using the FEEM-RICE model. While their analysis touches upon the same topic as 
ours, they focus on a subset of possible coalitions and investigate stability issues only for those. This 
means that they cannot show the general implications of technology spillovers on coalition formation 
nor address which regions will participate in the most ambitious stable coalitions. 
Most existing models assume that the level of environmental technology can be approximated by 
looking at the emission intensity of production, that knowledge can be aggregated over regions 
through summation and that spillovers have the effect of pivoting the marginal abatement cost (MAC) 
curve down. Recent literature suggests, however, that a best-shot aggregation of technology may be 
more appropriate (Sandler, 2006). Furthermore, alternative indicators of technology, based on for 
example energy intensity or carbon intensity, are also found in the applied literature (e.g. Kemfert, 
2004). Finally, Baker et al. (2008) and Bauman et al. (2008) challenge the conventional specification 
that spillovers (or learning, for that matter) pivot down the MAC curves. Baker et al. (2008) suggest 
two alternatives: an extension of the MAC curve to the right, and a change in the curvature of the 
MAC curve. 
The general insight that emerges from these studies is that there are a number of different channels 
through which technology spillovers may affect the payoffs of regions and thus the incentives to 
cooperate: (i) global spillovers from a world stock of knowledge, (ii) spillovers that are directly 
derived from participation in the agreement (coalitional spillovers) and (iii) spillovers to outsiders. 
Furthermore, technology spillovers can be specified in different ways, depending on the answer to the 
essential questions of how to measure technology and how to specify the effects of spillovers on the 
MAC curve. 
What all these studies lack, however, is a systematic analysis of the influence of technology 
spillovers on the stability of international climate agreements with heterogeneous players in an applied 
setting. Moreover, these studies do not shed light on the influence of the relative magnitude of 
spillovers between coalition members versus spillovers to outsiders, which can be a significant 
element for the success of climate coalitions. 
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4.2. The stability of coalitions model (STACO) 
4.2.1. Game-theoretic background 
In this section, we describe the game-theoretic model. Our analysis uses a two-stage, one shot game. 
In the first stage, regions denoted by Ni∈ , { }nN ,...,1=  decide whether they sign the agreement or 
not. Signatories form a coalition and non-signatories remain singletons in the second stage of the 
game. Then, all regions simultaneously determine their emission abatement levels. The payoff for each 
region iπ  is a function of regional benefits itB  and regional abatement costs itAC  at period t . 
Formally, we have: 
 { }∑
∞
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− −⋅+=
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t
itittit
t
i qACqqBrq    (4.1) 
where q  is an abatement matrix of dimension N × ∞ , and r  is the discount rate. The payoff is 
calculated as the net present value (NPV) of the stream of net benefits. We assume that the regional 
benefits depend on past and current global emission abatement, and the regional abatement costs 
depend on a regions own current abatement. The regional abatement levels are determined within the 
abatement strategy space [ ]itit eq ,0∈ , where ite  denotes emission levels in the business-as-usual 
(BAU) scenario.  
We apply the solution concept of a partial agreement Nash equilibrium between the signatories and 
singletons (Chander and Tulkens, 1995, 1997). We assume that signatories determine their abatement 
level by maximising the sum of the payoffs of the signatories taking the abatement levels of non-
signatories as given. Non-signatories choose their abatement level by maximising their own payoffs 
taking the other regions abatement levels as given. This abatement game has a unique interior 
solution under the STACO specification of benefit and cost functions (see Section 4.2.2).  
We apply the optimal sharing rule developed by Carraro et al. (2006) and Weikard (2009). Optimal 
sharing requires that each signatory obtains at least the payoff that can be secured when it deviates 
from coalition K . This is called the outside option payoff. In addition, the residual is distributed in 
proportion to the outside option payoffs2. Weikard (2009) shows that surplus sharing according to 
outside option payoffs internally stabilises all coalitions that are possibly stable under any sharing rule. 
That is, if the coalition payoff is distributed in such a way that each member gets at least its outside-
                                                 
2 The residual can be shared by each coalition member in any way desired, because it does not affect internal 
stability as long as these shares are non-negative. 
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option payoff, then no region has incentives to leave the coalition. Hence, the coalition is internally 
stable whenever the coalition payoff (weakly) exceeds the sum of the outside option payoffs.  
We refer to the situations where none or one of the regions joins a coalition as All Singletons, and 
a coalition where all regions cooperate as Grand Coalition. Following dAspremont et al. (1983), we 
call a coalition K stable if the coalition satisfies both internal and external stability. Internal stability of 
a coalition means that no signatory has an incentive to withdraw from the coalition. External stability 
of a coalition means that no singleton has an incentive to join the coalition. 
4.2.2. The STACO model  
In this section, we present the main issues in the numerical specification of our model in a dynamic 
setting described in Nagashima et al. (2009), which is an extension of the original static STACO-1 
model explained in Finus et al. (2006). We consider twelve world regions: USA (USA), Japan (JPN), 
European Union-15 (EU15), other OECD countries (OOE), Eastern European countries (EET), former 
Soviet Union (FSU), energy exporting countries (EEX), China (CHN), India (IND), dynamic Asian 
economies (DAE), Brazil (BRA) and rest of the world (ROW). Payoffs from abatement are given as 
the NPV of benefits minus abatement costs over the model horizon. We set the model horizon to 
infinity to capture future benefits from abatement, while adopting a planning horizon for abatement 
and coalition formation of 100 years, ranging from 2011 to 2110. Calibration of the regional BAU 
emission paths, 3  represented in the Appendix 4A (Figure 4A-1), is based on the data for CO2 
emissions derived from the EPPA model (Babiker et al., 2001; Paltsev et al., 2005) and the GDP path 
is also derived from the EPPA model. Our benefit function is based on a linearised approximation of 
avoided damages, calculated by using the damage module of the DICE model (Nordhaus, 1994) and 
the climate module by Germain and van Steenberghe (2003). For global damages, we apply the 
estimate by Tol (1997) that damages amount to 2.7% of GDP for a doubling of concentrations over 
pre-industrial levels. Global benefits are allocated according to a fixed share for each region, as 
displayed in Appendix (Table 4A-2). We specify a regional abatement cost function based on the 
estimates of the EPPA model by Ellerman and Decaux (1998). 
4.2.3. Technology spillovers 
In our base model, we adopt the (common) assumption that technology spills over to region i in period 
t ( itς ) by reducing marginal abatement costs through pivoting of the MAC curve
4: 
                                                 
3 We use data from World Bank (2003) to match the regional aggregation in EPPA to STACO. 
4 We investigate alternative assumptions in Section 4.5. 
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−∏  reflects the product of technological spillovers until period t, and α and β are the 
abatement cost parameters in our base year 2010 . 
The size of the technology spillover depends on which regions are member of the coalition. We 
assume that the spillovers will be higher when more regions are member of the coalition, and when 
regions with an advanced state of technology are member of the coalition, but the size of the spillover 
cannot be controlled by the coalition members, as their state of technology is exogenous. Spillovers to 
region j  in period t  ( jtς ) are expressed through a summation over all players of the regional 
spillover effect times the state of technology: 
 
1
N
jt ij it
i
SoTς ξ
=
= ⋅∑          (4.4) 
with 0 1ijξ≤ <  the spillover effect from region i to region j. In different scenarios, the value of  ijξ  
varies, depending on whether i and/or j are member of the coalition. Unfortunately, there is no strong 
empirical base to calibrate the values of  ijξ . Therefore, we conduct a robustness analysis by changing 
the values of these spillover coefficients in Section 4.4. 
The state of technology (SoT) used in Eq. (4.4) is the inverse of the regional emission intensity in 
the reference path, calculated as the business-as-usual amount of CO2 emission per unit of GDP.5 The 
rationale for this definition is that regions that have low emission intensities have a high level of 
knowledge on GHG abatement strategies. To investigate the robustness of this definition, we compare 
some alternative definitions in Section 4.5. As we use the state of technology as an indicator of the 
level of knowledge, we refer to the emission intensity in the reference path and do not adjust for 
changes in the emission intensity due to abatement. This is because we interpret abatement primarily 
as a movement along the technology curve, i.e. adoption of existing knowledge, rather than a shift of 
the curve, i.e. creation of new knowledge. As for the state of technology, Table 4.1 shows that Japan 
                                                 
5 We scale the SoTs such that global SoT equals 1 in 2110. 
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has the highest state of technology throughout the century, followed by EU15. On the other hand, 
U.S.A. and China have relatively low states of technology.  
Table 4.1: State of technology based on emission intensity 
Year USA JPN EU15 OOE EET FSU EEX CHN IND DAE BRA ROW 
2011 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 
2060 0.05 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.04 
2110 0.07 0.21 0.14 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.11 0.16 0.08 
Note: The state of technology is based on the inverse of BAU emissions over GDP for each region 
(ton/US1000$) and we scale the state of technology such that the global state of technology equals 1 in 
2110. 
To investigate the role of spillovers on coalitional stability in a systematic manner, we investigate five 
scenarios, which differ with respect to the type of spillover between regions. 
In the first or reference scenario, we consider coalition formation in the absence of technology 
spillovers, and do not assume any technological progress. We assume no technology spillovers among 
regions: 0ijξ = . 
In the second scenario, we assume regional spillovers that depend only on the own state of 
technology, i.e. internal spillovers. Therefore, we have 0owniiξ ξ= > , 0ij j iξ = ∀ ≠ . Although we 
have no solid empirical basis for the size of this internal spillover, we assume 0.01ownξ = . As the 
regional state of technology will always be smaller than unity, this implies technology spillovers of 
less than 1% per annum. 
In the third scenario, we assume global spillovers, which mimics international spillovers of 
knowledge generated by the stock of world knowledge as in Buonanno et al. (2003), although our 
model is much simpler and thus cannot capture the knowledge creation aspect. We rather focus on the 
link between technology spillovers and incentives to cooperate in an IEA. In this context, the essence 
of the global spillovers is that every region obtains technology spillovers, irrespective of membership 
of the coalition or not: 0globalijξ ξ= > . We assume that this global spillover replaces the internal 
spillover from scenario 2 ( 0ownξ = ). Assuming the same spillover rate, that is, 0.01globalξ = , leads to 
technological progress slowly increasing over the century to 1% per annum. 
In the fourth scenario, in addition to the global spillovers, signatories to the climate agreement gain 
spillovers from the other coalition members (cf. the coalition information exchange parameter in 
Carraro and Siniscalco, 1997); this scenario also refers to the mechanism in Kemfert (2004) that 
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participants cooperate on technological innovation. With coalitional spillovers, in addition to global 
spillovers, signatories can obtain higher spillovers from other signatories, that is,  
0 , ;
0 .
C global
ij
global
ij
i j K
else
ξ ξ ξ
ξ ξ
⎧ = + > ∀ ∈⎪
⎨
= >⎪⎩
 
We calibrate coalitional spillovers to Cξ =0.005 and still globalξ =0.01.  
This scenario is expected to provide a stimulus for regions to join a coalition, as membership brings 
technology benefits, although the effect is assumed to be moderate, as it is on top of the global 
spillover effect. 
In the fifth scenario, following Golombek and Hoel (2005), we consider all possible technology 
spillovers, i.e., we extend the mechanism of the third scenario with spillovers to singletons (which we 
label extended spillovers). In this setting, not only signatories benefit from internal coalition 
spillovers, but also singletons can obtain spillovers from signatories, that is  
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where extended spillovers ( NCξ ) equal 0.001 and still Cξ =0.005 and globalξ =0.01. In this case, we 
assume that a region can also benefit from its own contribution to the coalitional spillovers not as in 
the case of internal coalitional spillovers, and that outsiders can get some ratio of spillovers from the 
coalition. Following Carraro and Siniscalco (1997), we assume that the diffusion rate among coalitions 
is larger than the one towards outsiders. 
4.3. Results 
As we cannot properly estimate the values of different ξ , our analysis of the results focuses on the 
impact of varying levels of spillovers on stability of climate coalitions (Section 4.4), and a comparison 
of different specifications (Section 4.5). Nonetheless, it is instructive to start with an analysis of the 
stability for all 4,084 coalition structures for the five scenarios. 
In order to improve comparison of the results across scenarios, we need normalisation as larger 
technology spillovers imply larger NPV of payoffs (through lower abatement costs). We calculate the 
percentage of the gap between Grand Coalition and All Singletons that is closed by a coalition, which 
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can be interpreted as a normalised indicator of success of the coalition.6 Table 4.2 shows the best-
performing stable coalitions in all scenarios of technology spillovers, the associated NPV of global 
payoffs in billion dollars and the associated indicator of success. We obtain 185 stable coalitions in the 
cases of no spillovers and internal spillovers, and 182 stable coalitions in the case of global spillovers. 
Clearly, global spillovers lead to higher absolute payoffs than no spillovers and internal spillovers for 
any given coalition structure. While marginal abatement costs are lower and payoffs are higher in the 
presence of technology spillovers, the incentives to join or leave a coalition are not significantly 
influenced. The best performing coalition, in terms of global payoff and indicator of success, is formed 
by the USA, EET, CHN, IND and DAE. While absolute payoffs increase with global spillovers, the 
indicator of success remains virtually unchanged: the spillovers affect all coalitions and also the gap 
between Grand Coalition and All Singletons. As the incentives to change membership depend on a 
comparison of different coalitions, the absolute values are much less important than the relative 
differences. The indicator of success shows that these relative differences hardly change, which 
implies that the incentives to change membership hardly change. A first conclusion can therefore be 
that internal and global technology spillovers are not successful instruments to enhance the stability of 
climate coalitions. 
Under coalitional spillovers, where coalition members benefit from partners through technology 
spillovers, we have 193 stable coalitions. There are two mechanisms at work here. First, the indicator 
of success for any given coalition is lower than in the case of no, internal and global spillovers 
(although absolute payoffs are higher). This is due to the fact that the rate of technology spillovers 
depends on the coalition formation and these spillovers work best in the Grand Coalition, i.e. they 
increase the gap between the Grand Coalition and All Singletons. Secondly, new coalitions stabilise 
that are more ambitious; in this case, the coalition of USA, EET, EEX, CHN and IND. That these two 
mechanisms counteract each other is confirmed by the small decrease in the average indicator of 
success. 
In the case of extended spillovers, global payoffs and the associated indicator of success are 
slightly higher than in the case of coalitional spillovers. The reason is that the spillovers to outsiders 
are not reflected in the Grand Coalition; therefore, the gap between the NPV of global payoffs in 
Grand Coalition and in All Singletons is the same for coalitional spillovers and extended spillovers, 
while the NPV of global payoffs for any given coalition is larger in the case of extended spillovers as 
singletons can benefit from the spillovers generated by the coalition members. In our setting, however, 
the extended spillovers are not sufficiently strong to substantially alter the set of stable coalitions. We 
will investigate this finding in more detail in Section 4.4. 
                                                 
6 The indicator of success for a coalition is calculated as the difference between the NPV of global payoff when a 
coalition is formed and in All Singletons divided by the difference between the NPV of global payoff in the 
Grand Coalition and in All Singletons.  
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Table 4.2: NPV of global payoffs in the selected stable coalitions 
  No spillovers Internal spillovers Global spillovers Coalitional spillovers Extended spillovers 
Coalition 
Indicator 
of success 
(%) 
NPV of 
global 
payoff 
(billion $) 
Indicator 
of success 
(%) 
 NPV of 
global 
payoff 
(billion $) 
Indicator 
of success 
(%) 
NPV of 
global 
payoff 
(billion $) 
Indicator 
of success 
(%) 
NPV of 
global 
payoff 
(billion $) 
Indicator 
of success 
(%) 
NPV of 
global 
payoff 
(billion $) 
[USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE] 46.0 8590 (1) 45.9 8645 (1) 46.0 9655 (1)  43.4 9783 (2)  43.4 9789 (2)  
[EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, IND] 45.8 8571 (2) 45.7 8624 (2) 45.8 9635 (2)  43.2 9761 (3)  43.2 9769 (3)  
[EU15, OOE, EET, CHN, IND] 44.8 8486 (3) 44.7 8538 (3) 44.8 9530 (3)  42.2 9662 (5)  42.3 9671 (5)  
[EU15, EET, CHN, IND, DAE] 44.6 8472 (4) 44.6 8526 (4) 44.7 9525 (4)  42.3 9665 (4)  42.3 9675 (4)  
[USA, EET, EEX, CHN, DAE, BRA] 43.7 8386 (5) 43.6 8442 (5) 43.8 9440 (5)  42.0 9639 (7)  42.1 9650 (7)  
[USA, EET, EEX, CHN, IND] NS  NS  NS   44.3 9882 (1)  44.3 9886 (1)  
Total number of stable coalitions 185 185 182 193 195 
Indicator of success (average %) 21.1 21.1 21.1 21.0 21.3 
Note: The number in the bracket shows ranking in terms of NPV of global payoff. NS denotes not stable coalition 
Indicator of success (%): ((NPV of global payoff in a coalition  NPV of global payoff in All Singletons) / (NPV of global payoff in Grand Coalition  NPV of global 
payoff in All Singletons))*100 
Indicator of success (average %): ((Average NPV of global payoffs in all stable coalitions  NPV of global payoff in All Singletons) / (NPV of global payoff in Grand 
Coalition  NPV of global payoff in All Singletons))*100 
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In the coalitional and extended spillover scenarios, the number of stable coalition increases and 
new stable coalition between USA, EET, EEX, CHN, and IND emerges, which ranks first. That the 
stable coalition consisting of six regions between USA, EET, EEX, CHN, DAE, BRA does not rank in 
the top five shows that the size of the coalition does not necessarily dictate the ambitious level of the 
coalition: in the setting with heterogeneous regions, a smaller coalition of key players may be more 
successful than a large coalition. 
For these five scenarios, we can conclude that only moderately small stable coalitions emerge, 
which close the gap between the Grand Coalition and All Singletons by less than 50%. Furthermore, 
while coalitional spillovers do increase payoffs and stabilise somewhat more ambitious coalitions, 
they also increase the gap between Grand Coalition and All Singletons, making the indicator of 
success smaller.  
In the fourth and fifth scenarios, the coalition is assumed to be able to control the technology 
spillovers, albeit only partially in the extended spillover case. This setting can be interpreted as a 
model in which the public good (abatement) is coupled with a club good (technological knowledge; 
for details on club goods, see Sandler and Tschirhart, 1997). The provision of the public good is 
affected by the presence of the club good. In our setting, the coalition may be able to control which 
regions share in the club good, but it does not deliberately choose the level of provision of the club 
good: it is not an independent choice variable. This is due to our assumption that spillovers are linked 
to the exogenous state of technology of the coalition members. Thus, the public good game does not 
affect the provision of the club good for any given coalition. Still, the model does of course capture the 
effect that when more regions join the coalition, both the level of abatement (the public good) and the 
level of technology spillovers (the club good) increase. 
4.4. Disentangling the impact of coalitional spillovers 
As shown in the previous section, coalition spillovers can enhance stability to some extent, although 
the indicator of success is lower than in the other scenarios. To understand the main elements which 
stabilise the coalition, we address the following questions: Does the magnitude of the technology 
spillovers created by the coalition (the level effect) matter? Does the relative rate of the coalitional 
spillovers between the coalition members and outsiders (the asymmetry effect) influence the success 
of climate coalitions? In order to explore the main driving forces, we explore these two questions by 
varying the level of coalitional and extended spillovers in Section 4.4.1 and by varying the ratio 
between coalitional and extended spillovers in Section 4.4.2. We consider the case of extended 
spillovers examined in Section 4.3 as the base case in the following sections. 
  79
4.4.1. Analysis of the impact of the level effect 
In the first analysis, we explore the level effect on the stability of coalitions by increasing the 
magnitude of the coefficient of coalitional and extended technology spillovers. We examine the 
stability of all coalitions using different values of coalitional spillovers to coalitional members ( Cξ ) 
and to outsiders ( NCξ ), moving from 0.005 to 0.05 for coalition members and from 0.001 to 0.01 for 
outsiders in five steps, while the ratio of the coalitional spillovers to coalitional members over 
spillovers to outsiders remains the same.  
The results of these calculations are summarised in Table 4.3, which shows the NPV of global 
payoffs and associated indicator of success for the best-performing stable coalitions.  
Table 4.3: NPV of global payoffs in the selected stable coalitions 
for the analysis of level effects 
 Cξ / NCξ  
Coalition Base case 0.01/0.002 0.02/0.004 0.03/0.006 0.04/0.008 0.05/0.01 
USA, EET, EEX, CHN, IND 9886 (44.3) 10004 (41.6) 10247 (36.7) NS NS NS 
USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE 9789 (43.4) 9926 (40.9) 10209 (36.4) NS NS NS 
EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, IND 9769 (43.2) 9906 (40.8) NS NS NS NS 
EU15, EET, CHN, IND, DAE, BRA NS 10112 (42.5) 10593 (39.1) 11114 (36.1) 11678 (33.5) NS 
EU15, EEX, CHN, IND, DAE NS 10065 (42.1) 10430 (38.0) NS NS NS 
EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, IND, BRA NS NS 10634 (39.4) 11110 (36.0) 11624 (33.2) NS 
EU15, OOE, EET, EEX, CHN, DAE NS NS 10604 (39.2) 11080 (35.9) NS NS 
EU15, EEX, CHN, IND, DAE, BRA NS NS NS 11469 (38.2) 12103 (35.7) NS 
USA, EU15, EET, CHN, BRA NS NS NS 11380 (37.7) 11947 (34.9) NS 
EU15, EET, CHN, DAE, BRA, ROW NS NS NS 11228 (36.8) 11861 (34.4) 12555 (32.5) 
JPN, EU15, EET, CHN, DAE, BRA NS NS NS NS 12751 (39.0) 13741 (37.7) 
EU15, OOE, EET, EEX, CHN, DAE, BRA NS NS NS NS 12495 (37.7) 13324 (35.9) 
USA, EU15, CHN, DAE, BRA NS NS NS NS 12438 (37.4) NS 
JPN, EU15, EEX, CHN, DAE, BRA NS NS NS NS NS 14294 (40.1) 
JPN, EU15, OOE, CHN, DAE, BRA NS NS NS NS NS 14173 (39.6) 
USA, EU15, EET, CHN, DAE, BRA NS NS NS NS NS 14140 (39.4) 
Total number of stable coalitions 195 203 233 250 274 267 
Indicator of success (average %) 21.3 21.1 21.1 21.6 22.0 23.6 
Note: NS denotes not stable coalition. The numbers in bold show three best-performing stable coalitions in 
terms of NPV of global payoffs (billion US$) 
The number in bracket denotes indicator of success (%): ((NPV of global payoff in a coalition  NPV of global 
payoff in All Singletons) / (NPV of global payoff in Grand Coalition  NPV of global payoff in All 
Singletons))*100 
Indicator of success (average %): ((Average NPV of global payoffs in all stable coalitions  NPV of global 
payoff in All Singletons) / (NPV of global payoff in Grand Coalition  NPV of global payoff in All 
Singletons))*100 
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The results show that the best-performing stable coalitions substantially change with the magnitude of 
spillovers. It is likely that Brazil and Japan, who have higher marginal abatement costs, have 
incentives to join the coalition as spillovers increase. For example, the coalition of EU15, EET, CHN, 
IND and DAE, which ranks fourth in the base case model (in the last column of Table 4.2), is not 
stable anymore as spillovers increase, whereas these regions complemented by Brazil form a new 
stable coalition. In line with the analysis in Section 4.3, the indicator of success for each stable 
coalition decreases with higher spillovers, as is clearly shown in Table 4.3. Higher spillovers imply 
higher global payoffs in the Grand Coalition, while the global payoff in the All Singletons remains the 
same across all spillover levels. This difference is so large that the indicator of success decreases 
substantially with increasing spillovers for a given stable coalition. The conclusion can be drawn that 
larger spillovers tend to increase the size of stable coalition (up to seven members), and largely change 
the structure of the stable coalitions, but the level effect may not have large effects on the indicator of 
success. 
4.4.2. Analysis of the impact of the asymmetry effect 
In the second analysis, we focus on the effects of the relative rate of the coalitional spillovers between 
the coalition members in comparison to spillovers to outsiders on the stability of coalitions. We 
explore this asymmetry effect in two ways. First, we increase the coefficient of coalitional spillovers 
to outsiders in four steps while keeping those to coalition members the same as in the base case. 
Second, we increase the coefficient of coalitional spillovers to coalition members while those to 
outsiders remain the same. We suspect that larger asymmetry between technology spillovers among 
signatories versus outsiders may enhance larger stable coalitions. The larger spillovers induce 
signatories to stay in the coalition, and thus additional internally stable coalitions are expected to 
emerge. The large coalitional spillovers attract potential new entrants because coalition members can 
get higher benefits from increased abatement by reducing emissions at lower costs than in the base 
model. 
Table 4.4(a) shows the results of the asymmetry effects when the coefficient of coalitional 
spillovers to outsiders increases. The results suggest that the four best-performing stable coalitions 
remain the same, regardless of the level of extended spillovers. Thus, while the numbers change 
slightly, the Table clearly shows that the asymmetry effect is of little importance for the stability of 
climate coalitions.7 
                                                 
7 This conclusion may not hold for much larger values of the extended spillovers, but we feel that much higher 
values would not be realistic. 
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Table 4.4(a): NPV of global payoffs in the selected stable coalitions for the analysis of asymmetry 
effects 
 
Cξ  / NCξ  
Coalition Base case 0.005/0.002 0.005/0.003 0.005/0.004 0.005/0.005 
USA, EET, EEX, CHN, IND 9886 (44.3) 9891 (44.4) 9896 (44.4) 9901 (44.5) 9906 (44.5) 
USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE 9789 (43.4) 9795 (43.5) 9800 (43.5) 9806 (43.6) 9812 (43.6) 
EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, IND 9769 (43.2) 9778 (43.3) 9786 (43.4) 9795 (43.5) 9804 (43.6) 
EU15, EET, CHN, IND, DAE 9675 (42.3) 9685 (42.4) 9695 (42.5) 9705 (42.6) 9715 (42.7) 
EU15, OOE, EET, CHN, IND 9671 (42.3) 9680 (42.4) 9690 (42.5) 9699 (42.6) 9709 (42.7) 
EU15, EET, CHN, DAE, ROW 9655 (42.2) 9677 (42.4) 9689 (42.5) 9700 (42.6) 9712 (42.7) 
Total number of stable coalitions 195 194 201 200 204 
Indicator of success (average %) 21.3 21.7 21.6 21.9 22.1 
Note: The numbers in bold rank in top five in terms of NPV of global payoff (billion US$) 
The number in bracket denotes indicator of success (%): ((NPV of global payoff in a coalition  NPV of global 
payoff in All Singletons) / (NPV of global payoff in Grand Coalition  NPV of global payoff in All 
Singletons))*100 
Indicator of success (average %): ((Average NPV of global payoffs in all stable coalitions  NPV of global 
payoff in All Singletons) / (NPV of global payoff in Grand Coalition  NPV of global payoff in All 
Singletons))*100 
Table 4.4(b): NPV of global payoffs in the selected stable coalitions for the analysis of 
asymmetry effects 
 
Cξ  / NCξ  
Coalition Base case 0.01/0.001 0.02/0.001 0.03/0.001 0.04/0.001 0.05/0.001 
USA, EET, EEX, CHN, IND  9886 (44.3) 10000 (41.6) 10233 (36.6) NS NS NS 
USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE  9789 (43.4) 9920 (40.9) NS NS NS NS 
EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, IND  9769 (43.2) 9898 (40.7) NS NS NS NS 
USA, OOE, EET, CHN, IND  NS 9919 (40.9) 10170 (36.1) 10432 (32.0) NS NS 
USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE, BRA  NS NS 10663 (39.6) 11129 (36.2) 11631 (33.3) 12172 (30.8) 
EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, IND, BRA  NS NS 10595 (39.2) 11046 (35.7) 11532 (32.7) NS 
EU15, OOE, EET, EEX, CHN, DAE  NS NS 10563 (38.9) 11011 (35.4) NS NS 
EU15, EEX, CHN, IND, DAE, BRA  NS NS NS 11469 (38.2)  11998 (35.1) NS 
USA, EU15, EET, CHN, BRA  NS NS NS 11380 (37.7)  11885 (34.6) NS 
EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, BRA, ROW  NS NS NS 11153 (36.3) 11703 (33.6) 12304 (31.4) 
USA, EU15, CHN, DAE, BRA  NS NS NS NS 12367 (37.0) NS 
EU15, OOE, EET, EEX, CHN, DAE, BRA NS NS NS NS 12365 (37.0)  13156 (35.1) 
USA, EU15, EEX, CHN, BRA  NS NS NS NS 12294 (36.6) 12966 (34.3) 
USA, JPN, OOE, CHN, DAE, BRA  NS NS NS NS NS 14304 (40.2) 
JPN, EU15, EEX, CHN, DAE, BRA  NS NS NS NS NS 14082 (39.2) 
USA, EU15, EET, CHN, DAE, BRA  NS NS NS NS NS 14048 (39.0) 
Total number of stable coalitions 195 199 225 245 272 261 
Indicator of success (average %) 21.3 21.0 20.6 20.6 21.1 22.3 
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Note: NS denotes not stable coalition. The numbers in bold show three best-performing stable coalitions in 
terms of NPV of global payoff (billion US$) 
The number in bracket denotes indicator of success (%): ((NPV of global payoff in a coalition  NPV of global 
payoff in All Singletons) / (NPV of global payoff in Grand Coalition  NPV of global payoff in All 
Singletons))*100 
Indicator of success (average %): ((Average NPV of global payoffs in all stable coalitions  NPV of global 
payoff in All Singletons) / (NPV of global payoff in Grand Coalition  NPV of global payoff in All 
Singletons))*100 
Table 4.4(b) presents the results of the asymmetry effect when the coalitional spillovers increase, 
keeping the extended spillovers constant (thereby making the wedge between both larger). The Table 
largely combines the insights from Tables 4.3 and 4.4(a): the level effect dominates the asymmetry 
effect, and thus, Table 4.4(b) looks very similar to Table 4.3. While the level effect does stabilise 
larger (although not necessarily more ambitious) coalitions, as it increases the gap between Grand 
Coalition and All Singletons, the indicator of success does not increase with increasing spillovers. 
Again, we can draw the conclusion that the asymmetry effect is of minor importance. The main 
explanation for the limited importance of the asymmetry effect is that for the stability of climate 
coalitions, internal stability (i.e. no coalition member wants to leave the coalition) is a much more 
important condition than external stability (i.e. no outsider wants to join the coalition): increasing 
coalitional spillovers can be associated with increasing the internal stability (to some extent at the 
expense of weakening external stability), as they increase the surplus generated by the coalition. 
Spillovers to outsiders have a more complicated impact, as they increase the incentives to free-ride 
(and thus increase external stability and reduce internal stability), but they also imply higher global 
abatement levels and thus increase payoffs for coalition members as well. Furthermore, if an outsider 
decides to join the coalition, its membership will increase the technology spillovers created by the 
enlarged coalition, again leading to higher benefits for the region itself and for other regions. 
Consequently, these effects mitigate each other and the result emerges that increasing spillovers to 
outsiders does increase abatement levels and payoffs but does not stabilise larger coalitions. 
4.5. Alternative specifications and sensitivity analysis 
In order to investigate the robustness of our results, we simulate various alternative specifications of 
technology spillovers by (i) varying the aggregation of technology, (ii) using different indicators for 
the state of technology, and (iii) changing the impact of spillovers on the MAC curve. In addition, as 
we believe that a crucial parameter in the model is the discount rate r , this is subjected to a sensitivity 
analysis. For ease of comparison, we use the base model with extended spillovers as the reference case. 
Table 4.5(a) presents the results of the alternative specifications and the sensitivity analysis on the 
discount rate; these results will be discussed in the next sections. 
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Table 4.5(a): Sensitivity analysis (using extended spillovers) 
Coalition Base case Best-shot Alternative state of technology 
Alternative effect on 
MAC Discount rate 1% Discount rate 3% 
   Energy intensity 
Carbon 
intensity 
Extend to 
right 
Change 
curvature   
USA, EET, EEX, CHN, IND 9886 
(44.3) 
9665 
(45.5) 
9914 
(44.6) 
11906 
(42.0) 
9501 
(44.9) 
NS 38774 
(44.0) 
3562 
(44.6) 
USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE 9789 
(43.4) 
9553 
(44.4) 
9785 
(43.4) 
11898 
(41.9) 
9400 
(43.9) 
8799 
(45.9) 
38414 
(43.2) 
3525 
(43.7) 
EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, IND 9769 
(43.2) 
9653 
(45.4) 
9781 
(43.4) 
11740 
(40.8) 
9374 
(43.6) 
8783 
(45.7) 
38355 
(43.0) 
3516 
(43.4) 
EU15, EET, CHN, IND, DAE 9675 
(42.3) 
9526 
(44.2) 
9657 
(42.2) 
NS 9277 
(42.7) 
8685 
(44.6) 
38005 
(42.2) 
3480 
(42.5) 
EU15, OOE, EET, CHN, IND 9671 
(42.3) 
9541 
(44.3) 
9680 
(42.4) 
11609 
(39.8) 
9301 
(42.9) 
8680 
(44.6) 
37879 
(41.9) 
3489 
(42.8) 
USA, EET, EEX, CHN, DAE, BRA 9650 
(42.1) 
9409 
(43.0) 
9645 
(42.1) 
11778 
(41.0) 
9209 
(42.0) 
8625 
(43.9) 
38056 
(42.3) 
3458 
(42.0) 
EU15, EET, CHN, IND, DAE, BRA NS NS NS 12035 
(42.9) 
NS NS NS NS 
EU15, EEX, CHN, IND, DAE NS NS NS 11982 
(42.5) 
NS NS NS NS 
USA, EET, CHN, DAE, ROW NS NS NS 11911 
(42.0) 
NS NS NS NS 
Total number of stable coalitions 195 200 194 201 188 184 194 190 
Indicator of success (average %) 21.3 21.1 21.1 21.0 21.0 21.6 21.5 21.2 
Note: NS denotes not stable coalition. The numbers in bold rank in top five in terms of NPV of global payoff (billion US$) 
The number in bracket denotes indicator of success (%): ((NPV of global payoff in a coalition  NPV of global payoff in All Singletons) / (NPV of global payoff in Grand 
Coalition  NPV of global payoff in All Singletons))*100 
Indicator of success (average %): ((Average NPV of global payoffs in all stable coalitions  NPV of global payoff in All Singletons) / (NPV of global payoff in Grand 
Coalition  NPV of global payoff in All Singletons))*100 
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4.5.1. Alternative aggregation of technology 
In the simulations above, the assumption is that knowledge (state of technology in our terminology) 
can be summed over regions to identify the size of the spillovers. According to Sandler (2006), 
however, Knowledge is the quintessential best-shot or better shot public good, where breakthroughs 
come from concentrating effort and building up research centers of excellence. Therefore, we can 
construct an alternative spillover formulation where we follow Sandlers definition and define 
spillovers through a best-shot aggregation of technology. The implication of the best-shot aggregation 
(Hirshleifer, 1983; Sandler, 2006) is that the technology spillovers depend on the maximum state of 
technology in a coalition, rather than the sum of technologies. In the field of GHG abatement 
technologies, the rationale for the best-shot aggregation is that the technologies that regions have to 
reduce emissions will have substantial (or even full) overlap with the technologies in other regions. 
Consequently, the region with the highest state of technology will not learn from others. In this section, 
we explore the effects of best-shot aggregation on the stability of coalitions under the internal and 
extended coalitional spillovers. To reflect a regions capability of adopting advanced technology, we 
modify the spillover specification in Eq. (4.4) such that the spillover depends on the difference 
between the highest state of technology and the regions own state of technology. Hence, the 
spillovers8 can be defined as follows: 
{ } { }
{ } { }
, , , ,
, , , ,
max( ) max( ) ;
max( ) max( ) .
ς ξ ξ
ς ξ ξ
∈ ∈
∈ ∈
⎧ = ⋅ − + ⋅ − ∀ ∈⎪
⎨
⎪ = ⋅ − + ⋅ − ∀ ∉
⎩
C global
it j t i t j t i tj K j N
NC global
it j t i t j t i tj K j N
SoT SoT SoT SoT i K
SoT SoT SoT SoT i K
 (4.5) 
The Best-shot column in Table 4.5 (a) shows the NPV of global payoffs for the best-performing 
stable coalitions with the best-shot technology aggregation (assuming extended coalitional spillovers). 
We can observe that the five best-performing stable coalitions remain the same but the indicators of 
success for these coalitions are slightly higher than in the base model, which can be explained by the 
fact that the level of spillovers is somewhat smaller than in our base case. The results suggest that the 
aggregation method does not change the qualitative outcomes of the analysis. 
                                                 
8 All spillover coefficients are unchanged, and in the best-shot aggregation, we rescale the SoTs such that the 
maximum SoT equals 1 in 2110. 
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4.5.2. Alternative indicators for state of technology 
In this section, we consider alternative indicators for state of technology, using energy intensity or 
carbon intensity instead of emission intensity. Energy intensity is calculated as energy use9 per unit of 
GDP, whereas carbon intensity is calculated as the amount of CO2 emitted per unit of energy. 
Emission intensity is used among others by Carraro and Siniscalco (1997), while Kemfert (2004) uses 
energy intensity. The fourth and fifth columns in Table 4.5(a) show the best-performing stable 
coalitions with these alternative indicators of state of technology. With the state of technology based 
on energy intensity, we obtain the same five best-performing stable coalitions as in the base case. This 
is because the regional trends of energy intensity are similar to the trends of the emissions-output ratio. 
In contrast, with the state of technology based on carbon intensity, most of the stable coalitions are the 
same but additionally other stable coalitions emerge. In our model, emission and energy intensities 
decrease over time, but this is not the case with carbon intensity. This shows that while emission 
intensity and energy intensity are more or less interchangeable as an indicator of the state of 
technology in addressing climate change, carbon intensity is a very different indicator, which leads to 
different stable coalitions. 
4.5.3. Alternative levels of spillovers on the MAC curve 
The effect of technology spillovers (and learning) on the shape of the marginal abatement cost (MAC) 
curve is hardly ever subjected to a thorough analysis, even though suspicion of the effect of technical 
change on marginal abatement costs was already put forward more than 20 years ago by Downing and 
White (1986). Recently, two papers emerged, Baker et al. (2008) and Bauman et al. (2008), which 
challenge the conventional assumption that technological change will pivot the MAC curve down. 
Bauman et al. (2008) take up the argumentation of Downing and White (1986) and show that in 
certain circumstances, technological change may even increase marginal abatement costs. Baker et al. 
(2008) review the literature and derive that different technology options will have a different impact 
on marginal abatement costs. Following Baker et al. (2008), we adopt two alternatives to our base 
model: (i) technology spillovers will extend the MAC curve to the right, and (ii) technology spillovers 
will affect the curvature of the MAC curve.  
In model terms, this implies that we separate the effects of the spillovers on the two parts of our 
MAC function (Eq. (4.3) in Section 4.2.3). In the base case, a spillover will reduce both parameters α 
and β. We approximate an extension of the curve to the right as a spillover effect that will only affect 
parameter α (to the same extent as in the base model), leaving parameter β unchanged. This implies 
that the initial slope of the MAC curve is unchanged, but the curvature is reduced. In the alternative 
                                                 
9 The trajectory of final energy is based on the EPPA model (Paltsev et al., 2005). 
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with a changed curvature, we assume that technology spillovers will reduce the initial slope of the 
MAC curve, but increase the curvature (where we assume the effect is smaller but not insignificant). 
In mathematical notation, we have: 
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where Π  denotes the product over time. 
The main results of these alternative specifications can be found in the sixth and seventh columns 
of Table 4.5(a). In the alternative specifications, the total spillover effect is somewhat smaller than that 
in the base model (as the effect on β is missing, and the effect on α is reversed, respectively), and as 
expected, the indicator of success for each coalition is generally larger and the payoff smaller than in 
the base model. In the first alternative, the ranking of the best-performing stable coalitions is 
unaffected. In the second alternative, the level of spillovers is substantially smaller (as can be seen 
from the lower payoffs for a given coalition), and consequently, the coalition (USA, EET, EEX, CHN, 
and IND) that ranks first in the base model is not stable, but there are not many other changes in the 
stability of coalitions. Thus, we conclude that while the impact of the shape of the MAC curve cannot 
be ignored, the qualitative conclusions still hold. 
4.5.4. Changing discount rate 
We change the base value of discount rate r  from 2% to 3% and 1%, respectively, reflecting a higher 
(lower) rate of time preference. As shown in the eighth and ninth columns of Table 4.5(a), increasing 
(decreasing) the value of r  will decrease (increase) the NPV of global payoffs as future benefits from 
abatement are valued lower (higher), but the set of best-performing stable coalitions and the indicator 
of success for these coalitions remain largely the same as the base case: the relative comparison 
between different coalitions, which is what matters for stability analysis, is not substantially affected 
by the discount rate. 
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4.5.5. Alternative transfer schemes 
The purpose of this section is to explore to what extent our finding of very limited asymmetry effects 
is influenced by the adopted type of transfer scheme, by comparing coalitional spillovers (i.e. no 
spillovers to outsiders) with full spillovers to outsiders (i.e. equal to spillovers to coalition members). 
Table 4.5(b) shows that the best performing stable coalitions vary with the type of transfer scheme 
(conform to the expectations and earlier results for a setting without spillovers reported in Nagashima 
et al., 2009). The results also show that the asymmetry effect does not matter for which coalition 
emerges as best-performing, given the transfer schemes. There is a tendency that less efficient transfer 
schemes imply a larger positive effect of spillovers to outsiders, but this is because less efficient 
transfer schemes imply smaller and less ambitious stable coalitions, and thus a larger number of 
outsiders. Thus, we can conclude that the conclusion on the limited asymmetry effect is not directly 
related to the choice of transfer scheme.  
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Table 4.5(b): Sensitivity analysis (using extended spillovers) 
 Coalitional spillovers ( NCξ =0) Full extended spillovers ( NCξ = Cξ ) 
 Best performing coalition NPV of global 
payoff (billion $) 
Indicator 
of success 
(%) 
Best performing coalition NPV of global 
payoff (billion $) 
Indicator 
of success 
(%) 
Base case (optimal transfers) [USA, EET, EEX, CHN, IND] 9882 44.3 [USA, EET, EEX, CHN, IND] 9906 44.5 
Emission permits [EU15, CHN] 7578 22.8 [EU15, CHN] 7611 23.1 
No transfers [JPN, EU15] 5404 2.5 [JPN, EU15] 5513 3.5 
Note: Indicator of success (%): ((NPV of global payoff in a coalition  NPV of global payoff in All Singletons) / (NPV of global payoff in Grand Coalition  NPV of global 
payoff in All Singletons))*100 
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4.6. Discussions and conclusions 
In this paper we explore the effects of technology spillovers among heterogeneous regions on the 
stability of possible climate coalitions with optimal transfer scheme. We identify technology spillovers 
through three major channels, and investigate how technology spillovers can influence the regions 
incentive structure to join the coalition. It should be noted that we leave the issues of a separate 
technology agreement and endogenous learning effects for further analysis; thus, the spillovers we 
investigate are exogenous. For future research, it will also be worthwhile to examine endogenous 
feedback effects from abatement on the state of technology and those impacts on the stability of 
climate coalitions.  
Our main finding is that while global and coalitional spillovers can generate higher payoffs and 
boost global abatement levels, technology spillovers do not substantially increase the success of 
international climate agreements. 
By and large, technology spillovers exclusive to coalitional members do increase their incentive to 
stay in the coalition and their efforts to reduce emissions, which leads to increased stability. However, 
as the gap between full cooperation (the Grand Coalition) and no cooperation (All Singletons) also 
increases with the size of coalitional spillovers, the relative success of a coalition, measured in terms 
of the percentage of the gap between Grand Coalition and All Singletons that is closed by the coalition, 
mostly decreases with the level of coalitional spillovers. 
Furthermore, spillovers to outsiders have a mixed influence on the incentives to free-ride, and thus 
the set of stable coalitions remains largely unchanged. This also leads to the surprising finding that the 
ratio (asymmetry) between spillovers to coalition members and to outsiders is hardly important for the 
stability of coalitions. Thus, the analysis in this paper shows that spillovers between coalition members 
may be much less effective in overcoming the strong free-rider incentives that prevail in the 
international climate negotiations than is commonly assumed. 
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Appendix 4A 
Table 4A-1: Main model parameter values 
Symbol Description Value Unit Source 
M  Pre-industrial level of CO2 stock 590 GtC Nordhaus (1994) 
δ  Natural annual removal rate of CO2 stock 0.00866 - Nordhaus (1994) 
ω  Airborne fraction of emissions remaining in the atmosphere 0.64 - Nordhaus (1994) 
r  Discount rate 0.02 - Assumption 
iθ  Share of region i  in global benefits 
see Table 4A-2,  
column 3 
Own calculation based on 
Fankhauser (1995)  
iα  Abatement cost parameter of region i
see Table 4A-2, 
column 4 
Own calculation based on 
Ellerman and Decaux (1998)
iβ  Abatement cost parameter of region i
see Table 4A-2,  
column 5 
Own calculation based on 
Ellerman and Decaux (1998)
Dγ  
Scale parameter of damage and 
benefit function 0.027 - Tol (1997) 
Table 4A-2: Regional parameters in the benefit and abatement cost function 
Regions Emission in 2010 
Share of global 
benefits  
Parameter of 
abatement cost 
Parameter of 
abatement cost 
 GtC (share)    
USA 1.763 (0.238) 0.226 0.0005 0.0398 
JPN 0.344 (0.046) 0.173 0.0155 1.8160 
EU15 0.943 (0.127) 0.236 0.0024 0.1503 
OOE 0.360 (0.049) 0.035 0.0083 0 
EET 0.226 (0.030) 0.013 0.0079 0.0486 
FSU 0.774 (0.104) 0.068 0.0023 0.0042 
EEX 0.469 (0.063) 0.030 0.0032 0.3029 
CHN 1.127 (0.152) 0.062 0.00007 0.0239 
IND 0.344 (0.046) 0.050 0.0015 0.0787 
DAE 0.316 (0.043) 0.025 0.0047 0.3774 
BRA 0.122 (0.016) 0.015 0.5612 8.4974 
ROW 0.637 (0.086) 0.068 0.0021 0.0805 
World 7.425 ( )1=∑  ( )θ 1i =∑      
iα iβiθ
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Figure 4A-1: Regional BAU emission paths 
Source: Own calculations based on projections from the MIT-EPPA model (Paltsev et al., 
2005).
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Chapter 5  
International climate agreements with induced 
technological change*  
Technological change plays a crucial role in controlling climate change. Over the past two decades, a 
number of theoretical and empirical studies have been devoted to understand the drivers of 
technological change. This paper examines the impact of R&D investments on the stability of climate 
coalitions with an optimal transfer scheme and it explores how international cooperation on abatement 
affects the incentives of signatories to invest in R&D to reduce emissions. With an applied model we 
investigate the role of three different specifications of technological change for regions incentives to 
join an international climate agreement. Specifically we compare the effects of (i) no technological 
change, (ii) exogenous technological change, and (iii) induced technological change (ITC). In the 
latter case, the stock of knowledge for reducing emissions develops through regional R&D 
investments.  
We find that the set of best performing stable climate coalitions hardly changes between the 
scenario of no technological change and exogenous technological change, but we find a different set of 
stable coalitions for induced technological change. Coalitions that are stable in all three scenarios can 
achieve the highest payoffs in the case of induced technological change.  
 
                                                 
* This chapter is based on the article: Miyuki Nagashima and Hans-Peter Weikard (2009), International climate 
agreements with induced technological change, presented at the International NCCR Climate, January, 21-23, 
2009, Bern, Switzerland. The authors would like to acknowledge valuable instructions and suggestions from Rob 
Dellink. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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5.1. Introduction 
Following the definition of technological change (TC) developed in neoclassical economics, a 
previous chapter (Chapter 3) has examined the stability of international climate agreements (ICAs) in 
the presence of exogenous technological change (ExTC). In our specification, ExTC lowers abatement 
costs of CO2 at a constant rate over time. Over the past two decades, a number of theoretical and 
empirical studies have been devoted to understand the drivers of TC (e.g. Binswanger and Ruttan, 
1978; Romer, 1990; Griliches, 1992; Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Coe and Helpman, 1995). This 
work has led to new types of models where TC is price or policy induced and determined 
endogenously.1 In this Chapter, we introduce induced TC (ITC) into the analysis of the stability of 
international climate agreements. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, studies by Weyant and Olavson (1999), Löschel (2002) and Clarke et al. 
(2008) provide an overview of the different sources of TC and illustrations of how these are 
implemented in different energy and economic models of responses to climate change. Three main 
sources of TC can be defined: (i) R&D investment (Goulder and Mathai, 2000; Buonanno et al., 
2003), (ii) R&D spillovers (Griliches, 1992; Bosetti et al., 2008), and (iii) learning by doing (Manne 
and Richels, 2004; Castelnuovo et al., 2005). It has been widely acknowledged that different sources 
of TC have different economic and environmental impacts. We provide a brief overview of the state of 
the art of the studies on induced technological change (ITC) to understand how ITC is specified and 
implemented in economic models of climate change. Most of the work on TC focuses on the rate of 
TC while ITC models aim to explain not only the rate but also the direction of TC (Ruttan, 2001; 
Acemoglu, 2002; Otto et al., 2007). Goulder and Mathai (2000) explore the effects of ITC and clarify 
the implications of different types of ITC and the associated impacts on economy and environment by 
considering both cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit criteria. Their analysis of the impact of knowledge 
accumulation through R&D investment reveals that abatement tends to be shifted to later stages due to 
the availability of more advanced technologies derived from a larger accumulated stock of knowledge 
in the future. 
Nordhaus (2002) incorporates ITC into his DICE-99 model: the R&DICE model. The original 
DICE-99 model is a global model that assumes exogenous Hicks-neutral technological change in the 
production function. A reduction in carbon intensity (carbon emissions per unit of output) is achieved 
by substitution of capital and labour inputs for carbon energy. On the other hand, the R&DICE model 
assumes that an improvement in carbon intensity is driven by technological change via R&D inputs 
into the energy sector, and this carbon-energy-saving technological change is finally embedded in 
                                                 
1 According to Jaffe et al. (2001) the analysis of endogenous TC focuses on the rate of TC, while the analysis 
of induced TC focuses on the direction of TC through strategic R&D investments. 
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the emission function. In the R&DICE model a price increase for carbon based energy will induce 
firms to invest in the development of low carbon processes and products which will lead to lower 
emissions. Nordhaus concludes that the substitution effect as present in the DICE-99 model is likely to 
be larger than the effect of ITC on CO2 abatements, mainly due to the small social returns to R&D. 
Few studies have investigated the role of ITC in the formation of international climate agreements. 
Buonanno et al. (2003) use an endogenous environmental technical change model, called  ETC RICE 
model, with six regions to study the case of a Kyoto agreement without or with emission permit 
trading among Annex I or worldwide where regions play a non-cooperative Nash game. TC is 
specified in three ways: (i) endogenous technological change and exogenous environmental 
technological change (the stock of knowledge is a production factor), (ii) endogenous technological 
change and policy-induced environmental technological change (R&D affects both productivity and 
the emission-output ratio), and (iii) technological spillovers. In their model, a stock of knowledge is 
accumulated over time through R&D investment and it is embodied in a production function and the 
emission-output ratio. Endogenous technological change is driven by regional spillovers within sectors 
and increasing returns to scale from human capital. On the other hand, endogenous TC appears 
through improvements of the emission-output ratio via R&D investments. Buonanno et al. (2003) 
conclude that abatement costs are lower in the presence of endogenous TC with induced 
environmental TC than in the presence of only endogenous TC. The incentives to invest in R&D 
depend on regional marginal costs and the option of emission trading. The region with lowest marginal 
abatement costs has a strong incentive to carry out R&D to maximise social welfare by selling 
emission permits. The presence of spillovers leads to an increase of incentives to free-ride, thus the 
overall R&D efforts are reduced. 
In the context of linkage of climate control with increased R&D expenditures, Kemfert (2004) 
examines incentives for cooperation and stability of all possible coalitions by using a world integrated 
assessment model (WIAGEM) with four regions. ITC is defined in a way that an increase in R&D 
investments leads to an increase in energy productivity. Kemfert concludes that incentives to join a 
coalition tend to be stronger if cooperation includes both climate control and technological innovation 
because the benefits resulting from technological improvement outweigh free-rider incentives. 
Tol et al. (2000) examine the role of the issue linkage with restricted technology diffusion for 
stabilising a larger climate coalition in which abatement-specific technologies are developed through 
learning-by-doing or R&D investments in a similar framework as Goulder and Mathai (2000). Tol et 
al. (2000) conclude that the threat of restricting technology diffusion may prevent the coalition 
member from deviating, although the coalition may lose by restricting technology diffusion. The 
effectiveness of the restriction increases with the size of the coalition. 
Previous chapters examine the stability of international climate agreements in the presence of 
technological change and spillovers. In these modelling approaches drivers of TC and spillovers are 
exogenous. Abatement costs fall over time either through an autonomous improvement or through 
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knowledge spillovers from other regions. This chapter extends this analysis by relaxing the assumption 
of exogenous technological change. In our model, R&D investments improve a stock of knowledge 
that lowers abatement costs. In this respect we follow the analytical framework developed by Goulder 
and Mathai (2000). But we combine an ITC model with a game of coalition formation. 
The main aim of this chapter is to examine how R&D influences the success of an international 
agreement on greenhouse gas abatement and how international cooperation on abatement may trigger 
the incentives for signatories to invest in R&D to reduce emissions. To study the effects of region-
specific investment on technological change, we investigate three scenarios: (i) no technological 
change, (ii) exogenous technological change, and (iii) induced technological change. We do not 
consider technology spillovers. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 provides the theoretical 
framework for incorporating ITC into a game of coalition formation. Section 5.3 explains the 
empirical features of our model. Section 5.4 presents the main results. Section 5.5 reports the results of 
a sensitivity analysis. Finally, Section 5.6 offers conclusions. 
5.2. Induced technological change and coalition formation 
As in previous chapters, we assume that only a single international climate agreement (ICA) can be 
formed and that each region is free to join. This type of coalition formation game is called a cartel 
formation game with open membership. The solution concept employed here is internal-external 
stability. Seminal papers in this domain are Hoel (1992), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Barrett 
(1994). We consider two stages; at the first stage the ICA forms. At the second stage R&D investment 
and abatement paths are chosen. We allow for transfers between signatories of a climate agreement. 
Let N denote a set of n regions with individual regions i N∈ . At the first stage, each region decides 
about its membership in the agreement. Regions announcing that they will not join the coalition 
remain singletons. Regions announcing that they will join become signatories of the agreement. A 
coalition K  is a set of k coalition members. We refer to a coalition structure as All Singletons if 
1≤k . The coalition with nk =  members is called Grand Coalition.  
We call a coalition K  stable if the coalition satisfies both internal and external stability. Internal 
stability of a coalition means that no signatory has an incentive to withdraw from the coalition, and 
external stability denotes that none of the singletons has an incentive to join the coalition, while others 
do not change their membership (single deviation). We denote region i s payoff under coalition K  by 
( )iV K . 
The stability concepts are defined as follows: 
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Internal stability: Coalition K  is internally stable if and only if 
{})\()( iKVKV ii ≥   Ki∈∀ .    (5.1) 
External stability: Coalition K  is externally stable if and only if 
 { })()( jKVKV jj ∪≥   Kj∉∀ .    (5.2) 
At the second stage of the game, each region determines the optimal strategies for R&D investments 
and abatements. We now identify these strategic choices for each region in the All Singletons case and 
for the case with a given coalition.  
Let , 1( ,..., )i t tB q q  be a regional benefit function at time t . It is a function of past and current global 
abatements ),...,( 1 tqq  with 0
B
q
∂
>
∂
 and 
2
2 0
B
q
∂
=
∂
. Let , , ,( , )i t i t i tC q H  be the regional abatement cost 
function, where ,i tq  is regional abatement at time t  and ,i tH  is the regional stock of knowledge at 
time t . The regional abatement cost function has the following properties widely used in the literature 
(e.g. Goulder and Mathai, 2000): 0C
q
∂
>
∂
, 
2
2 0
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q
∂
>
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, 0C
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∂
<
∂
, and 
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H q
∂
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. The implication here is 
that regional marginal costs increase with regional abatements (the first two properties), and that 
regional abatement costs and regional marginal abatement costs are both reduced through an increased 
stock of knowledge (the last two properties). The benefit and abatement cost functions are specified in 
detail in Section 5.3. 
The optimal paths of the emission abatements and R&D investments ,i tI  over the time horizon 
maximise the net present value (NPV) of payoff  iπ  for region i . The objective function is, 
,1 , ,1 , , 1 , , , ,
1
( ,..., ; ,..., ) (1 ) ( ,..., ) ( , )ti i i T i i T i t t i t i t i t i t
t
q q I I r B q q C q H I
∞
−
=
⎡ ⎤π = + ⋅ − −⎣ ⎦∑ ,   (5.3) 
where r  is the discount rate and T  is a planning horizon. The regional benefit iB  is the NPV of 
future benefits, which enables us to consider benefits from current abatement for an infinite time 
horizon.  
We apply the notion of Partial Agreement Nash Equilibrium (PANE) where we assume that 
signatories act jointly as a single player and singletons act individually (Chander and Tulkens, 1995, 
1997; Bloch, 1997). Under this notion, the singletons i K∉  determine their strategic choices by 
maximising their own payoffs taking the other regions strategies as given, while signatories i K∈  
choose their strategies by maximising the sum of the payoffs of the signatories taking the strategies of 
singletons as given. With our specification of benefit and cost functions, we obtain a unique interior 
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solution of abatements and investments. This justifies to write the payoff function as a function of the 
coalition structure, usually called a partition function ( )iV K . The partition function specifies payoffs 
for every coalition K N⊆  and the singleton players under K . 
The optimisation problem for singletons is 
,1 , ,1 ,,..., ; ,...,
( ) max π
i i T i i T
i i
q q I I
V K ≡         (5.4) 
 s.t.  , 1 , ,( )i t i t i tH H f I+ − = ,        (5.5) 
  given   ,1iH . 
Eq. (5.5) presents the advancement of the stock of knowledge for abatement technology with ( ) 0f ⋅ > , 
0f
I
∂
>
∂
, and 
2
2 0
f
I
∂
<
∂
 (cf. Goulder and Mathai, 2000). The stock of knowledge at time t  ( ,i tH ) is 
accumulated through the investment in R&D, which leads to increased abatements compared to the 
situation without any R&D investments. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that regional abatement 
costs are affected by regional R&D investment. The rate of change in the stock of knowledge may 
differ between regions as the investment path may differ.  
Given Eq. (5.3), the discrete-time current value Hamiltonian for singletons is defined as follows; 
1
, , 1 , , , , , 1 ,( ,..., ) ( , ) (1 ) ( )i t i t t i t i t i t i t i t i tB q q C q H I r f I
−
+⎡ ⎤= − − + + ⋅λ ⋅⎣ ⎦H    i K∀ ∉ , (5.6) 
where , 1i t+λ  is the costate variable that expresses a shadow value of the stock of knowledge at time 
1t + . The shadow value of the stock of knowledge is positive and decreasing over time, which implies 
that additional knowledge is always useful for the region and the effectiveness of a unit of investment 
is higher in an earlier period than in a later period. Without loss of generality, the stock of knowledge 
is normalised to be unity in the initial period. The abatement strategy space for each region is defined 
as 0,i,t i,tq e⎡ ⎤∈⎣ ⎦ , where ,i te  denotes regional emission levels in the business-as-usual (BAU) scenario 
with no abatement. 
The Hamiltonian is assumed to be differentiable. Formally, we obtain the following set of first 
order conditions as follows (cf. e.g., Conrad and Clark, 1987): 
,
,
0i t
i tI
∂
=
∂
H
        (5.7) 
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, 1 , ,( )i t i t i tH H f I+ − = ,       (5.5) 
, 1 , , ,( ,..., ) ( , )i t t i t i t i tB q q C q H′ ′=  for Ki∉ .    (5.9) 
Next, we move to the optimisation problem for signatories as follows, 
, ,,
( ) max π
i t i t
i j
I q j K
V K
∈
≡ ∑   Ki∈∀               (5.10) 
s.t. , 1 , ,( )i t i t i tH H f I+ − =        (5.5) 
  given  ,1iH . 
The discrete-time current value Hamiltonian for signatories is, 
, , 1 , , , , , 1 ,( ,..., ) ( , ) ( )i t j t t j t j t j t j t i t i t
j K
B q q C q H I f I+
∈
⎡ ⎤= − − + λ ⋅⎣ ⎦∑H   Ki∈∀ .            (5.11) 
The set of first order conditions for signatories is, 
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, 1 , ,( )i t i t i tH H f I+ − = ,       (5.5) 
, 1 , , ,( ,..., ) ( , )j t t i t i t i t
j K
B q q C q H
∈
′ ′=∑ .                           (5.12) 
As formulated above, technological progress is endogenously determined; therefore, no autonomous 
technological change is considered. We consider a difference game where the paths of regional 
abatement and investment are mutually best responses to those of other regions. We solve the model 
from the last period of the time horizon, assuming that investments and abatement costs beyond the 
last period of time horizon go to zero for each region. Hence, the transversality condition for each 
region is, 
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and , 1 0i T +λ = . 
To analyse the role of TC on coalition formation, we investigate three scenarios. In the first scenario, 
we consider coalition formation in the absence of technological change (no TC), i.e. where there is no 
R&D investment which lowers marginal abatement costs. In the second scenario, to capture the effects 
of ITC on the stability of coalitions, we incorporate exogenous technological change (ExTC) which 
evolves at a given annual rate over time. Under ExTC coalition formation does not influence the path 
of stock of knowledge and investments. To make this exogenous approach comparable to the 
endogenous one, the annual rate of exogenous TC for each region is the average rate over the time 
horizon obtained in the case of ITC under All Singletons. In the third scenario, we consider ITC 
through R&D investments as formulated above.  
For each scenario, an optimal sharing rule (Carraro et al., 2006; McGinty, 2007; Weikard, 2009; 
Fuentes-Albero and Rubio, 2010) is applied. Optimal sharing compensates regions for their abatement 
efforts in order to set incentives to join the agreement. Under an optimal sharing rule each coalition 
member obtains at least its outside-option payoff  ( \{ })iV K i , i.e. the payoff the region receives when 
deviating from coalition K  (Weikard, 2009). The residual ( ) ( \{ })K i
i K
V K V K i
∈
−∑ , which is the 
difference between the coalitional payoff under coalition K  and the sum of all members outside 
option payoffs, can be distributed between coalition members in any way desired without an effect on 
internal stability. In our analysis, the residual is distributed proportional to the outside option payoffs. 
Therefore, the partition function ( )OiV K  with optimal sharing rule is defined as: 
  ( \{ })( ) ( )
( \{ })
O i
i K
j
j K
V K iV K V K
V K j
∈
≡ ⋅
∑
.               (5.14) 
Rearranging Eq. (5.14) indicates that under optimal sharing a coalition K  is internally stable if and 
only if  
   ( ) 1
( \ { })
K
i
i K
V K
V K i
∈
≥
∑
,                 (5.15) 
for all i K∈ and all K N⊆ . Hence, K is internally stable if the coalition payoff (weakly) exceeds the 
sum of the outside option payoffs, else K cannot be internally stable. Eq. (5.15) is a necessary 
condition for stability. It is sufficient for internal stability if transfers are arranged according to Eq. 
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(5.14). The optimised paths of R&D investments and abatements are not affected by the transfers, 
while the transfers are affected by the R&D investments and the abatements. 
5.3. Calibration of the model 
In this section, we explain the main lines of the numerical specification of our model that is based on 
STACO-2.1 (Nagashima et al. 2009) with an emphasis on modifications that we adopt for the purpose 
of our study. The main equations are described in Box 5.1. We consider twelve world regions: USA 
(USA), Japan (JPN), European Union-15 (EU15), other OECD countries (OOE), Eastern European 
countries (EET), former Soviet Union (FSU), energy exporting countries (EEX), China (CHN), India 
(IND), dynamic Asian economies (DAE), Brazil (BRA) and rest of the world (ROW). In line with 
earlier Chapters, we set the planning horizon of 100 years from 2011 ( t =1) to 2110, and derive 
payoffs for 100 years which depend on future benefits from abatements within 100 years. As results 
depend on future values of decision variables, we need additional assumptions on these values and 
therefore we assume that regions will adopt a path of abatement and R&D based on the assumption 
that the coalition will continue for another 200 years. This additional time is sufficient to avoid 
interactions of the terminal constraint on the payoffs for the first 100 years. 
It should be noted that our model does not aim at accurate forecasts for such long time-horizon, 
rather we want to avoid last-period effects within the first century caused by the finite time-horizon 
of the model. The payoff for region i , iπ , is a function of benefits iB , abatement costs iC  and 
investments iI  as described in Section 5.2. The first term on the right hand side of Eq. (5.16) denotes 
the NPV of the stream of payoffs over the planning horizon. The discount rate is assumed to be 2%. In 
Section 5.5, the base value of the discount rate is changed from 2% to 1% and 3%, respectively, for a 
sensitivity analysis. The second term indicates future impacts by abatements after the planning 
horizon. Each region determines an optimal path of the abatements and investments. We impose the 
assumption that the coalition established at the initial period lasts for 300 years.  Based on the DICE 
model developed by Nordhaus (1994), the stock of CO2 is calibrated, as shown in Eq. (5.17). The 
stock of CO2 depends on the stock in the previous period 1tM − , pre-industrial stock M , a natural 
annual removal rate of the stock δ , emissions in the BAU scenario ,i te , abatement ,i tq  and the 
airborne fraction of emissions remaining in the atmosphere ω . The benefit function follows the 
damage module of the DICE model (Nordhaus, 1994) and the climate module by Germain and Van 
Steenberghe (2003). In Eq. (5.18), ty  denotes global GDP in year t  as given in Nordhaus (1994), and 
1γ  and 2γ  are estimated by OLS-regression (Dellink et al., 2004). For the global damage parameter 
Dγ , we apply the estimate by Tol (1997) that damages amount to 2.7% of GDP for a doubling of 
concentrations over pre-industrial levels, that is, Dγ = 0.027. Eq. (5.19) shows the global benefits 
  102
expressed as avoided damages. In Eq. (5.20), global benefits are allocated according to the share iθ  
for each region, as displayed in the Appendix. These regional benefit shares are calibrated to regional 
damage estimates by Fankhauser (1995). As the time horizon is extended to 300 years, we modify the 
specification of the future damages in a way that the marginal global benefits grow with GDP until 
2110 (as assumed in the earlier chapters) and remain constant afterwards.  
We use the data from the EPPA model (Babiker et al., 2001; Paltsev et al., 2005) to calibrate the 
regional BAU emission paths in our model, adjusted to our regional aggregation using additional data 
from World Bank (2003). It should be noted that an estimation of the regional BAU emission paths is 
only available until 2110, but we extrapolate using the same formula, which leads to almost constant 
BAU emission paths after 2110. The regional abatement cost function (Eq. 5.21) is based on the basic 
formula with regional cost parameter α  and β  (as described in Appendix), estimated by Ellerman and 
Decaux (1998), where we additionally incorporate the impacts of the stock of knowledge as a 
reduction of abatement costs. Eq. (5.22) denotes the development of the regional stock of knowledge. 
Each region can obtain the fraction of γ  of its own investment2. The scale parameter  γ  is assumed to 
be constant over time and region.  
As for the first order condition, Eq. (5.7) and (5.8) can be described as follows: 
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As shown in Eq. (5.7) and (5.8), the incentive to carry out R&D investment depends on a costate 
variable (a shadow value of the stock of knowledge) in the next period , 1i t+λ  which depends on the 
shadow value of the stock of knowledge, the stock of knowledge itself and abatements in the period of 
t .  
For no TC we assume 0γ = , and each region does not carry out any investment, and, hence iH  is 
constant over time. For ExTC we assume that the stock of knowledge for each region grows at a 
constant rate and the rate is chosen such that the stock of knowledge in the last period ,i TH  is equal to 
,i TH  in the ITC-All Singletons case. Regional investment in ExTC is a function of ,i tH , an annual 
                                                 
2 This is similar to the assumptions by Goulder and Mathai (2000) and Tol et al. (2000) for their specifications of 
knowledge accumulation function. 
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growth rate of ,i tH , and γ  which is the same rate as in ITC. 
Box 5.1: Equations in STACO-2.1 
Payoffs 
 , 1 , , , , , 1
1 1
(1 ) ( ,..., ) ( , ) (1 ) ( ,..., )
T
t t
i i t t i t i t i t i t i t T
t t T
r B q q C q H I r B q q
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− −
= = +
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Stock of CO2 
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M M q q M M q q M e q− − −
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Damages 
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                                                                     (5.18)       
Benefits 
1 1 1 1( ,..., ) ( ( , )) ( ( , ,..., ))t t t t t- t t t - tB q q d M M d M M q q= −0                                                                    (5.19)       
1 1( ,..., ) θ ( ,..., )i,t t i t tB q q B q q= ⋅                                                                                                        (5.20)       
Abatement costs 
 
1 13 2
3 2
,
( ) i i,t i i,ti,t i,t
i t
α q β q
C q
H
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Stock of knowledge 
1
2
, 1 , ,i t i t i tH H I+ − = γ ⋅                                                                                                                        (5.22) 
5.4. Results 
This results section starts with an examination of All Singletons for each scenario. Then, Section 5.4.2 
examines stability of climate coalitions for each scenario mentioned above with optimal transfer 
schemes. 
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5.4.1. All Singletons 
Table 5.1 shows the results of the All Singletons case for each scenario, where marginal abatement 
costs equal marginal benefits for each region. The results obtained in All Singletons give good insights 
into the incentive structure of the different regions. As mentioned in Section 5.3, the results until 2110 
are presented while the model covers 300 years. It should be noted that due to our method of 
calibration, the results in the case of ExTC and ITC are approximately identical.  
Table 5.1: All Singletons 
Annual abatement 
 (% of BAU emissions) 
NPV of payoff 
(Billion US$ over 100 years) 
2110 Region 
2011 
no TC ExTC ITC 
noTC ExTC ITC 
USA 9.7  3.7  3.8 3.9 854 858 858 
JPN 2.5  1.6  1.6 1.6 724 730 731 
EU15 7.4  3.6  3.7 3.7 951 958  958 
OOE 5.5  1.8  1.8 1.8 144 146  146 
EET 4.3  1.9  1.9 1.9 55 55  55 
FSU 6.6  3.7  3.7 3.7 277 280  280 
EEX 1.8  1.1  1.1 1.1 126 127  127 
CHN 14.5  6.7  6.8 6.8 229 231  231 
IND 10.2  3.4  3.4 3.4 206 208  208 
DAE 1.9  1.1  1.1 1.1 105 106  106 
BRA 0.1  0.1  0.1 0.1 65 65  65 
ROW 6.2  2.9  2.9 2.9 280 282  282 
World 7.9 3.5 3.6 3.6 4,016 4,046 4,047 
Global stock of CO2 in 2110 = 1,458 GtC (no TC, ExTC, ITC) 
As shown in Table 5.1, the percentage of abatement differs across regions as the abatement level is 
determined by marginal benefits and marginal costs. Regions with flatter marginal abatement cost 
curves, such as USA, China and India, tend to have an incentive to make substantial abatement efforts 
even in the All Singletons case. Among these three regions, the USA can obtain the highest NPV of 
payoffs of almost 860 billion US$ (in the case of ExTC and ITC) due to its higher marginal benefits 
from global abatements. The EU15 with a moderately flat marginal abatement cost curves has also 
strong incentives to reduce emissions as they can obtain a higher share of marginal benefits. Regions 
with steeper marginal abatement cost curves and lower marginal benefits (energy exporting countries, 
Brazil, and dynamic Asian economies etc.) have hardly any incentive to reduce emissions on their 
own.  
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Next we focus on the optimal path of R&D investments which drives the development of the stock 
of knowledge in the case of ITC. Figure 5.1 presents the paths of R&D investment for the top three 
regions with respect to R&D effort when ITC is considered. 
 
Figure 5.1: Investment paths in the presence of ITC (billion US$) 
 in All Singletons for the top three regions 
As shown in Figure 5.1, the level of R&D investments (and technological change) differs 
significantly across regions and USA has a stronger incentive to carry out R&D investments than other 
regions even without any cooperation on abatement. In All Singletons, regions with strong incentives 
to reduce emissions have stronger incentives to carry out R&D, as investments at time t  depend on 
abatement and stock of knowledge in future periods. Regions with larger investments have a larger 
stock of knowledge; see Eq. (5.22). Overall, the effort for R&D investments is directed to regions 
where it pays to abate emissions. 
5.4.2. Stable coalitions 
In this section, we explore how coalition formation affects the outcomes for the different specifications 
of TC. We compute R&D investments, abatement and payoffs for all possible cartel coalitions 
( 122 12 4084− = ) and examine their stability with an algorithm programmed in MATLAB. Table 5.2 
shows the results for the best performing stable coalitions for each scenario with optimal transfers. We 
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use the same indicator of success3 as in Chapter 4, in order to compare the outcomes across scenarios. 
As shown in Table 5.2, the NPV of global payoffs slightly increases when ExTC is considered 
compared with those obtained in the case of no TC. Due to our calibration the assumed rates of TC are 
small and the resulting effects on payoffs are too small to substantially affect stability. The set of best 
performing stable coalitions and the associated indicator of success between the scenario of no TC and 
ExTC are very close to each other. When we consider ITC, four of the top five stable coalitions under 
noTC are no longer stable. Furthermore, the number of internally stable coalitions, and therefore the 
number of stable coalitions, decreases. 
Generally coalitions can achieve the highest NPV of payoffs in the case of ITC even though 
regions are paying for investments while in the ExTC scenario TC is assumed to come at no cost. Note 
that coalition members, as they take their coalition partners benefits into account, increase their 
abatement levels. This, in turn, triggers additional investments by signatories in R&D as compared to 
the All Singletons case. However, coalition formation does not affect abatement and R&D of non-
signatories in our specification with linear benefits and no knowledge spillovers. Table 5.3 shows the 
amount of R&D investments by the members of the best performing coalition (EU15, EET, CHN, 
IND, DAE) compared to All Singletons. The results show that all coalition members increase their 
investments substantially. As the investment levels depend on the shadow value of the stock of 
knowledge which in turn depends on abatement levels, regions with lower abatement costs have to 
make larger efforts to abate and invest more than other regions.  
R&D investments carried out by coalition members lead to lower regional abatement costs, and 
cooperation on abatement drives each coalition member to carry out more abatement compared with 
All Singletons. As a result of increased abatement in a coalition, not only coalition members but also 
singletons can obtain higher benefits in the case of ITC, which leads to a decrease (increase) in the 
number of internally (externally) stable coalitions. ITC thus makes a coalition more productive. 
However, the public good nature of abatement increases free-rider incentives and reduces stability. 
This finding is in line with Barretts (1994) results that large coalitions can form when little is at stake, 
but only small coalitions can form if a lot is at stake. 
                                                 
3 Indicator of success (%): ((NPV of global payoff in a coalition  NPV of global payoff in All Singletons) / 
(NPV of global payoff in Grand Coalition  NPV of global payoff in All Singletons))*100 
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Table 5.2: Stable coalitions with optimal transfer scheme (top five in terms of NPV of global payoff) 
Note: NS indicates that the coalition is not stable coalition. 
Indicator of success (%): ((NPV of global payoff in a coalition  NPV of global payoff in All Singletons) / (NPV of global payoff in Grand Coalition NPV of global 
payoff in All Singletons))*100 
  no TC ExTC ITC 
Signatories 
Rank Indicator 
of success 
(%) 
NPV of 
global 
payoff 
(billion $) 
Rank Indicator 
of success 
(%) 
NPV of 
global 
payoff 
(billion $) 
Rank Indicator 
of success 
(%) 
NPV of 
global 
payoff 
(billion $) 
USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE 1 45.9 7,652 1 46.0 7,697 NS* 46.2 7,967 
EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, IND 2 45.7 7,634 2 45.7 7,677 NS* 46.0 7,949 
EU15, OOE, EET, CHN, IND 3 44.8 7,562 3 44.8 7,605 NS* 45.1 7,879 
EU15, EET, CHN, IND, DAE 4 44.6 7,546 4 44.6 7,588 1 44.8 7,854 
USA, EET, EEX, CHN, DAE, BRA 5 43.6 7,466 5 43.6 7,510 NS* 43.8 7,767 
USA, OOE, EET, EEX, CHN 8 42.3 7,366 8 42.4 7,410 2 42.6 7,660 
EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, DAE, BRA 9 42.3 7,362 9 42.3 7,403 3 42.5 7,656 
USA, EEX, CHN, IND 11 42.0 7,339 11 42.0 7,383 4 42.4 7,643 
EU15, OOE, EEX, CHN, DAE 14 41.7 7,320 14 41.8 7,362 5 42.1 7,621 
Internally stable coalitions 627 628 581 
Externally stable coalitions 3584 3584 3628 
Stable coalitions 185 186 179 
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Table 5.3: Comparison of investments (in million US$) in All singletons (AS) and in a 
coalition between EU15, EET, CHN, IND and DAE 
 2011 2035 2060 2085 2110 
EU15              AS 
Coalition 
10 
40 
10 
60 
20 
70 
20 
80 
20 
80 
EET                AS 
Coalition 
0.0 
10 
0.0 
20 
0.0 
20 
0.0 
30 
0.0 
30 
CHN               AS 
Coalition 
4 
1190 
6 
1600 
8 
1910 
9 
2000 
9 
1900 
IND                 AS 
Coalition 
0.1 
70 
0.2 
90 
0.2 
120 
0.3 
130 
0.3 
120 
DAE               AS 
Coalition 
0.0 
20 
0.0 
30 
0.0 
30 
0.0 
40 
0.0 
40 
5.5. Sensitivity analysis  
Due to the unavailability or uncertainty of data for calibration of the main parameter values, we 
conduct a sensitivity analysis to explore the effects of alternative parameter values on the results for 
the case of ITC. We focus on two crucial parameters used in our model. First, we change the 
parameter for the productivity of R&D investment γ  by increasing (decreasing) its value in 
incremental steps, which examines the case of a higher (lower) effectiveness of R&D. Second, we 
change the base value of discount rate r  from 2% to 1% and 3%, respectively. As the NPV of global 
payoffs increases with γ  due to higher effectiveness of R&D investment, it makes more sense to 
compare the results of the indicator of success among scenarios with different values of γ  instead. 
Table 5.4 shows the ranks and the indicator of success for the best-performing stable coalitions in 
terms of NPV of global payoff under each scenario for different values of γ . As shown in Table 5.4, 
when the same stable coalitions appear across scenarios (e.g. a coalition of USA, EEX, CHN and 
IND), the indicator of success is quite robust with respect to changes of the value of γ . Only stability 
and the rank in the set of stable coalitions differ. It should be noted that only stable coalitions are 
ranked according to their indicator of success. The shift of ranks with increasing values of γ  is due to 
the following mechanisms. First, increasing productivity of R&D investments increases both coalition 
payoff and positive spillovers from abatement, as larger productivity of R&D means that more is at 
stake when regions consider membership. Second, as noted before, the larger the stakes, the larger the 
free-rider incentives. Finally, the top-ranked coalitions lose stability as γ  increases, and coalitions 
with a lower indicator of success become the new top-ranked coalitions. 
The last three rows of Table 5.4 show the number of internally stable coalitions, externally stable 
coalitions and stable coalitions, respectively. The results show that the number of internally 
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(externally) stable coalitions decreases (increases) with the value of γ , which implies that the free-
riding incentives increase with higher values of γ . 
Sensitivity analysis with respect to the discount rate shows that the NPV of global payoffs 
decreases with the value of the discount rate. The results for the indicator of success are compared 
across scenarios. Table 5.5 presents the rankings and the indicator of success for the five best-
performing stable coalitions under each scenario for different discount rates. As shown in Table 5.5, a 
higher discount rate leads to lower indicator of success. Furthermore, the number of stable coalitions 
increases with the discount rate. Here we observe a similar pattern as with changes in γ . As the 
discount rate falls (and more is at stake), the best-performing coalitions are no longer stable. It is 
interesting to observe that the indicator of success of the best-performing stable coalition is fairly 
robust (around 45%) among different scenarios. 
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Table 5.4: Sensitivity analysis with different values of the R&D productivity parameter γ  for the ITC model specification 
 γ 0=   
（No TC） 
5γ 5 10−= ⋅  4γ 10−=  
(Base case) 
4γ 1.5 10−= ⋅  4γ 2 10−= ⋅  
Signatories Rank 
Indicator of 
success 
(%) 
Rank 
Indicator of 
success 
(%) 
Rank 
Indicator of 
success 
(%) 
Rank 
Indicator of 
success 
(%) 
Rank 
Indicator of 
success 
(%) 
USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE 1 45.9 1 46.1 NS 46.2 NS 46.2 NS 46.1 
EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, IND 2 45.7 2 45.9 NS 46.0 NS 46.0 NS 45.9 
EU15, OOE, EET, CHN, IND 3 44.8 NS 45.0 NS 45.1 NS 45.2 NS 45.2 
EU15, EET, CHN, IND, DAE 4 44.6 3 44.8 1 44.8 1 44.8 NS 44.8 
USA, EET, EEX, CHN, DAE, BRA 5 43.6 4 43.7 NS 43.8 NS 43.8 NS 43.8 
USA, CHN, IND, DAE, BRA 7 42.4 5 42.6 NS 42.9 NS 43.1 NS 43.3 
USA, OOE, EET, EEX, CHN 8 42.3 6 42.5 2 42.6 2 42.6 NS 42.6 
EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, DAE, BRA 9 42.3 7 42.4 3 42.5 NS 42.5 NS 42.5 
USA, EEX, CHN, IND 11 42.0 10 42.2 4 42.4 3 42.5 1 42.6 
EU15, OOE, EEX, CHN, DAE 14 41.8 12 41.9 5 42.1 NS 42.2 NS 42.2 
USA, EET, EEX, CHN, DAE NS 42.0 NS 42.1 6 42.1 5 42.1 3 42.0  
USA, EET, CHN, IND, BRA 15 41.6 13 41.8 7 42.0 4 42.1 2 42.2  
USA, OOE, EET, CHN, DAE 19 41.2 18 41.3 10 41.4 7 41.4 5 41.4  
USA, CHN, IND, DAE NS 40.8 NS 41.0 13 41.2 8 41.4 4 41.5  
Internally stable coalitions 
Externally stable coalitions 
Stable coalitions 
627 
3584 
185 
612 
3597 
179 
581 
3628 
179 
552 
3657 
173 
527 
3674 
164 
Note: NS indicates not stable coalition. 
Indicator of success (%): ((NPV of global payoff in a coalition  NPV of global payoff in All Singletons) / (NPV of global payoff in Grand Coalition NPV of global 
payoff in All Singletons))*100 
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Table 5.5: Sensitivity analysis with different values of the discount rate  
for the ITC model specification 
  Discount rate 1%  
 
Discount rate 2% 
(Base case) 
Discount rate 3% 
Signatories Rank 
Indicator 
of success 
(%) 
Rank 
Indicator 
of success 
(%) 
Rank 
Indicator 
of success 
(%) 
USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE NS 50.9 NS 46.2 1 45.4 
EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, IND NS 50.6 NS 46.0 2 45.2 
EU15, EET, CHN, IND, DAE NS 49.4 1 44.8 3 44.1 
USA, EET, EEX, CHN, DAE, BRA NS 48.6 NS 43.8 4 42.8 
USA, CHN, IND, DAE, BRA NS 47.8 NS 42.9 5 41.9 
USA, OOE, EET, EEX, CHN NS 47.0 2 42.6 6 41.8 
EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, DAE, BRA NS 47.2 3 42.5 9 41.5
USA, EEX, CHN, IND NS 47.1 4 42.4 10 41.5 
EU15, OOE, EEX, CHN, DAE NS 46.8 5 42.1 15 41.1 
USA, EET, CHN, IND 1 44.4 NS 40.2 NS 39.7
EU15, EET, CHN, IND 2 43.3 NS 39.2 NS 38.6
USA, EET, EEX, CHN, BRA 3 42.2 31 38.0 NS 37.2
USA, EEX, CHN, DAE 4 41.7 NS 37.2 NS 36.2
EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, BRA 5 41.1 NS 37.0 NS 36.2
Internally stable coalitions 416 581 622 
Externally stable coalitions 3771 3628 3588 
Stable coalitions 135 179 181 
Note: NS indicates not stable coalition. Non-stable coalitions are not ranked. 
Indicator of success (%): ((NPV of global payoff in a coalition  NPV of global payoff in All Singletons) / (NPV 
of global payoff in Grand Coalition NPV of global payoff in All Singletons))*100 
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5.6. Conclusion and scope for future research 
In this chapter, we examine the stability of all possible climate coalitions in a cartel game with an 
optimal transfer scheme under different specifications for technological change. Three scenarios are 
investigated to explore the role of TC on regional incentive structures: (i) no TC, (ii) exogenous TC, 
and (iii) induced TC (ITC). ITC is endogenously determined: costly regional R&D investments 
improve the stock of knowledge which, in turn, lowers abatement costs. We investigate the impacts of 
ITC on the stability of an international climate agreement, using the STACO-2.1 model.  
The set of best performing stable coalitions and the associated indicator of success hardly change 
between the scenario of no TC and ExTC, but ITC does produce different set of stable coalitions. 
Coalitions that are stable in all three scenarios can achieve the highest NPV of payoffs in the case of 
ITC even though regions are paying for investments. Of course, on an optimal R&D investment path 
every investment made is worthwhile and will cover the cost. 
Furthermore, the number of internally (externally) stable coalitions decreases (increases) with ITC 
relative to the other two cases, and the number of stable coalitions decreases. Our results indicate that 
in the case of ITC, all coalition members increase their investments substantially when they cooperate. 
As the investment levels depend on the shadow value of the stock of knowledge which depends on 
abatement levels and level of stock of knowledge, regions with lower abatement costs have to 
contribute the most to reduce emissions and, in turn, increase their investments more than other 
regions. R&D investments carried out by coalition members lead to lower abatement costs in the 
coalition and cooperation on abatement drives each coalition member to carry out more abatement 
compared with the All Singletons case. As a result of increased global abatement, not only coalition 
members but also singletons obtain higher benefits in the case of ITC which leads to decrease 
(increase) in the number of internally (externally) stable coalitions. Therefore, ITC might improve 
global payoffs, however, at the same time it tends to increase free-rider incentives due to the public 
good nature of global warming. 
We find that the indicator of success is quite robust with respect to the productivity of R&D (i.e. 
the value of γ ). Furthermore, the number of internally (externally) stable coalitions decreases 
(increases) with the value of γ , as free-riding incentives increase. We find coalitional stability to be 
sensitive with respect to changes of the discount rate. The number of stable coalitions increases with 
the value of discount rate. In both cases, the dominating mechanism is that a higher productivity of 
R&D or a lower discount rate increase the payoffs of regions, and thus increase the gains from 
cooperation, but also increase free-rider incentives. The seminal result of Barrett (1994) that stable 
coalitions are smaller when the stakes are higher applies here. 
It is left to future research to investigate other sources of technological change, such as spillovers 
from R&D investments undertaken by other regions. Among the alternatives to the Kyoto Protocol on 
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emission abatement, technological development and cooperation have been considered in the literature 
as one of the instruments to control climate change. In reality, a range of technology policies and 
agreements have been established bilaterally and/or multilaterally in the global climate regime, such as 
the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate. It will be worthwhile to examine 
whether cooperation on abatement technology may improve the stability of climate coalitions in a 
framework of ITC. 
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Appendix 5A 
Table 5A-1: Main model parameter values 
Symbol Description Value Unit Source 
M  Pre-industrial level of CO2 stock 590 GtC Nordhaus (1994) 
δ  Natural annual removal rate of CO2 stock 0.00866 - Nordhaus (1994) 
ω  Airborne fraction of emissions remaining in the atmosphere 0.64 - Nordhaus (1994) 
r  Discount rate 0.02 - Assumption 
iθ  Share of region i  in global benefits 
see Table 5A-2,  
column 2 
Own calculation based on 
Fankhauser (1995)  
iα  Abatement cost parameter of region i  
see Table 5A-2, 
column 3 
Own calculation based on 
Ellerman and Decaux 
(1998) 
iβ  Abatement cost parameter of region i  
see Table 5A-2,  
column 4 
Own calculation based on 
Ellerman and Decaux 
(1998) 
γD  
Scale parameter of damage and benefit 
function 0.027 - Tol (1997) 
Table 5A-2: Regional parameter values 
Regions Share of global benefits  
Parameter of 
abatement cost 
Parameter of 
abatement cost 
    
USA 0.226 0.0005 0.0398 
JPN 0.173 0.0155 1.8160 
EU15 0.236 0.0024 0.1503 
OOE 0.035 0.0083 0 
EET 0.013 0.0079 0.0486 
FSU 0.068 0.0023 0.0042 
EEX 0.030 0.0032 0.3029 
CHN 0.062 0.00007 0.0239 
IND 0.050 0.0015 0.0787 
DAE 0.025 0.0047 0.3774 
BRA 0.015 0.5612 8.4974 
ROW 0.068 0.0021 0.0805 
World ( )θ 1i =∑      
iα iβiθ
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Chapter 6 
Discussion and conclusions 
6.1. Introduction 
Mitigating global warming is one of the crucial challenges we are facing. The IPCC (2007a) states that 
Warming of the climate system is unequivocal. A number of studies have examined the impacts of 
climate change on agriculture, economic activities, human health, and eco-systems, and have 
suggested that global cooperation plays a crucial role in achieving significant reduction in global GHG 
emissions. Achieving global cooperation is, however, a difficult task due to the fact that global 
warming is a phenomenon with public good characteristics.  This situation is reflected in the actual 
international negotiations on climate change where a global consensus is hard to establish. Therefore, 
international climate agreements should be self-enforcing as no authority exists to regulate free-riding. 
Voluntary participation by regions can be realised if signing the agreement is profitable to them; total 
benefits outweigh the total costs involved in signing the agreement. One of the key elements to attain 
the success of the agreement is to ensure the participation from major emitters such as the United 
States and developing countries with growing economies.  
The analysis in this thesis reveals that incentives to join the agreement are influenced not only by 
the type of mechanisms that may promote cooperation, but also by the design of these mechanisms. I 
examine the impacts of three types of mechanisms: (i) transfer schemes, (ii) technology spillovers and 
(iii) induced technological change. The aim of this thesis is to explore the impact of these different 
mechanisms and their designs on the success of an international climate agreement.  I consider a two-
stage, non-cooperative game on controlling climate change. For the numerical simulations, a dynamic 
version of the STAbility of COalitions model (STACO-2.1) is used. The basic framework of the 
STACO is as follows. At the first stage, regions decide whether to join a unique agreement or not 
(membership decision). Regions announcing that they will not join a coalition become a singleton, and 
those announcing that they will join become signatories of the agreement. In our model with twelve 
regions, we obtain 4084 ( 122 -12) different coalition structures. In the second stage, regions adopt their 
abatement strategies over the planning horizon. Non-signatories choose their abatement levels by 
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maximising their own payoffs, taking the other regions abatement levels as given. Signatories choose 
the abatement levels that maximise the sum of the payoffs of the signatories, taking the abatement 
levels of non-signatories as given and considering the benefits of other signatories. In the case of R&D 
investments, the general framework is extended in such a way that regions decide the optimal 
strategies for abatement and R&D investments in the agreement on abatement over the planning 
horizon. Furthermore, I assume that decisions for membership are taken at the beginning of the time 
horizon. The conclusions in this chapter are based on the results obtained by using our stylised model 
with specific setting. The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 provides the 
answers to the research questions presented in Chapter 1. Section 6.3 presents general conclusions and 
discussion. Finally, Section 6.4 suggests some lines of further research. 
6.2. Answers to the research questions 
This section presents in brief the answers to the research questions presented in Chapter 1. 
Q1 How can I implement the dynamic aspects of abatement efforts and incentives to join an 
international climate agreement into an applied game-theoretical analysis and which stable 
coalitions would occur if no transfer is considered? 
To derive optimal abatement paths over time, I constructed a model for the stability of coalitions, 
STACO-2.1, that is an update and dynamic extension of the STACO-1 model. The model enables us 
to identify the regional optimal abatement paths based on the future stream of benefits and costs of 
abatement. As each countrys abatement strategy depends on its abatement costs and benefits in each 
period, all countries can simultaneously decide the level and timing of the abatement.  
The case without an international climate agreement (i.e. the case of All Singletons) can serve as a 
reference point for the analysis of the various mechanisms in the following analysis. Once I have 
calculated the abatement levels and payoffs for all possible coalitions, I test the stability of each 
coalition. The outcomes obtained in All Singletons reflect the characteristics of the regions, that is the 
benefits from abatement as avoided damages and abatement costs over the time horizon. Annual 
global abatement increases over time, while the percentage of annual global abatement compared to 
BAU emissions tends to be decreasing over time. At the regional level, differences in marginal 
benefits and costs among regions drive different paths of abatements. 
The USA, a region with low marginal abatement costs and high benefits, reduces emissions 
substantially even in the All Singletons structure. On the other hand, regions with high marginal 
abatement costs and lower benefits, such as energy exporting countries, Brazil and dynamic Asian 
economies, have little incentive to reduce emissions. Although Japan can enjoy a large share of global 
benefits, it does not take much abatement efforts due to its relatively high marginal abatement costs. It 
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should be noted that for all regions, zero abatement is not an optimal strategy as they can benefit more 
from abatement than they can benefit by conducting zero abatement. 
In the Grand Coalition where all regions sign the agreement, the NPV of global payoff substantially 
increases compared to the All Singletons case. Some regions are, however, worse off by joining the 
coalition, such as China with the lowest abatement cost function due to the fact that China has to 
contribute much to reduce emissions. This feature reflects the difficulties to obtain full cooperation in 
the actual negotiations on climate change if no appropriate burden sharing mechanism is applied. 
The analysis shows that a unique stable coalition between Japan and EU15 emerges if no transfers 
are applied. Both regions reduce their emissions more than in the All Singletons structure. Both 
coalition members have an interest in cooperation, because of their higher marginal benefits from 
abatement, while none of the other regions want to join, as their abatement costs would increase too 
much if they have to take the benefits of Japan and EU15 into account. 
Q2 How does the design of transfer schemes affect the stability of an international climate 
agreement? 
To examine the roles of different types of transfer schemes, I investigate the impacts of a number of 
pragmatic and optimal transfer schemes on the stability of voluntary-based international climate 
agreements. The pragmatic transfer schemes are divided into two categories: allocation-based and 
outcome-based transfer schemes. I simulate the following cases: (i) allocation-based schemes where 
emission permits are distributed proportional to initial or future reference (BAU) emission levels to 
coalition members, (ii) outcome-based schemes where the coalition surplus is distributed proportional 
to the reference emissions, and (iii) an optimal sharing scheme where each signatory receives at least 
as much as what it could have obtained by deviating from the coalition. 
In the case of allocation-based schemes, no stable coalition emerges if the emission permits are 
distributed based on a single (historical) base year. The observation from this analysis is that 
historically large emitters get a disproportionately large share of the permits that they can sell while 
fast-growing regions, such as China and India, need to buy emission permits. This leads to the 
situation that historically large emitters are permit-sellers, while the developing countries are permit-
buyers. Results improve when the permits are distributed based on the full path of future emissions. 
Two stable coalitions between EU15 & China and between Japan & India are formed. China and India 
will obtain their increased payoffs due to the increased emission permits compared with those under 
the initial-emission-based permit trading, so that they can sell their permits to the respective coalition 
partner. The future-emissions-based permit trading will increase the incentives to join the coalition for 
the regions with growing emissions because the allocations of the permits are larger than in initial-
emission-based permit trading. Hence, future-emissions-based permit trading may be a key 
determinant in persuading developing countries to sign an international climate agreement. 
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Turning to outcome-based schemes where transfers are based on a division of the gains from 
cooperation, one of the main advantages of surplus sharing is that individual rationality is always 
satisfied as long as a coalition is at all profitable, i.e. countries cannot be worse off in a coalition with 
a transfer scheme than as a singleton. The only stable coalition formed by the USA and China emerges 
under both the initial-emissions-based and future-emissions-based surplus sharing. China with a higher 
growth rate of emission obtains a higher NPV of payoff under the future-emissions-based surplus 
sharing than the USA does. The global sum of incentives to change membership is less under the 
future-emissions-based surplus sharing. This implies that the coalition that emerges under future-
emissions-based surplus sharing will be possibly more stable than the coalition that emerges under 
initial-emissions-based surplus sharing due to the smaller incentives to change membership.  
The outcomes can be improved further when optimal surplus sharing is introduced. Under optimal 
surplus sharing, each region can secure its outside-option payoff. There is no incentive to leave a given 
coalition if the coalitional payoff exceeds the sum of the outside option payoffs. I obtain 182 non-
trivial larger stable coalitions which consist of up to six regions and a higher NPV of global payoffs 
than under any other transfer scheme. 
To sum up, I derive the following conclusions from the analysis of transfer schemes. First, the 
number and the identity of members of a stable coalition are influenced by the design of transfer 
schemes. The findings show that if the transfer scheme fails to be designed appropriately (e.g. permit 
trading based on initial emissions), outcome in terms of stability may be worse than in the case 
without transfers. Second, the Grand Coalition is not stable irrespective of the transfer scheme. The 
free-rider incentives are huge in the absence of transfers and too large to be overcome by any transfer 
scheme. Third, as seen in our analysis, the optimal surplus sharing scheme performs best in terms of 
stability, and economic and environmental outcomes compared to any pragmatic transfer schemes. 
Examining stability of climate coalitions with different transfer schemes gives significant insights into 
changes in regional incentives. 
Q3 How do different technology spillover mechanisms among regions influence the incentive 
structures to join and stabilise an international climate agreement? 
It is widely recognised that environment-related technological change plays an essential role in 
reducing emissions and saving abatement costs. A number of studies have proposed to link the 
agreements on emissions abatement to technological cooperation, where a region signs an agreement 
on emission controls and on technology cooperation or technology transfers with its partners. Among 
the main sources of technological change specified in the previous literature, I focus on the role of the 
spillovers to answer this research question. I systematically investigate how technological spillovers 
affect the formation and stability of climate coalitions to understand whether the effects of technology 
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spillovers are large enough to stabilise more ambitious coalitions by offsetting the incentive to free-
ride. 
Technology spillovers and their effects can be described in different ways. Most existing models 
measure the level of technology by using the emission-output ratio (emissions over GDP) and assume 
that the stock of knowledge (which is embedded in the production function and the emission-output 
indicator) can be aggregated over the regions. The spillovers will lower the abatement costs by 
pivoting the marginal costs down. Technology spillovers can be treated as a club good which is 
exclusive to the coalition members, and therefore, membership will be profitable to coalition members 
and help to stabilise coalitions. The level of technology spillovers differs from coalition to coalition, 
because the rate of spillovers depends on the partners state of technology. To explore the role of 
spillovers on stability, I investigated five scenarios: (i) no spillovers, (ii) internal spillovers, (iii) global 
spillovers, (iv) coalitional spillovers, and (v) extended spillovers (all possible technology spillovers). I 
use an indicator of success of international climate agreements based on the ratio of the differences of 
NPV of global payoffs between a coalition and All Singletons over the difference of global NPV 
between of Grand Coalition and All Singletons. 
Three major results are found. First, while global spillovers lead to higher NPV of global payoffs 
compared to no spillovers and internal spillovers for any given coalition structure, the incentive to 
change membership does not change significantly because relative differences between different 
coalitions hardly change, although global spillovers achieve the highest NPV of global payoffs in a 
given coalition. Second, in the case of coalitional spillovers, while the absolute value of NPV of global 
payoffs is higher, the indicator of success for any given coalition is lower than in the case of no, 
internal or global spillovers. This is due to the fact that coalitional spillovers perform best in the Grand 
Coalition, so that they increase the gap between Grand Coalition and All Singletons as compared to a 
setting without spillovers. Third, extended spillovers slightly enhance the indicator of success (due to 
the fact that spillovers to outsiders are not reflected in the Grand Coalition, therefore, the gap between 
NPV of global payoffs in Grand Coalition and in All Singletons is the same for coalitional spillovers 
and extended spillovers), however, they are not strong enough to change the set of stable coalitions in 
our settings. 
To explore the main driving forces which influence the success of an agreement, I focus on the 
impact of different magnitudes of spillovers (level effects) and of different relative rates of coalitional 
spillovers over spillovers to outsiders (asymmetry effects). The results of the analysis of level effects 
indicate that as the magnitude of spillovers increases, the best-performing stable coalitions change 
substantially. Furthermore, the indicator of success is decreasing with increasing spillovers for a given 
stable coalition, as the gap between Grand Coalition and All Singletons increases as compared to a 
setting without spillovers. It can be concluded that level effects will enlarge the stable coalition (up to 
seven members), but they may not increase the indicator of success. 
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I explore the asymmetry effects on stability and success by increasing spillovers to outsiders (or 
spillovers to coalition members) while keeping the same value of spillovers to coalition members (or 
spillovers to outsiders). Increasing the spillovers to coalition members does increase stability of 
coalitions as expected because they induce signatories to stay in the coalition. The indicator of 
success, however, decreases with coalitional spillovers. This is again because large coalitional 
spillovers increase the gap between Grand Coalition and All Singletons.  
On the other hand, increasing the spillovers to outsiders, while spillovers to coalition members 
remain the same, is not important for the stability of climate coalitions, due to the balance between the 
increase in external stability arising from increased incentives to free-ride and the increase in internal 
stability arising from increased incentives for signatories to stay in a coalition. Overall, the findings 
suggest that the spillovers may improve the stability of coalitions, however, they cannot fully 
overcome the strong incentives to free-ride in larger coalitions.  
Q4 How do R&D investments influence the success of an international agreement on abatement 
and how does international cooperation on abatement induce incentives to carry out R&D 
investments that are socially optimal? 
The role of innovation and technological change has received a lot of attention in the climate change 
debate. Over the past few decades, in depth discussions on the drivers of technological change have 
been provided in the context of climate change. In general, to reduce abatement costs, a region carries 
out R&D investment.  
To answer this research question, I examine three scenarios: (i) no technological change (noTC), 
(ii) exogenous technological change (ExTC), and (iii) induced technological change (ITC). In Chapter 
5, I extend the model which was used in Chapters 2-4 to determine the rate of technological change 
endogenously, and I apply optimal transfers. Through R&D investments, knowledge about abatement 
technology is accumulated over time and leads to a reduction in abatement costs. For simplicity, under 
ITC, the rate of development for the regional stock of knowledge is assumed to be constant over time 
and across regions. For noTC it is assumed that no region carries out any net investment in R&D, 
therefore, the stock of knowledge remains constant over time. For ExTC, I assume that the growth rate 
of the stock of knowledge is constant over time, and the rate is calibrated in such a way that the stock 
of knowledge in the last period is equal to the one of the last period in the All Singletons case with 
ITC. 
I find that optimal strategies for R&D investments significantly differ across regions in All 
Singletons, and regions with higher incentives to reduce emissions (regions with lower marginal costs) 
have relatively higher incentives to carry out R&D investments. Higher investments lead to higher 
levels of stock of knowledge which enables regions to abate at lower costs. When regions cooperate 
on abatement, the set of best performing stable coalitions in terms of NPV of payoffs change little 
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between two scenarios of noTC and ExTC. In the case of ITC, the number of stable coalitions 
decreases. Induced technological change influences incentives to join the coalition in the following 
way. When a coalition is formed, coalition members increase abatement levels relative to the All 
Singletons case. Increase in abatement triggers additional investments by coalition members, and 
especially regions with lower abatement costs make large efforts to abate and eventually to invest in 
R&D compared with other signatories. Increased investment and abatement levels by signatories bring 
larger benefits compared with the All Singletons case. As burdens for signatories increase and benefits 
for singletons increase due to the public good nature of climate control, the number of internally 
(externally) stable coalition decrease (increase). Therefore, cooperation on abatement in the case of 
ITC can achieve a high global payoff, but free-riding incentives also increase. 
6.3. General conclusions and discussion 
Our analysis of international climate agreements reveals that well-designed mechanisms can facilitate 
successful formation of partial coalitions, although global cooperation is still hard to be achieved. The 
reason lies in the public good nature of global warming and regional characteristics of benefits and 
costs. Following insights of transfer schemes obtained in previous studies, our systematic analysis 
supports the fact that an incentive to join the agreement is highly sensitive to the design of transfer 
scheme. For different designs of transfer schemes, there is a trade-off between feasibility and 
effectiveness. Allocation-based transfer schemes are easier to implement than an optimal transfer 
scheme which can achieve more successful coalition formation in the context of global payoffs and 
CO2 emissions. 
The role of technological change has received a lot of attentions to reduce a significant amount of 
emissions. Two types of sources of technological change are investigated in the thesis: (i) technology 
spillovers and (ii) R&D investment. In our setting, a major difference between two sources is whether 
cooperating regions have to pay for their own technology improvement. If technology spillovers are 
treated as private goods, a country with higher abatement technology can be an attractive partner for 
other countries to cooperate with, as cooperation on abatement will lead to reduction in abatement 
costs without paying for technology improvement. Within the context of assumptions used here, 
quantitative results suggest that the spillovers between cooperating regions may not be effective 
enough to overcome the free-riding incentives for non-cooperative countries, as large emission 
reduction by cooperating countries will bring large benefits also to non-cooperating countries. 
In the case of ITC, regional R&D investments improve the stock of knowledge which leads to low 
abatement costs. When cooperating with other regions, signatories can obtain higher payoffs than in 
All Singletons, which is driven by increased investment after cooperation on abatement. ITC plays a 
significant role in increasing global payoffs, however, it also increases free-rider incentives as non-
signatories also benefit from a large reduction made by signatories. As long as R&D investment 
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increases payoffs under cooperation on abatement and the gains from cooperation are large, the 
difference in the source of technological change will not provide any significant differences in terms 
of improvement in the success of  a climate agreement. 
The Kyoto Protocol has provided us with opportunities to search for successful international 
cooperation on climate change, although there are some issues to be improved. One of the issues lies 
in the poorly designed setting of stabilisation targets or of allocation for emissions permits for Annex I 
countries. The settings in which the permits are allocated based on emissions in 1990 levels benefit 
historically large emitters, so that a country with a higher energy efficiency in 1990 will be worse off 
than other countries. In addition, this historical emission-based setting may not be attractive for 
developing countries that expect high economic growth in the 21st century, as examined in Chapter 3. 
Therefore, ongoing discussion on regional stabilisation targets or allocation of emission permits 
should take into account that the estimation of the reduction potential by region be based on regional 
characteristics such as incentive structures, technology levels and structures of industries. It is 
apparent in the ongoing international negotiations on controlling climate change that achieving global 
consensus is a difficult task, as regions have different characteristics regarding benefits and costs of 
global warming. It will be plausible to have a partial cooperation which consists of regions which have 
significant potentials for controlling climate change cost-effectively, rather than full cooperation. 
Flexible measures which lead to a win-win cooperation for the countries involved will be necessary to 
achieve a successful partial cooperation. 
In case of technology spillovers, a provider of high technology does not necessarily have benefits 
from cooperation. The country with more advanced abatement technologies does not really obtain a 
strong up-grade of its technology from its partners, but the partners may provide potentials to abate 
emissions at lower costs.  
6.4. Scope for future research 
Finally, I present some topics for future research in the domains of  (i) the applied modelling, (ii) 
technological change, and (iii) international agreements. First of all, in our climate module, we assume 
that damage is a linear function of past and current global abatement levels. This assumption is 
supported by the econometric findings by Dellink et al. (2008a). The linearity of the damage function 
guarantees dominant abatement strategies for regions. To relax the assumption of the dominant 
strategies for estimating the degree of carbon leakage among regions, it will be worthwhile to apply 
the state of the art of carbon cycle and climate system descriptions, which imply a different 
relationship between carbon cycle and CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere. Moreover, further 
examination on regional damage from global warming is needed as the success of a international 
climate agreement is sensitive to the regional shares of global damages.  
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Second, regarding drivers of technological change, a possible extension is to examine the impacts 
of learning-by-doing on the stability of coalitions where abatement costs are a function of the 
abatement levels, and marginal abatement costs are decreasing through accumulated experience of 
abatement. Different implication in the context of abatement strategies over time will be obtained 
relative to the case of R&D investments. 
The final extension involves the international framework for controlling climate change. As one of 
the alternatives to the Kyoto Protocol with cooperation on emission abatement, an agreement on 
technological cooperation may emerge. The development and diffusion of cleaner technologies is now 
on the negotiation agenda for a post-2012 climate regime. Parallel to the negotiation on emission 
abatement under the Kyoto Protocol, technology-oriented agreements have been established bilaterally 
and/or multilaterally outside the UN framework, such as the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean 
Development and Climate (APP). Although the APP does not provide a cap on total emissions, it has 
been active in reducing emissions through an improvement of energy efficiency, involving 
participation from major emitters, such as USA, China and India. A technology-oriented agreement on 
a voluntary basis can be an effective framework in the sense that it induces participation from 
developing countries under the cooperation with developed countries, and it considers industries 
which are exposed to international competition by cooperating across countries. 
It is left to future research to investigate the impacts of technology cooperation where signatories 
work together to invest in R&D for improvement in energy efficiency which contributes to reduction 
in CO2 emissions. It will be worthwhile to examine whether this type of agreements on technology 
cooperation increases incentives to join the agreement and contributes to the stability of climate 
coalitions. 
The reader should be aware that a central assumption in the game-theoretical analysis applied in 
this thesis is that regions act on the basis of self-interest. An interesting research question is how 
elements of altruistic behaviour would affect the outcomes. 
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Summary 
Global warming is one of the crucial challenges that the world is facing now. The allocation of 
reduction efforts among regions has long been negotiated and it will not be an easy task to achieve a 
full cooperation with stringent targets. 
The thesis examines the formation of international climate agreements (ICAs) in a game-theoretic 
framework. I analyse strategic behaviour of a number of regions to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions. Game-theoretic approaches have been widely used to examine an interaction between 
countries in the negotiations on climate change, and have emphasised difficulties in designing such a 
voluntary agreement. This thesis provides a systematic approach to examine the impacts of designs of 
the ICAs on the success of ICAs. 
In Chapter 2, I present the basic structure of the STACO-2.1 model, composed of a game-theoretic 
framework and applied features, with specifications and calibrations of the functions used in the 
model. I analyse the results for (i) the All Singletons coalition structure, (ii) the Grand coalition 
structure, and (iii) all stable coalition structures. This case can serve as a suitable reference point for 
the analysis of the various mechanisms in the following chapters. The results show that a coalition of 
EU15 and Japan is stable. Both regions have an interest in cooperation, because of their higher 
marginal benefits from abatement. The results suggest that regions with relatively lower marginal 
abatement costs and lower marginal benefits would be worse off when they cooperate as they bear the 
largest burden of abatement but obtain the least benefits. This suggests that transfer schemes can be 
effective to stabilise larger coalitions. 
In Chapter 3, I analyse the impact of pragmatic and optimal transfer schemes on the incentives for 
regions to join international climate agreements. With an applied model that comprises twelve world 
regions I investigate: (i) a benchmark without transfers, (ii) scenarios with allocation-based rules 
where coalition members receive tradable emission permits proportional to initial or future emissions, 
(iii) scenarios with outcome-based rules where the coalition surplus is distributed proportional to the 
emissions, and (iv) a scenario based on an optimal sharing rule where the coalition surplus is 
distributed proportional to outside option payoffs.  
I find that when the transfer scheme is poorly designed in the sense that it increases incentives to 
free-ride, the best performing stable coalition may be worse than in the case of no transfers. In our 
applied setting this occurs for the initial-emissions-based tradable permit system (grandfathering). 
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Improvements of the initial-emissions-based tradable permit system, such as a tradable permit system 
based on the full path of emissions or a surplus sharing scheme, do enhance stability of coalitions. For 
the optimal transfer scheme we find that larger coalitions, which include key players such as the 
United States and China, can be stable, but no transfer scheme is capable of stabilising the Grand 
Coalition. The results show that optimal transfers perform much better than more pragmatic transfer 
schemes. Such schemes, however, require detailed insight into the incentive structures of the regions. 
Therefore, there is a trade-off between more pragmatic schemes that may be easier to implement but 
are hardly effective and optimal transfers which may be hard to achieve in actual negotiations. 
In Chapter 4, I explore how different technology spillover mechanisms among regions can 
influence the incentives to join and stabilise an international agreement. Several theories on the impact 
of technology spillovers are evaluated by simulating a range of alternative specifications: (i) no 
spillovers, (ii) internal spillovers, (iii) global spillovers, (iv) coalitional spillovers, and (v) extended 
spillovers (all possible technology spillovers). 
I find that spillovers are a good instrument to increase the abatement efforts of coalitions and 
reduce the associated costs. In our setting, however, they cannot overcome the strong free-rider 
incentives that are present in larger coalitions. Therefore, technology spillovers do not substantially 
increase the success of international environmental agreements. This conclusion is robust with respect 
to the specification of technology spillovers. 
In Chapter 5, I relax the assumption of exogenous technological change analysed in the previous 
chapters and explore the impacts of induced technological change (ITC) on the stability of an 
international climate agreement. To examine the impacts of different specifications of technological 
change in reducing abatement costs on regional incentives, three scenarios are investigated: (i) no 
technological change (noTC), (ii) exogenous technological change (ExTC), and (iii) induced 
technological change (ITC). Technological change is induced by the abatement targets. It reduces 
emissions through regional R&D investments, which lowers abatement costs over time. The results 
reveal that the set of best-performing stable coalitions and the associated indicator of success hardly 
change between the scenario of noTC and ExTC, but ITC does produce a different set of stable 
coalitions. Coalitions that are stable in all three scenarios can achieve the highest NPV of payoffs in 
the case of ITC. The results indicate that coalition members increase their investments and abatement 
substantially when they cooperate in the case of ITC. As a result of increased global abatement, not 
only coalition members but also singletons obtain high benefits, which leads to decrease (increase) in 
the number of internally (externally) stable coalitions. Therefore, ITC might improve global payoffs, 
however, at the same time it tends to increase free-rider incentives due to the public good nature of 
global warming. I find that the indicator of success is quite robust with respect to the productivity of 
R&D. Furthermore, the number of internally (externally) stable coalitions decreases (increases) with 
the value of the productivity of R&D, as free-riding incentives increase. I find that stability is sensitive 
with respect to changes of the discount rate. The number of stable coalitions increases with the value 
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of discount rate. In both cases, the dominating mechanism is that higher productivity of R&D or a 
lower discount rate increase the payoffs of regions, and thus increase the gains of cooperation, but also 
increase free-rider incentives. 
Overall, the main finding of this thesis is that well-designed mechanisms can facilitate successful 
formation of partial coalitions, although global cooperation is still hard to achieve. The reason lies in 
the public good nature of global warming and regional characteristics of benefits and costs. Following 
insights of the current literature on transfer schemes, our systematic analysis supports the fact that an 
incentive to join the agreement is highly sensitive to the design of transfers. For different designs of 
transfer schemes, there is a trade-off between feasibility and effectiveness. Allocation-based transfer 
schemes are easier to implement than an optimal transfer scheme which can achieve more successful 
coalition formation in the context of global payoffs and CO2 emissions. 
The role of technological change has received significant attentions to reduce a significant amount 
of emissions. Two types of sources of technological change are investigated in the thesis: (i) 
technology spillovers and (ii) R&D investment. If technology spillovers are treated as private goods, a 
country with higher abatement technology can be an attractive partner for other countries to cooperate 
with, as cooperation on abatement will lead to reduction in abatement costs without paying for 
technology improvement. Within the context of assumptions used here, quantitative results suggest 
that the spillovers between cooperating regions may not be effective enough to overcome the free-
riding incentives for non-cooperative countries, as large emission reduction by cooperating countries 
will bring large benefits also to non-cooperating countries. 
In the case of induced technological change, regional R&D investments improve the stock of 
knowledge which leads to low abatement costs. When cooperating with other regions, signatories can 
obtain higher payoffs than in All Singletons, which is driven by increased investment after cooperation 
on abatement. ITC plays a significant role in increasing global payoffs, however, it also increases free-
rider incentives as non-signatories also benefit from a large reduction made by signatories. As long as 
R&D investments increase payoffs under cooperation on abatement and the gains from cooperation 
are large, the difference in the source of technological change will not provide any significant 
differences in terms of improvement in the success of a climate agreement. 
The Kyoto Protocol was the first significant step that provided stimulus for search for successful 
international cooperation on climate change policies, although there are issues to be improved. Now, 
negotiation on the post Kyoto framework has been taking place with an aim of large cooperation on 
tackling climate change among countries. Flexible measures which lead to a win-win cooperation for 
the countries involved will continue to play a crucial role in achieving a successful cooperation and the 
search for well-designed mechanisms will be further pursued. 
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Samenvatting 
De opwarming van de aarde is een van de grootste uitdagingen waarmee de wereld op dit moment 
wordt geconfronteerd. Tussen de verschillende regios is lang onderhandeld over de verdeling van de 
inspanningen voor emissiereductie en het blijkt niet eenvoudig te zijn om volledige samenwerking met 
strikte reductiedoelstellingen te bereiken. 
Dit proefschrift analyseert de formatie van internationale klimaatverdragen in een speltheoretisch 
kader. Ik analyseer het strategisch gedrag van een aantal regios die gericht zijn op het reduceren van 
broeikasgasemissies. Speltheoretische modellen worden gebruikt om de interactie tussen landen die 
onderhandelen over klimaatverandering te analyseren. De modellen benadrukken dat het moeilijk is 
om tot een vrijwillige overeenkomst te komen. Dit proefschrift gebruikt een systematische methode 
om de invloed van het ontwerp van internationale klimaatverdragen op het succes van internationale 
klimaatverdragen te analyseren. 
In hoofdstuk 2 presenteer ik de basisstructuur van het model STACO-2.1 (STAbiliteit van 
COalities), dat bestaat uit een speltheoretische kader en toegepaste modules met specificaties van de in 
het model gebruikte functies. Ik analyseer de resultaten voor (i) de ieder-voor-zich coalitiestructuur 
(All Singletons coalition structure), (ii) de mondiale coalitiestructuur (Grand coalition), en (iii) alle 
stabiele coalitiestructuren. Deze analyse vormt de basis voor het verder onderzoeken van de 
verschillende mechanismen in de volgende hoofdstukken. De resultaten laten zien dat een coalitie van 
EU15 en Japan stabiel is. Beide regios hebben interesse in samenwerking omdat zij beide hoge 
marginale baten ontvangen van emissiereductie. De resultaten suggereren dat regios met relatief lage 
marginale emissiereductiekosten en lage marginale baten slechter af zijn wanneer zij samenwerken, 
omdat zij dan de grootste last dragen, maar de minste baten ontvangen. Een systeem van financiële 
herverdeling kan effectief zijn om grotere stabiele coalities te vormen. 
In hoofdstuk 3 analyseer ik de invloed van pragmatische en optimale systemen voor financiële 
herverdeling op het stimuleren van deelname van verschillende regios aan internationale 
klimaatverdragen. Ik analyseer met een toegepast model, dat bestaat uit twaalf wereld regios, de 
volgende onderdelen: (i) een benchmark zonder financiële herverdeling, (ii) scenarios waar 
coalitieleden verhandelbare emissierechten ontvangen die proportioneel gelijk zijn aan de emissies in 
een basisjaar of aan toekomstige emissies, (iii) scenarios waar het surplus van de coalitie (wat alle 
betrokken landen samen aan extra netto baten genereren) proportioneel verdeeld wordt in relatie tot de 
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hoeveelheid emissies en (iv) een scenario gebaseerd op een optimale verdeelregel, waar het surplus 
van de coalitie zodanig verdeeld wordt dat de motivatie om niet mee te werken wordt 
geminimaliseerd. 
De resultaten geven aan dat een gebrekkig ontworpen herverdelingsschema mogelijk slechter werkt 
dan een systeem zonder financiële herverdeling, omdat de prikkels om zwart te rijden (te free-riden) 
stijgen. In de toegepaste setting gebeurt dit wanneer de toedeling van verhandelbare emissierechten 
gebaseerd wordt op de emissies in een basisjaar (grandfathering). De stabiliteit van de coalitie wordt 
bevorderd door een betere allocatie van emissierechten, door bijvoorbeeld een systeem van 
verhandelbare emissierechten te baseren op het volledige toekomstige emissiepad of een 
verdeelschema gebaseerd op het surplus van de coalitie. Met het optimale systeem van financiële 
herverdeling vinden we grotere coalities die stabiel kunnen zijn, met belangrijke spelers zoals de 
Verenigde Staten en China. Echter er bestaat geen systeem van financiële herverdeling dat leidt tot een 
stabilisering van de Grote coalitie. De resultaten laten zien dat de optimale financiële herverdeling 
beter functioneert dan de meer pragmatische systemen van herverdeling. Deze systemen vereisen 
echter een meer gedetailleerde kennis van de economische prikkels voor de verschillende regios. 
Hierdoor ontstaat er een afweging tussen meer pragmatische systemen die makkelijker zijn te 
implementeren maar weinig effectief zijn of optimale financiële herverdeling, die echter moeilijker 
zijn te bewerkstellingen in de huidige onderhandelingen.  
In hoofdstuk 4 onderzoek ik hoe de verschillende mechanismen van technologische 
uitstralingseffecten (spillover) van verschillende regios invloed kunnen hebben op de stimulans om 
deel te nemen aan en het stabiliseren van een internationaal verdrag. Ik evalueer meerdere theorieën 
over de invloed van technologische uitstralingseffecten door het simuleren van de volgende reeks van 
alternatieve specificaties: (i) geen uitstralingseffecten, (ii) interne uitstralingseffecten (alleen binnen de 
eigen regio), (iii) mondiale uitstralingseffecten (naar de hele wereld), (iv) coalitionele 
uitstralingseffecten (alleen tussen samenwerkende landen), en (v) volledige uitstralingseffecten (alle 
hiervoor genoemde technologische uitstralingseffecten tezamen). 
De resultaten laten zien dat uitstralingseffecten een goed instrument zijn om de emissiereductie-
inspanning van coalities te verhogen en de gerelateerde kosten te reduceren. In onze setting kunnen 
uitstralingseffecten echter niet de sterk aanwezige prikkels om zwart te rijden, die aanwezig zijn bij 
grote coalities, voorkomen. Technologische uitstralingseffecten leiden dus niet automatisch tot een 
aanzienlijke toename van het succes van international milieuverdragen. Deze conclusie is robuust in 
relatie tot de specificaties van technologische uitstralingseffecten.  
In hoofdstuk 5 versoepel ik de aanname van exogene technologische verandering zoals 
geanalyseerd in de voorgaande hoofdstukken en onderzoek ik het effect van geïnduceerde 
technologische verandering (ITC) op de stabiliteit van een internationaal klimaatverdrag. Drie 
scenarios zijn onderzocht om het effect van verschillende specificaties van technologische 
verandering op het reduceren van emissiekosten op regionale initiatieven te bepalen. Deze scenarios 
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zijn: (i) geen technologische verandering (noTC), (ii) exogene technologische verandering (ExTC), en 
(iii) geïnduceerde technologische verandering (ITC). Technologische verandering reduceert emissies 
doordat regionale R&D investeringen leiden tot een verlaging van de emissiekosten in de toekomst. 
De resultaten laten zien dat de set van meest effectieve stabiele coalities en de gerelateerde indicator 
van succes bijna niet veranderen tussen de scenarios noTC en ExTC, echter scenario ITC produceert 
een andere set van stabiele coalities. De coalities die stabiel zijn in alle drie de scenarios, hebben de 
hoogste netto contante waarde van de opbrengsten in scenario ITC. Door de toename van mondiale 
emissiereductie zullen niet alleen de coalitieleden maar ook de buitenstaanders (singletons) hogere 
baten ontvangen, en dit leidt tot een afname (toename) van het aantal interne (externe) stabiele 
coalities. ITC kan leiden tot een toename van de mondiale opbrengsten, maar tegelijkertijd tot een 
toename van de prikkels om zwart te rijden vanwege het publieke goed karakter van 
klimaatverandering. De resultaten laten zien dat de indicator van succes robuust is ten aanzien van de 
productiviteit van R&D. Het aantal interne (externe) stabiele coalities daalt (stijgt) met de waarde van 
de productiviteit van R&D, wanneer de prikkels om zwart te rijden stijgen. Welke coalities stabiel zijn 
hangt af van de discontovoet. Een stijging van de discontovoet leidt tot een toename van het aantal 
stabiele coalities. Het dominerende mechanisme is dat een hogere productiviteit van R&D en/of een 
lagere discontovoet beide leiden tot een toename van de opbrengsten van de regios, waardoor de 
winst om samen te werken toeneemt, maar dit leidt ook tot een toename van het zwartrijdergedrag. 
De belangrijkste uitkomst van dit proefschrift is dat goed ontworpen mechanismen de succesvolle 
formatie van gedeeltelijke coalities kunnen faciliteren, alhoewel het ook dan moeilijk is om mondiale 
samenwerking tot stand te brengen. De redenen hiervoor zijn het publieke goed karakter van 
klimaatverandering en de kosten en baten die per regio verschillen. In navolging van de inzichten in de 
huidige literatuur over financiële herverdeling bevestigt onze systematische analyse dat een initiatief 
om deel te nemen aan een verdrag erg gevoelig is voor het ontwerp van het systeem van financiële 
herverdeling. Er is een afweging tussen haalbaarheid en effectiviteit voor verschillende ontwerpen van 
financiële herverdeling. Systemen van financiële herverdeling die gebaseerd zijn op allocatie zijn 
makkelijker te implementeren dan een optimaal systeem van financiële herverdeling. Hierdoor 
ontstaan er meer succesvolle coalities in de context van mondiale opbrengsten en CO2 emissies. 
De rol van technologische verandering heeft veel aandacht gekregen als middel om emissies te 
reduceren. Twee verschillende vormen van technologische verandering zijn onderzocht in dit 
proefschrift, namelijk (i) technologische uitstralingseffecten, en (ii) geïnduceerde technologische 
verandering. Wanneer technologische uitstralingseffecten worden gedefinieerd als een privaat goed, 
dan zal een land met een hoger niveau aan emissiereductie technologie een interessantere partner zijn 
voor andere landen om mee samen te werken. Voor deze landen zal samenwerking leiden tot een 
afname van de emissiereductiekosten zonder te betalen voor technologische verandering. Uitgaande 
van de veronderstellingen in het toegepaste model duiden de kwantitatieve resultaten erop dat 
uitstralingseffecten tussen samenwerkende regios mogelijk niet effectief genoeg zijn om prikkels van 
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zwart rijden voor niet-samenwerkende landen te voorkomen, omdat hoge emissiereducties van 
samenwerkende landen ook grote baten opleveren voor niet-samenwerkende landen. 
In het geval van geïnduceerde technologische verandering (ITC) leiden regionale R&D 
investeringen tot een verbetering van het kennisniveau wat leidt tot lagere emissiereductie kosten. 
Wanneer ondertekenaars van een verdrag samenwerken met andere regios kunnen zij hogere 
opbrengsten ontvangen dan in het geval van ieder-voor-zich (All Singletons), dit komt door een 
toename van investeringen als gevolg van samenwerking. ITC speelt een belangrijke rol in de toename 
van de mondiale opbrengsten, maar leidt ook tot een toename van de prikkels om zwart te rijden, 
omdat niet-ondertekenaars ook de baten ontvangen van de emissiereductie van de ondertekenaars. Als 
R&D investeringen leiden tot een toename van de opbrengsten van samenwerking en de baten van 
samenwerking groot zijn, dan heeft de herkomst van de technologische verandering geen invloed op 
de toename van het succes van een klimaatverdrag.  
Het Kyoto Protocol was een belangrijke eerste stap in de zoektocht naar succesvolle internationale 
samenwerking op het gebied van klimaatbeleid, hoewel er nog verbeteringen mogelijk zijn. Op dit 
moment vinden er onderhandelingen plaats over een post-Kyoto verdrag, met als doel om 
klimaatverandering in een nog bredere samenwerking tussen verschillende landen aan te pakken. 
Flexibele maatregelen blijven daarbij een cruciale rol spelen om succesvolle win-win samenwerking 
tussen landen te bewerkstellingen en de zoektocht naar goed ontworpen mechanismen zal voortduren. 
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